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Abstract
The precautionary principle is about making decisions in the presence of uncertainty 
and before there is ‘sufficient scientific evidence’. Paradoxically, implementation of 
the precautionary principle often depends upon existing scientific knowledge and 
‘evidence’. In order to investigate this puzzle I undertake two environmentally related 
case studies, one into radioactive waste disposal, the other into endocrine disrupting 
chemicals. These show how scientific evidence is defined and used in precautionary 
deliberations. Through these, I demonstrate that science does not provide an 
‘objective truth’ from which indisputable courses of policy action can be determined.
I argue that the precautionary principle fills the vacuum created by a science that 
promises certainty but which continually fails to deliver on that promise.
In practice, interpretations o f the precautionary principle depend on the ‘institutional’ 
contexts in which deliberations take place, and on the interests of the organisations 
involved. As I illustrate, the ‘career trajectories’ of ‘environmental problems’ are also 
relevant. This is important since different environmental ‘issues’ have different 
‘careers’ and hence present different opportunities for precaution.
Ultimately, this thesis highlights the need to go beyond science when attempting to 
understand and implement the precautionary principle in environmental policy. I 
argue that its implementation involves creating frameworks of deliberation that are 
more sympathetic to precautionary courses of action, and that moral, context specific 
issues are at stake. The challenge for policy is not just one of making decisions based 
on uncertainty, but of understanding tlwvery Tormation'frf environmental problems.
In reaching these conclusions, I hope to have made a useful contribution to 
environmental debate and to theoretical understandings of science and precaution i 
contemporary policy.
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What is the precautionary principle? How has it evolved? How can it be 
implemented? These are some of the very basic questions that gave rise to this thesis 
and subsequently to many more questions.
In 1995 the Centre for Science Studies at Lancaster University set up an Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC) CASE award in collaboration with Friends of 
the Earth and advertised a PhD studentship entitled ‘The evolution and application of 
the precautionary principle for sustainable development’. I applied and was offered 
the opportunity to undertake this research. A CASE award entails working with a 
collaborative organisation which has been involved in determining the thesis project 
and which is therefore interested in the research outcomes. For the student this 
includes additional remuneration on top of the basic ESRC award plus access to 
materials and resources at the organisation’s discretion. My collaboration with 
Friends o f the Earth has been very successful, with many of the staff at Friends o f the 
Earth giving freely of their time, experience, knowledge and materials. In return I 
hope I have produced something that will be of value to them in their future work.
I was attracted to this PhD project in the first instance partly because of its close 
association with Friends of the Earth and partly because of an intuitive belief in the 
precautionary principle. The precautionary principle is a principle that suggests that 
action should be taken to protect the environment before there is sufficient scientific 
evidence to prove a link between cause and effect.1 At the time of starting my 
research I was incredibly naive about what I would be able to achieve with regard to 
the precautionary principle. I expected to be able to create a list of implementation
rules with which to judge whether the precautionary principle had been adopted 
properly, and I naively assumed that this list could to applied to all environmental 
problem areas. Through my research I have come to realise that the precautionary 
principle is nothing in itself. It is not an absolute reference point but is, rather, a 
rhetoric and a vocabulary which is given meaning and is made on the ground each 
time it is invoked.
Friends of the Earth also had a wish list o f what I could produce for them. They 
wanted something tangible that would help them with their campaigning, and 
something ‘academic’ that would lend weight and authority to their interpretation of 
the precautionary principle. Their view is typical of the environmental movement at 
large. The shared position is that the precautionary principle should be invoked in 
connection with all environmental controversies. Whilst Friends of the Earth and 
other environmental NGOs have some idea as to what this would mean in specific 
cases they have a tendency to reify the notion of the precautionary principle. For 
example, in relation to radioactive waste management Friends of the Earth state: 
‘Retrievability and reversibility are fundamental aspects of the 
precautionary principle, which is central to sustainable development.
... Taking a precautionary approach to making financial provisions for 
nuclear waste management also implies ensuring that future 
generations will be able to make decisions on a timely basis.’
1 See Appendix 1 for a list o f agreements that refer to the precautionary principle. These are discussed 
in detail in chapter two.
2 Green, P. and Western, R. (1994). Time to face the inevitable: a submission from  Friends o f  the Earth 
Ltd to the UK Department o f  the Environment's review o f  radioactive waste management policy. 
London: Friends o f  the Earth, 25 October 1994, p33 and 37.
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Here they talk about the precautionary principle as if everyone understands what those 
‘fundamental aspects’ are. This is a common position, and not just one adopted by 
Friends of the Earth. By contrast, I argue that the precautionary principle is usefully 
viewed as a ‘boundary object’ , that is, the concept creates a space in which 
protagonists encounter each other, and in which they sustain the sense of a common 
debate, even when the interests at stake are fundamentally opposed. This is one of the 
issues this thesis addresses. In particular, I look at how the notion of a ‘problem’ is 
set up and the way in which the concept of precaution is positioned and discussed in 
terms of scientific evidence.
The precautionary principle is important on the world stage as it has been incorporated 
into a number of national and international agreements. Appendix 1 lists many of 
these agreements. Despite its importance, or perhaps because of it, the concept of 
precaution is vague and is therefore the subject of numerous, divergent interpretations. 
The precautionary principle has consequently not been applied methodically in 
national decision-making, although there have often been calls for such an application. 
Through researching what has been written about the precautionary principle and 
through undertaking case studies of its application in two divergent cases, I have come 
to realise that the precautionary principle comes into being as it is negotiated in 
practice in relation to each new issue.
3 Star, S.L. and Griesemer, J.R. (1989). Institutional ecology, translations and boundary-objects: 
amateurs and professionals in Berkeley's museum o f  vertebrate zoology 1907-1939. Social Studies o f  
Science 19, (3): 387-420.
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Core questions
From an initial set of questions about the definition of precaution, further lines of 
inquiry developed. I found that as I pursued meanings of precaution I obtained more 
questions rather than answers. This helped me determine the type of fieldwork that I 
would undertake and my approach to the rhetoric of precaution.
However, I began with the more practical question: on what basis can the 
precautionary principle be applied to a specific environmental issue? Some 
environmental issues appear to be appropriate areas in which to apply the 
precautionary principle. Why is that? Who are the key players involved? Is there a 
link between whose voice is heard and the perceived relevance of the precautionary 
principle? Does the nature of the issue itself make a difference, and if so, how and in 
what ways? Are the systems and structures currently in place for making decisions 
tightly bound or institutionally flexible? Why does conflict arise around particular 
environmental issues and how does controversy drive interests in precaution?
If the precautionary principle is about making decisions in the presence of uncertainty 
and before there is sufficient scientific evidence then what can be the basis o f these 
decisions? I found that thinking along these lines was unrewarding as it implied that 
decisions based on scientific evidence were unproblematic and that if certainty could 
be achieved then decisions were easy. I thought it was important to investigate this 
hypothesis so I asked myself about how decisions are based on scientific evidence. 
How is science used in environmental decision-making? Working back, what are the 
structures and frameworks in place that enable decisions to be formulated and made?
Critically, how does the principle of precaution fit into different environments of 
decision-making and into different fields of scientific (un)certainty? In order to 
empirically investigate the precautionary principle in action, and so understand its 
characteristics and qualities I felt it was necessary to look at two areas of 
environmental concern that provided sufficient contrast in terms of the history of the 
problem, whether the problem was of media interest, the nature of the perceived 
environmental risks and consequences, and the range of voices that could be heard 
talking about it. I chose the two environmental problem areas of radioactive waste 
disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals due to the topicality of these issues in the 
media, the campaigning interest that Friends of the Earth had in them and the 
relevance of the comparisons that could be made between them in terms of the 
concept of precaution.4
Radioactive waste is produced at all stages of the nuclear cycle. My interest is in the 
waste that arises from civil nuclear applications, primarily, though not exclusively, 
from nuclear energy production. Like all waste produced in this country, radioactive 
waste has to be managed and there is much controversy about how this should be 
done. Due to the extremely long half-lives o f some radioactive isotopes (24,000 years 
in the case of plutonium) radioactive waste has to be disposed of in a safe and 
effective way. The core of the controversy is what constitutes safe and effective 
radioactive waste disposal.
Endocrine disruption describes a situation whereby the hormone systems of humans 
and wildlife are detrimentally affected, leading to physical and sexual development
4 Full details o f  the selection o f these case studies are covered in chapter four.
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problems and abnormalities, including reproductive difficulties, which may result in 
the death of affected individuals. Various chemicals have been implicated although 
the extent and the exact causes of the problem are still in dispute.
One of the factors that became clear to me when thinking about these case studies was 
that there is a multitude of terms that are ambiguous and multifariously defined with 
regard to making decisions about any issue. The problem of definitions became a 
central theme. How have debates over definitions been played out in the case of 
radioactive waste and endocrine disruption? Controversies over definitions often 
centred around controversy over scientific evidence presented for and against a 
particular position. This made me ask questions about the nature of scientific 
evidence itself. What constitutes scientific ‘knowledge’? How is scientific 
controversy resolved? Many of the agreements advocating implementation of the 
precautionary principle suggest that action should be taken even before science has 
demonstrated a link between cause and effect, that is before it is scientifically 
understood what is causing observed effects on humans, wildlife and the environment 
or before it is scientifically understood what the potential effects of a given activity 
might be. This raised questions of how links between cause and effect are established 
at present. And at what point is a link accepted by all parties and the controversy 
resolved? What, therefore, constitutes scientific evidence and who decides what is 
sufficient evidence? What informs different positions on what scientific knowledge to 
accept or reject? What can be learned from looking at these issues that helps 
understand how the precautionary principle can be operationalised?
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The naivety of my initial position became more sophisticated through consideration of 
these questions. I argue that it is the interests of those individuals and organisations 
involved in making decisions about any environmental issue that shape interpretations 
of the precautionary principle and I suggest that the precautionary principle only 
occurs as it is enacted. The ‘interests’ approach forms a block of ideas in the 
sociology of science which I marry together with understandings about the uses of 
scientific evidence in order to ask the empirical question ‘what does precaution 
mean?’.
This question constitutes the comer stone of this thesis. In order to address it I 
compare meanings of precaution advocated and developed with reference to the two 
case studies of radioactive waste disposal and endocrine dismpting chemicals. The 
radioactive waste disposal case study centres on the Nirex Inquiry, a public inquiry 
held in Cumbria in 1995-1996 at which UK Nirex Ltd, whose task it is to implement 
the government’s strategy for the disposal of most low and intermediate level 
radioactive waste produced in the UK, appealed against the decision of Cumbria 
County Council not to allow planning permission for a proposed Rock 
Characterisation Facility.3 The endocrine dismpting chemicals case study centres on 
the fact that discussion about this issue is still at an early stage and that there is still 
much disagreement as to what the problem actually is. I focus on the debate generated 
at two workshops commissioned by the Department of the Environment into 
environmental oestrogens and organised by the Institute for Environment and Health 
at Leicester University in 1995 and 1996.6
5 This case study is discussed in chapter five.
Both these case studies involve looking at how precautionary vocabulary is used and 
made real. In this way I show that what is seen as a ‘problem’ depends upon such 
factors as the history of the associated industry, the players involved in discussions, 
and research that has already been undertaken regarding the issue at stake. I show that 
the extent of ‘industrialisation’ of a problem, i.e. where an ‘industrial’ voice can be 
defined and heard, is significant as it means there is an ‘industrial’ position from 
which negotiation can take place. The importance of this is that what implementation 
of the precautionary principle means in specific cases will be determined by the range 
of voices invoking this vocabulary and the diversity of interests associated with them.
Through deconstructing the use of scientific evidence and understanding how 
scientific knowledge is interpreted I show how controversies are shaped and how 
decisions are made. This highlights some of the issues surrounding ‘implementation’ 
of the precautionary principle. By showing that science does not provide an ‘objective 
truth’ from which an indisputable course of action can be determined and by 
demonstrating that decisions are made by negotiation between individuals, each with 
their attendant interests, I set the stage for looking at alternative interpretations of the 
precautionary principle.
Ultimately I show that there are still many questions to answer. I conclude that 
although a structured set of rules cannot be created (as I so naively assumed at the 
outset) whereby the precautionary principle can be said to be implemented, it may be 
possible to create frameworks of deliberation and policy making that are more
6 This case study is discussed in chapter six.
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sympathetic to precautionary courses of action. These could only come about through 
an acceptance that the positions of those involved are explicitly value-laden.
What does all this mean for the concept of precaution in practice? I suggest that the 
precautionary principle is a convenient tool because it takes on the meaning of the 
definer. Despite appearances, it cannot be assumed by those discussing precaution 
that they are all talking about the same thing. It cannot be taken as a reference point 
for absolute action but it can shape action by helping define the stage where the actors 
enact their parts. The set on that stage then depends on the issue at hand.
Thesis structure
This thesis takes the reader through the history of the precautionary principle, 
introduces the theoretical approach used, defines and justifies the choice of 
methodology, introduces two empirically based case studies identifying the main 
characteristics of those cases, draws comparisons between the two case studies and 
relates what is learned back to the meaning of the precautionary principle.
In this chapter, I have introduced the thesis itself, and established the central issues 
and how I have addressed them. In chapter two I describe the evolution of ideas about 
precaution and consider the historical origins of ‘the precautionary principle’. I 
demonstrate how discussion about the precautionary principle is often couched in 
scientific terms in the national and international agreements that advocate its use. I 
highlight a tension between the notion of the precautionary principle being a law 
which implies a codified practice and the notion of the precautionary principle being
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about prudence, which is not about rules but rather about judgement. This signals an 
important point in this thesis, that the precautionary principle involves a move away 
from the a posteriori induction of science which proceeds from effects to causes, 
towards an a priori deduction which proceeds from causes to effects. The concept of 
precaution is not only deployed by ‘experts’ and in chapter two I review a selection of 
proverbs from around the world to demonstrate that precaution also exists as a 
common sense reaction to uncertain situations in many cultures. Following this I 
analyse a range of formal agreements advocating the precautionary principle and from 
these I identify six distinct situations in which the precautionary principle is expected 
to apply: situations where a causal link to effects is unclear; where scientific 
evidence does not yet exist; where there is no scientific evidence; where cost is a 
factor; where the scale of the threat is a factor; and where there are a diversity of 
situations to be accounted for.
In chapter three I move on to discuss uncertainty, expertise and interests. I review 
some of the literature about uncertainty in order to get an impression of the magnitude 
o f meaning conveyed by the term and I establish how it is related to scientific 
controversy and subsequently to decision-making. I look at how expertise is defined 
and deployed in relation to scientific uncertainty and I review ideas from the 
sociology of science that relate to the notion of precaution. From this review I explain 
why I adopt an ‘interests’ approach as a theoretical framework for analysing my case 
studies.
In chapter four I explain how my research was designed and constructed, discussing 
the merits of a CASE award, and introducing the two case studies o f radioactive waste
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disposal and endocrine dismpting chemicals. I discuss my chosen methodology of 
semi-stmctured interviews and provide a justification for why this method, as opposed 
to other methods of qualitative data gathering, was appropriate for this piece of 
research.
Chapters five and six are the empirical chapters of this thesis. In them I identify the 
characteristics of radioactive waste management and endocrine dismpting chemicals, 
respectively, that have a bearing on the application of the precautionary principle. I 
focus on the concepts of scientific evidence and uncertainty, as these are the issues 
around which deliberations take place. This reframes the emphasis from looking at a 
reified ‘precautionary principle’, about which there is little detailed discussion to 
focus on those factors that the involved actors considered relevant to their 
deliberations. This reconciles the issues behind the ‘rhetorical precaution’ discussed 
in chapter two and the issues analysed through the case studies.
In chapter five I review interpretations of radioactive waste by comparing my 
respondents’ views and by looking at documentation produced by relevant 
organisations. Additionally I look at the way in which ‘evidence’ was defined, used 
and deployed by participants in the Nirex Inquiry and I analyse the formal stmcture of 
a public inquiry in order to show how such an ‘event’ stmctures debate and reveals 
contrasting perspectives of precaution. In chapter six I identify a number of scientific 
studies that have been drawn upon to indicate that endocrine dismption is a subject 
worthy of further research and policy action. I investigate debate about the 
relationship between cause and effect by looking at definitions of the endocrine 
‘problem’ as related by my respondents and as documented in reports from
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conferences and workshops set up to discuss the endocrine disruption issue. I show 
how these definitions reveal and reflect the positions of the various actors involved. I 
also look at the way in which the notion of how much evidence is sufficient to 
demonstrate that there is a problem worth taking policy action over has been debated 
and interpreted by my respondents.
I undertook my fieldwork during 1996 and 1997 and I limit discussion of the issues 
surrounding both radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disruption to the state of 
these debates at that time. I am very aware that the situation in both these fields has 
moved on since then. The career of each of these issues has developed and the 
discussion in my empirical chapters may seem oddly of out date. However, this does 
not impinge on the content or quality of this thesis, since one of the main points that I 
am making is that each environmental problem is unique and it is the history of the 
issue and the stage in its ‘career’ that has been reached that determines the level at 
which decisions are being made. I have used two snapshots of the way decisions are 
made in order to investigate the process of decision-making and what this means for 
the deployment of the precautionary principle. It is the process that is important to 
this thesis rather than the outcome.
In chapter seven I undertake a comparison of the two case studies. I identify five key 
areas especially relevant in that comparison: the emergence of an environmental 
‘problem’; the widespread nature o f the problem; the role of ‘industry’; the extent of 
institutionalisation; and the rhetorical absence/presence of the precautionary principle 
in deliberations. I consider these with reference to the set of precautionary themes 
identified from my analysis o f the agreements invoking the precautionary principle in
13
chapter two. This comparison brings two main concerns to the fore: the ‘interests’ of 
the players involved in making decisions and the role that ‘scientific evidence’ plays 
in the process. I show how deeply the use of science and the quest for certainty is 
entrenched in decision-making. I also reveal that the scientific evidence presented in 
each debate is full of uncertainties so that decisions come about through the consensus 
of those involved rather than because some inherent, unambiguously determining 
‘truth’ becomes known. If it is accepted that decisions are currently made through 
consensus reached by negotiation amongst individuals each with their associated 
interests, and not because science provides an indisputable guide to a precautionary 
course o f action, then it is possible to start looking at alternative bases for 
implementing the precautionary principle. Finally I discuss the potential for moving 
‘beyond science’ in decision-making and what that means for the precautionary 
principle.
I conclude this thesis by reviewing its content and setting out the argument succinctly, 
demonstrating the limitations contained within it and describing the contribution it 
makes to academic debate and practical action. I discuss the implications of this 
thesis for an academic audience in terms of interests theory, scientific evidence and 
the precautionary principle. I also look at the implications for Friends of the Earth, 
this time in terms of how the research might impact on their campaigning and use of 
the precautionary principle. Finally I look at the implications for a corporate 
audience, discussing the impacts this thesis could have on future policy making and 




‘It is often necessary to make a decision on the basis o f knowledge 
sufficient for action, but insufficient to satisfy the intellect’1
1 Kant, I in Lyons, G. (1995). Reassessing pollution: wildlife, humans and toxic chemicals in the 
environment. Godalming: WWF UK. February 1995, p4.
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Introduction
This chapter describes the evolution of precaution into what has become known as the 
precautionary principle. I illustrate the vagueness of the concept and highlight that 
currently there is no framework within which the precautionary principle can be said 
to operate. I trace the emergence of precaution from its origins as Vorsorgeprinzip in 
Germany to its use as a principle within international agreements and I introduce the 
notion that what the precautionary principle means in practice is a matter for 
negotiation between the stakeholders involved in deliberations about particular 
environmental problems. With reference to various formal agreements I demonstrate 
how the rhetoric of precaution has moved from a precautionary approach to the 
precautionary principle, a move that makes the concept unique and familiar and 
allows it to be applied to different situations. However, I also show that none of these 
agreements express what the precautionary principle might mean in terms of 
implementation.
Subsequently I discuss how the precautionary principle has been interpreted in 
particular environmental contexts highlighting a difference between what is labelled 
science and what is labelled precaution -  a distinction rooted in the difference 
between a posteriori induction and a priori deduction. Through discussing this 
difference I establish the relation between the two.
In the following section I introduce proverbs from around the world in order to show 
that the concept of precaution exists as a common sense reaction to uncertain
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situations. Following this I analyse a range of formal agreements in order to identify 
specific elements of precaution. I identify six situations in which the precautionary 
principle is expected to apply: situations where a causal link to effects is unclear; 
where scientific evidence does not yet exist; where there is no scientific evidence; 
where cost is a factor; where the scale o f the threat is a factor; and where there are a 
diversity of situations to be accounted for.
Finally I introduce the two studies that I have undertaken in order to investigate the 
application of the precautionary principle. I discuss the comparable and contrasting 
features of the issues of radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals 
in order to illustrate the array of situations in which the precautionary principle is 
invoked.
What is the precautionary principle?
In this thesis I do not advocate any one definitive meaning of the precautionary 
principle. Rather, I show how the concept of precaution has developed and changed 
over time and how it has come to be referred to as a principle. This involves 
analysing some of the agreements in which reference has been made to precautionary 
actions. Having outlined this development, I analyse the language used in these 
agreements in order to isolate the different elements that have come to be identified as 
part of the precautionary principle. I identify a relationship between the empirical use 
and rhetorical use of precaution, both implying that the precautionary principle is not 
any one thing but is created each time it is invoked. These elements are explored later 
in the thesis with regard to the two case studies. This highlights a perceived paradox
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regarding the internal consistency of the precautionary principle, that it is described 
both as a tool to be applied to various situations and as a result or an end in itself. 
However, I do not adjudicate between these descriptions as it is this very 
inconsistency that makes the precautionary principle challenging.
Interpreting precaution
Definitions of the precautionary principle are open to negotiation.2 The concept 
embodies many different notions o f caution, care, preventative action, common sense 
and responsibility although an explicit definition has never been agreed upon.3 
Whether an explicit definition is actually desirable or possible is one of the questions 
this thesis addresses. Tim O’Riordan states that
‘.. .the precautionary principle is neither a well defined principle nor a 
stable concept ... It is because the mood of the times needs an 
organising idea that the precautionary principle is getting a fair wind’.4 
This implies that there is currently no overall framework within which precautionary 
decisions can be made but that such an idea nonetheless promises a means of dealing 
with the complexities that modernity brings with it. It suggests that the precautionary 
principle, despite being so ambiguous, is being regarded as having great potential 
because it recognises these complexities and offers potential and hope that a
2 See Bodansky, D. (1991). Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle. Environment 33,
(7): 4-5 & 43-45; Ramchandani, R. and Pearce, D.W. (1992). Alternative approaches to setting Effluent 
Quality’ Standards: precautionary, critical load, and cost-henefit approaches. Norwich: CSERGE. 
1992.
2 Hunt, J. (1994). The social construction o f precaution. In, O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds), 
Interpreting theprecautionaiy principlc.X 17-125. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, p 121.
4 O'Riordan, T. and Jordan, A. (1995). The precautionary principle in contemporary environmental 
politics. Environmental Values 4, (3): 191-212, p 191.
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framework can exist.5 O ’Riordan goes on to say that
‘ . The precautionary principle has much efficacy because it captures 
an underlying misgiving over the growing technicalities of 
environmental management at the expense of ethics, environmental 
rights in the face of vulnerability, and facilitative manipulation of cost- 
benefit analysis’.6
He is saying here that the precautionary principle is valuable because it provides an 
alternative to a purely technology-based environmental management, it brings ethics 
into the discussion, allows environmental rights a voice, and challenges the 
appropriateness of cost-benefit analysis as a decision-making tool.7 O’Riordan 
believes that the vagueness over the meaning of the precautionary principle may 
actually be its strength:
‘.. .precaution will remain politically potent so long as it continues to 
be tantalisingly ill-defined and imperfectly translatable into codes of 
conduct, whilst capturing the emotions of misgiving and guilt’.8 
In light of the above apparent vagueness over its meaning and potential 
implementation, it is important to recognise that the precautionary principle has been 
invoked in international agreements and policy documents.9 One such agreement that 
is widely quoted with reference to the precautionary principle is the Rio Declaration of
5 Cameron and Abouchar discuss the idea o f a legal framework through which the precautionaiy 
principle could be operationalised, Cameron, J. and Abouchar, J. (1991). The Precautionary Principle: a 
fundamental principle o f law and policy for the protection o f the global environment. Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review  14, (1): 1-27.
6 O'Riordan, T. and Jordan, A. (1995). The precautionary principle in contemporary environmental 
politics. Environmental Values 4, (3): 191-212. p 192
7 See Ramchandani, R. and Pearce, D.W. (1992). Alternative approaches to setting Effluent Quality 
Standards: precautionaiy, critical load, and cost-benefit approaches. Norwich: CSERGE. 1992. for 
an evaluation o f the effects o f combining the precautionary principle with cost-benefit analysis
8 O'Riordan, T. and Jordan, A. (1995). The precautionaiy principle in contemporary environmental 
politics. Environmental Values 4, (3): 191-212, p 193.
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1992 :
“Principle 15: In order to protect the environment, the precautionary 
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their 
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.”10
This and other international agreements and policy documents are discussed in detail 
later in this chapter. First I consider the history of the concept and how its meaning 
has been negotiated.
German origins of precaution
The concept that we know as the precautionary principle originated in Germany as 
Vorsorgeprinzip in the 1970’s and is one of five fundamental principles11 underlying 
German environmental policy. The literal German translation is ‘Vor’, meaning 
‘before’, ‘Sorge’, meaning ‘care’, and ‘Prinzip’ meaning ‘principle’. This translates 
into ‘the principle of taking care before we act’. Boehmer-Christiansen, who has
12written a detailed history of the Vorsorgeprinzip in German environmental policy,
9 See Appendix 1
10 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Agenda 21, Rio 
Declaration, June 1992, quoted in Young, M.D. (1993). For our children's children: some practical 
implications o f  inter-generational equality and the precautionaiy principle. Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service. November 1993, p40-43.
11 The others are the Polluter Pays Principle ( Verursacherprinzip), Consensus (Kooperation), the 
Principle o f Proportionality in cost and gain {Wirtschaftliche prinzip) and the Common Burden 
Principle (Gemeinlast Prinzip). See Boehmer - Christiansen, S. (1994). The Precautionary Principle in 
Germany: enabling government. In, O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the 
Precautionaiy Principle:3l-60. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, p33.
12 See Boehmer - Christiansen, S. (1994). The Precautionary Principle in Germany: enabling
2 0
states that the five principles, of which the precautionary principle is one, ensure that 
all political actors bargain with each other on the basis of agreed ground rules rather 
than ‘sound science’.13 She does not, however, identify what these agreed ground 
rules are. This illustrates part of the complicated issue of the implementation of the 
precautionary principle, as it appears that no agreed ground rules actually exist. 
Whether ground rules can actually be agreed is a matter for negotiation between 
stakeholders involved in decision-making about specific environmental issues.
In discussing what implementation of the precautionary principle might look like in 
practice, Boehmer-Christiansen points out that some of the other German principles 
underlying their environmental policy may counteract or over-rule precaution and so it 
would be a mistake to consider German environmental policy as totally precautionary. 
She suggests there are many forms of action the Vorsorgeprinzip might inspire and 
legitimise: it can promote basic research and technological research and development; 
it can force the setting up of liability and compensation regimes; it can require the 
immediate investment into existing cleaner technologies through regulation and it can 
employ the use of economic measures such as state subsidies or taxation to
government. In, O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the Precautionaiy Principle:3\-60. 
London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, p31-60. See also von Moltke, K. (1987). The vorsorgeprinzip in 
West German environmental policy - a report prepared at the request o f  the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (United Kingdom) fo r  its study on the application o f  the concept of'Best 
Practicable Environmental O ption': Institute for European Environmental Policy, 
von Moltke, K. (1991). Three reports on German environmental policy. Environment 33 (7): 25-29.
13 Boehmer - Christiansen, S. (1994). The Precautionary Principle in Germany: enabling government.
In, O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds). Interpreting the Precautionaiy P rincipled  1-60. London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd, p34. See also von Moltke, K. (1987). The vorsorgeprinzip in West German 
environmental policy - a report prepared at the request o f  the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution (United Kingdom) fo r  its study on the application o f  the concept of'Best Practicable 
Environmental Option': Institute for European Environmental Policy., for a discussion o f  
Vorsorgeprinzip
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‘internalise’ externalities,14 so that
Vorsorge becomes a metaphor for a wide-ranging industrial and 
economic strategy’.15 
Boehmer-Christiansen’s notion of what the precautionary principle can be is 
restrictive in that she limits it to industrial and economic strategy, leaving out social 
strategy. This means that the embedded interests of the players involved in decision­
making may be ignored due to a concentration on more fiscal or practical matters.
From its German origins in “Vorsorgeprinzip”, the concept of precaution has gone 
through a number of stages on its journey to becoming a ‘principle’. This chapter 
traces the development of the ideas of precaution from a concept to a ‘principle’ in the 
international policy arena. The type of strategy the precautionary principle embodies 
evolves as interpretations of precaution are deconstructed and analysed.
Boehmer-Christiansen states that in Germany a large number of political actors 
participate in environmental debate, and must agree on compromises since their 
ideologies and constituencies are so very different that unanimity would never be 
reached. She maintains that these differences are openly acknowledged.16 Whereas in 
other parts of Europe and North America it is the natural sciences that dominate the 
advisory process, in Germany the engineering profession plays a central role. An
14 Boehmer - Christiansen, S. (1994). The Precautionary Principle in Germany: enabling government.
In, O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle-31-60. London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd. p48
15 Boehmer - Christiansen, S. (1994). The Precautionaiy Principle in Germany: enabling government.
In, O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the Precautionaiy P rin cip le3 1-60. London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd, p 5 1.
16 Boehmer - Christiansen, S. (1994). The Precautionary Principle in Germany: enabling government.
In, O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the Precautionary P rin cip le3 l-60 . London:
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illustration of this is German investment in ‘clean’ and ‘environmentally friendly’ 
technologies as a way of addressing environmental problems. This contrasts with 
such methods as toxicological risk assessment, which are employed to provide 
evidence of harm, an approach often used in the UK, for example.17 Additionally, in 
Germany, the courts play a major role in interpreting and implementing environmental 
regulation and in deciding whether precaution has been adequately complied with. 
This illustrates the diversity of situations, due to national regulatory differences and 
political differences, in which the precautionary principle is required to operate. The 
precautionary principle, as an aspect of the environmental debate, requires negotiation 
between many political, industrial and other interested bodies, and there is no fixed or 
established formula available whereby consensus amongst these participants can be 
reached. By identifying that different measures are used to advise different policy 
regimes in particular national contexts, Boehmer-Christiansen establishes the 
subjectivity involved in determining which factors are relevant to particular 
environmental policy decisions. This compounds the problem of whether a set of 
ground rules for assessing whether the precautionary principle has been applied can be 
formulated.18
Boehmer-Christiansen says:
‘The outcome of this constellation of institutional and cultural factors
Earthscan Publications Ltd, p 51.
17 See, for example, Department o f the Environment (1995). A guide to risk assessment and risk 
management fo r  environmental protection. London: HMSO, p44 which states that ‘taking a risk 
assessment approach to the precautionary principle ensures that best use is made o f what scientific 
evidence is available’.
18 Tickner asserts the necessity for a common definition o f the precautionary principle and a set o f  
criteria for precautionary decision-making, Tickner, J. (1997). The precautionary principle. The 
NetM’orker 2, (4). p4
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has been a technology-led environmental policy justified less with 
reference to Vorsorge than by the rapid dissemination of best available 
technology’.19
Here she states that policy is not being driven by precaution but rather that 
preventative action is being taken in situations where known or threatened harms can 
occur. She claims that it is the vast array of social and institutional factors that have 
led to a reliance on technological solutions to environmental problems. However, it is 
also this array of factors that prompt calls for action to be based on precaution rather 
than on a science that is uncertain. From its roots in a specific national context, the 
precautionary principle has been appropriated at an international level.20
Precaution in national and international agreements
Internationally the precautionary principle has evolved in a rather ad hoc manner, a 
point that is illustrated by looking at the list of national and international policy 
agreements making reference to precaution (see Appendix 1). Even a cursory glance 
at this list shows that reference to the precautionary principle brings with it no explicit 
rules for implementation.21 All manner of activities have been described as 
precautionary, for example the use of ALARA22 in relation to radioactive emissions
19 Boehmer - Christiansen, S. (1994). The Precautionary Principle in Germany: enabling government.
In, O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the Precautionaiy Principle'.^1-60. London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd, p52.
20 See Gundling, L. (1990). The status in International Law o f the Principle o f Precautionary Action. 
International Journal ofEstuarine and Coastal Law (Special edition 'The North Sea: Perspectives on 
Regional Environmental Co-operation') : 23-30.; Bodansky, D. (1991). Scientific Uncertainty and the 
Precautionary Principle. Environment 33 (7): 4-5 & 43-45.
21 See Costanza, R. and Cornwell, L. (1993). The 4P Approach to dealing with Scientific Uncertainty. 
Environment 34 (9): 12-20 & 42, p l5 .
22 ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) is a legal principle controlling the level o f risks 
associated with an activity and is fundamental to safety regulation in the UK. It permits cost to be taken
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from nuclear installations, the banning of beef on the bone in the UK in response to 
the BSE crisis, and the banning of soy-based breast implants due to a number of 
observed adverse effects. The precautionary principle is able to encompass all these 
themes under the same umbrella because it is so broad and lacking in tight definition.
I now illustrate with reference to a list of agreements referring to precaution,23 how it 
is that the precautionary principle came to be a principle as opposed to an approach or 
a method. This distinction is important because there is value in identifying 
something as the precautionary principle as opposed to a precautionary approach. 
Using the definite article ‘the’ rather than the indefinite article ‘a’ is emphatic and 
makes the concept unique and familiar. It implies something that can be moved 
around and applied to other situations. However, it also raises problems as it raises 
expectations and adds a value that is generalisable and variously applicable.
In 1980 the EC Council, in a Decision about CFCs in the environment, stated that: 
“Whereas, in accordance with the common position of Member States 
of 6 December 1978 and in accordance with recommendation III of the
into account when determining how much risk should be reduced. In relation to nuclear safety, the 
requirement is extended so that risks are reduced to levels that are as low as reasonably achievable 
(ALARA). Defined in Cumbria County Council (1994). Best practicable environmental option 
(BPEO) fo r  radioactive wastes: issues relating to storage, late disposal or early disposal. Vol 2\ 
Cumbria County Council, p D l.
23 See Appendix 1. This list has been put together by reviewing literature that refers to the 
precautionary principle. I have followed up citations that refer to agreements invoking the 
precautionary principle and have made use o f lists compiled by others, particularly Young, M.D. 
(1993). For our children's children: some practical implications o f  inter-generational equality and the 
precautionary principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, November 1993, and 
Haigh, N. (1993). The precautionary principle in British environmental policy. London: Institute for 
European Environmental Policy.
Haigh, N. (1994). The introduction o f the precautionary principle into the UK. In: O'Riordan, T. and 
Cameron, J. (eds), Interpreting the Precautionaiy Principle:229-25\. London: Earthscan Publications 
Ltd.
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Munich Conference, a significant reduction should, as a precautionary 
measure, be achieved in the next few years in the use of 
chlorofluorocarbons giving rise to emissions.”24 (my emphasis)
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 198525 also refers to 
precautionary measures, as does the preamble to the Montreal Protocol of 1987.26 By 
November o f 1987 the Ministerial Declaration of the Second International Conference 
on the Protection of the North Sea is referring to a precautionary approach:
“in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of 
the most dangerous substances a precautionary approach is necessary 
which may require action to control inputs of such substances even 
before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific 
evidence.”27 (my emphasis)
The move from a measure to an approach as illustrated by these two examples is 
subtle but distinctive. It implies a transition from taking a suitable action in order to 
reduce a harm by restricting the use of the harmful substance to something more 
approximate that allows for action to control inputs of harm without making 
restriction on the use of those inputs. This notion of a precautionary approach is 
echoed in the 1989 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against
24 EC Council Decision 80/372 concerning CFCs in the environment - April 1980 in Haigh, N. (1994). 
The introduction o f the precautionaiy principle into the UK. In, O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J. (eds), 
Interpreting the Precautionaiy Principle:229-25 \ . London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, p243.
23 Vienna Convention for the Protection o f the Ozone Layer, March 1985 in Haigh, N. (1994). The 
introduction o f the precautionary principle into the UK. In, O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds), 
Interpreting the Precautionaiy Principle: 229-251. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, p243.
26 Preamble to the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection o f the Ozone Layer, 
1987 in Young, M.D. (1993). For our children's children: some practical implications o f  inter- 
generational equality' and the precautionary principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, November 1993, p40-43.
21 Ministerial Declaration o f the Second International Conference on the Protection o f the North (1987), 
in Haigh, N. (1994). The introduction o f the precautionary principle into the UK. In, O'Riordan, T. and 
Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the Precautionaiy Principle: 229-251. London: Earthscan Publications
26
28Pollution. The term ‘precaution’ is being used here to advocate different levels of 
intervention.
In 1990 the UK government published its first White Paper on the environment, This 
Common Inheritance, which claims to be a ‘...comprehensive review of every aspect 
of Britain’s environmental policy.’29 This White Paper has a chapter entitled ‘First 
Principles’ which introduces the precautionary principle by saying that:
“... given the environmental risks, we must act responsibly and be 
prepared to take precautionaiy action where it is justified. ... Where 
there are significant risks of damage to the environment, the 
Government will be prepared to take precautionary action to limit the 
use of potentially dangerous materials or the spread of potentially 
dangerous pollutants, even where scientific knowledge is not 
conclusive, if  the balance of likely costs and benefits justifies it. This 
precautionary principle applies particularly where there are good 
grounds forjudging either that action taken promptly at comparatively 
low cost may avoid more costly damage later, or that irreversible 
effects may follow if action is delayed.”30 (my emphasis)
Precautionary action may be justified on the grounds that there are significant risks of 
damage to the environment, although this is qualified with reference to the balance of 
costs and benefits. Exactly what constitutes a significant risk is not made clear and
Ltd, p244.
28 Convention for the Protection o f the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution (Barcelona Convention) 
1989 in Young, M.D. (1993). For our children's children: some practical implications o f  inter- 
generational equality and the precautionaiy principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, November 1993, p40-43.
29 Command Paper 2100 (1990). This common inheritance. London: HMSO. September 1990, p9.
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what the good grounds for judgement might be are not explicated. Reference to a 
principle is made without there being any notion of what that principle embodies. The 
statement implies that action will be taken even when scientific uncertainty exists, but 
suggests that the judgement will then be based on economic criteria.
What becomes clear from these national and international agreements is that the 
rhetoric of precaution is used without any express understanding of what the notion 
might mean in terms of implementation. While the terminology has developed from 
‘measure’ to ‘approach’ to ‘principle’, and while governments and NGOs alike have 
advocated the ‘principle’, there has been less attention paid to how it can be 
successfully operationalised. This question of how and whether it can be 
implemented in practice is of key importance to this thesis. I use my later case studies 
on radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disruption to consider what precaution 
has and can mean in the context of those situations, and to ascertain what more 
general conclusions can be deduced regarding the meaning of precautionary action in 
other situations.
The precautionary principle in environmental contexts
I now look at the meanings and interpretations that have been attached to the 
precautionary principle in the context of particular environmental issues and the 
scientific controversies surrounding them.
30 Command Paper 2100 (1990). This common inheritance. London: HMSO. September 1990, plO&l 1.
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Many of the national and international agreements which refer to the precautionary 
principle express that action should be taken even if there is no, or insufficient, 
scientific evidence to link a cause with an effect.31 This implies that action should be 
taken before the environment starts to show harm, an idea that shifts the burden of 
proof from the protector of the environment to the polluter.32 The Ministerial 
Declaration of the Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea 
in 1987 used the phrase ‘...even before a causal link has been established by absolutely 
clear scientific evidence’.33 In 1990 there were many references to the lack of 
scientific evidence, for example the UK Government White Paper This Common 
Inheritance stated even where scientific knowledge is not conclusive . . . \34 In 
1991 an OECD Council Recommendation on Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control stated that ‘the absence of complete information should not preclude 
precautionary action to mitigate the risk of significant harm to the environment’35 and 
in 1992 the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
stated in what has become known as the Rio Declaration ‘... Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
31 See Appendix 1
32 Wynne, B. and Mayer, S. (1993). How science fails the environment. New Scientist 5 June 1993: 33- 
35. For further discussion on the implications o f reversing the burden o f proof see Purchase, I.F.H. 
(1997). Comments to 'Can we reverse the burden o f proof?'. Toxicology Letters 90: 229-232.
Hansson, S.O. (1997). Can we reverse the burden o f proof? Toxicology Letters 90: 223-228.
Gelbke, P. (1997). Comments to 'Can we reverse the burden o f proof?'. Toxicology Letters 90: 233- 
234..
33 Quoted in Haigh, N. (1994). The introduction of the precautionary principle into the UK. In, 
O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds). Interpreting the Precautionaiy Principle'. 229-251. London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd, p244.
34 Command Paper 2100 (1990). This common inheritance. London: HMSO. September 1990, p i 1.
35 OECD Council Recommendation C(90)164 on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control - January 
1991 in Haigh, N. (1994). The introduction o f the precautionary principle into the UK. In, O'Riordan,
T. and Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the Precautionaiy Principle:229-25\. London: Earthscan 
Publications Ltd. p245
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degradation.’36 37 The phrasing of these agreements establishes that there is broad 
recognition of the existence of scientific uncertainty. The view is that this should not 
hinder policy to protect the environment.38
From the above it can be seen that the precautionary principle has become established 
as a popular policy refrain within the environmental arena although its roots are 
embedded in an earlier language which is now black-boxed within the agreements in 
which it is used. Each ‘new’ environmental issue brings with it reference from some 
quarter or another to the precautionary principle and the need for its application. This 
was seen in the case of the BSE crisis in the UK when the government claimed that it 
should ban beef on the bone for precautionary purposes.39 It has also been claimed by 
environmental groups that genetically modified crops should not be allowed to 
undergo field trials because not enough is known about their ability to cross-pollinate
36 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Agenda 21, Rio 
Declaration, June 1992 in Young, M.D. (1993). For our children's children: some practical 
implications o f  inter-generational equality and the precautionaiy principle. Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service. November 1993. p40-43
37 Other agreements include the Paris Commission (PARCOM) in 1989 Recommendation 89/1 o f which 
states ‘...even when there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between the emissions and 
effects (“the principle o f  precautionary action”) ...’; the Third Conference on the North Sea in the 
Hague Declaration, March 1990 , which uses the phrase "... even when there is no scientific evidence to 
prove a causal link between emissions and effects’; and the Bergen Ministerial Declaration, 16 May 
1990, which states ‘... lack o f full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.’ Also in 1990 the Houston Declaration used the words 
‘... lack o f full scientific certainty is no excuse to postpone actions which are justified in their own right’ 
and the Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change stated ‘... lack o f ftill 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
such environmental degradation’. In 1992 Article 3 o f the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
echoed the Rio Declaration by stating that"... Where there are threats o f serious or irreversible damage, 
lack o f full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures...’ and 
Article 2(2)(a) o f  the Convention for the Protection o f the Marine Environment o f the North-East 
Atlantic used the phrase ‘...even when there is no conclusive evidence o f a causal relationship between 
the inputs and the effects.’
38 See Earll, R.C. (1993). The Precautionary Principle: making it work in practice. London: The 
Environment Council. 24 November 1993. for a list o f barriers to implementation and suggestions o f  
resolutions
39 Department o f Health (1997). Research on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies: first meeting 
o f new review committee - press release issues jointly by Department o f Health and MAFF:2. London.
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with non-GMO crops, and that this would be in line with the precautionary 
principle.40 These cases suggest that what is considered to constitute implementation 
of the precautionary principle are discrete, distinct actions that relate specifically to 
the issue in question but which do not provide general guidelines for broader 
implementation.41
While the precautionary principle refers to the use of scientific knowledge and the 
concept of uncertainty is critical, the idea of precaution does not, in itself, influence 
the production of scientific knowledge.42 Additionally it is not a legal principle in the 
sense that there is no legal definition against which implementation can be judged.43 
It has evolved through documentation and is now translated wholesale by those 
wishing to use it in order to advocate a specific course of action.
There is a level at which the precautionary principle can be understood as reflecting a 
common-sense notion that the environment should be protected from deleterious
40 Rissler, J. and Mellon, M. (1993). Perils amidst the promise: ecological risks o f  transgenic crops in 
a global market. Cambridge, MA: Union o f Concerned Scientists. December 1993.
Hill, J. (1994). The regulation o f genetically modified organisms. In, O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., 
(eds), Interpreting the Precautionaiy Principle:\12-\%2. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd.. For 
further discussion about regulation o f GMOs in terms o f the precautionary principle see Levidow, L. 
(1996). Regulating GMO releases: Britain's precautionary dilemmas. Natures-Sciences-Societes 4, (2): 
131-143.. See also Mayer, S., Grove-White, R., and Wynne, B. (1996). Uncertainty, precaution and 
decision making. Brighton: Global Environmental Change Programme. June 1996.
41 See Bodansky, D. (1991). Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle. Environment 33, 
(7): 4-5 & 43-45. who cautions against believing the precautionary principle will resolve all the difficult 
problems o f  international environmental regulation or prevent new environmental hazards emerging in 
the future.
42 Gray, J.S. (1990). Statistics and the Precautionary Principle. Marine Pollution Bulletin 21, (4): 174- 
176. p i 76, goes further than this, asserting that ‘the precautionary principle should not be part o f  
science’.
43 However, Cameron and Abochar suggest that a definition is less important than a framework for 
action, Cameron, J. and Abouchar, J. (1991). The Precautionary Principle: a fundamental principle o f  
law and policy for the protection o f the global environment. Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review  14, (1): 1-27.
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anthropocentric activities.44 On another level the precautionary principle can be 
understood as an expert issue in which risk and uncertainty and the weight of evidence 
play central roles 45 The difference between these lay and expert interpretations is that 
the former requires no concrete factors upon which to base precautionary action, while 
the latter implies that risk, uncertainty and scientific evidence can all be weighed up 
by experts in order to determine what implementation should involve. Paradoxically, 
linking the precautionary principle back to risk and scientific evidence in many ways 
undermines the very reasons why international agreements call for action to be based 
on precaution in the first instance, namely that the scientific uncertainty that surrounds 
many environmental problems emphasises that risk cannot always be quantified and 
evidence is not always available. This tends to be forgotten in some calls for a more 
comprehensive set of criteria by which implementation of the precautionary principle 
can be judged 46 The environmental arena is not the only one to which the 
precautionary principle has been applied, but as I show in the next section, and the rest 
of the thesis, it is a field in which scientific and common-sense interpretations of 
precaution have developed along significantly different tracks. Conflict between them 
is the subject of the following sub-section.
44 Freestone, D. and Hey, E., (eds) (1996). The precautionaiy principle and international law: the 
challenge o f  implementation. The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International.; Bilder, R.B. and 
Brunnee, J. (1997). Book review and note: the precautionary principle and international law - the 
challange o f implementation. American Journal o f  International Law 91: 210-212.
45 Department o f  the Environment (1995). A guide to risk assessment and risk management fo r  
environmental protection. London: HMSO.
46 For example, at a meeting I attended in Brussels in 1999, representatives o f the chemical industry 
were calling for more quantitative criteria by which they could be deemed to be implementing the 
precautionary principle. European Commission - Directorate General for Environment, Nuclear Safety 
and Civil Protection and Directorate General for Industry (1999). Industrial chemicals: burden o f the 
past, challenge for the future. Industrial chemicals: burden o f the past, challenge for the future:
Brussels, Belgium. European Commission.
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Lay and expert understandings of precaution
Looking at dictionary definitions of the words precaution and principle draws 
attention to potential conflict within the term itself. According to the Oxford English 
Reference Dictionary a principle is defined as:
‘a fundamental truth or law as the basis of reasoning or action’.47 
And precaution is defined as
‘an action taken beforehand to avoid risk or ensure a good result; or 
prudent foresight’.
Therefore, by putting the terms together the precautionary principle can be interpreted 
as a fundamental law of prudent foresight. However, there is a tension between the 
notion of law, which implies a codified practice, and prudence or precaution in which 
no rule exists, but in which judgement is critical. The more the prudence line is taken 
the more conflict there is with a science concept that relies on proof, ratification and 
falsification -  i.e. a set of certain criteria. This is an important tension to recognise as 
it identifies an area from which critical differences might stem. Science relies on a 
posteriori induction, proceeding from effects to causes, in order to make informed 
inferences about the world. The precautionary principle implies a move from a 
posteriori to a priori reasoning, which proceeds from causes to effects. Potential 
causes may be identified while the full effects are still uncertain. This is where the 
problem lies (in the move from an a posteriori induction to an a priori deduction) in 
that our a posteriori experience (on which science is based) is no longer a safe basis
47 Pearsall, J. and Trumble, B., (eds) (1996). The Oxford English Reference Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p i 149
48 Pearsall, J. and Trumble, B., (eds) (1996). The Oxford English Reference Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford
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on which to form judgements or principles on how we should act. This is because 
science creates a culture of risk in which certainty cannot be attained although it 
alludes to a promise of certainty, which creates anxiety, fear and distrust.49 This was 
demonstrated in the BSE crisis.50 Precaution and prudence suggest that this inability 
to create certainty is acknowledged, thus moving away from the notion of a posteriori 
knowledge. Deleterious effects on the environment are extremely complex and it is 
difficult, on purely scientific criteria, to gain an understanding of what is ‘really’ 
going on. This is demonstrated in the ongoing debate about global warming and 
climate change.51 Thus a posteriori inferences do not tell us everything we might like 
to know about complex situations, in order to make good decisions.
Everybody makes decisions in the course o f everyday life, sometimes based on 
formalised information, sometimes not. Whatever the level of information available, 
decisions often have to be made in a fixed period of time, and sometimes with hardly 
enough time to weigh up the alternative options. People make decisions about
University Press, p i 138
49 Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: towards a new modernity. Translated by Sage Publications. London: 
Sage Publications.
50 ENDS Report (1996). Risk without honour. ENDS Report 254: 1.
Wynne, B. (1996). Patronising Joe Public. The Times Higher 12 April 1996: 13.
51 Barraclough, I.M. (1991). Pathways to man - the effect o f climatic change. Future climatic change 
and radioactive waste disposal. International Workshop: UEA, Norwich. UEA Norwich.
British Government Panel on Sustainable Development (1996). Second Report. London: DoE. January 
1996.
British Government Panel on Sustainable Development (1995). First Report. London: DoE. Jan 1995. 
British Government Panel on Sustainable Development (1997). Third Report. London: DoE. Jan 1997. 
UK Government (1996). Government Response to the Second Annual Report o f  the Government's 
Panel on Sustainable Development. London: DoE. March 1996.
Churchill, R. and Freestone, D., (eds) (1991). International law and global climate change. London: 
Graham and Trotman / Matinur Nijhoff.
Shackley, S. and Wynne, B. (1996). Representing uncertainty in global climate change science and 
policy: boundary-ordering devices and authority. Science, Technology and Human Values 21, (3): 275- 
302.
Zwick, A. (1996). Decisions in a climate o f uncertainty: addressing the C 02 issue. The IPTS Report 2: 
17-21.
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everyday matters based on their intuition regarding the safety of a particular course of 
action. They don’t evaluate scientific data before reaching a decision. Proverbs often 
represent short pithy expressions of the type of precautionary behaviour used in 
everyday decision-making. In this they offer an insight into lay behaviour and some 
also provide moral support for particular courses of action.
A brief review of such proverbs show that precaution exists as a common-sense 
concept, and reveals some of its qualities. That is not to say that proverbs dictate the 
lay position but rather that conventional wisdom can be considered by analysing 
proverbs, as distinct from expert positions on precaution. My aim here is to identify 
the different levels on which precaution can be understood and to show that the notion 
of precaution is not something new, only recently found within international 
agreements embodying expert understandings, but something which can be traced 
back through many different cultures. This is relevant since it is important to 
understand the tensions that exist between intuitive or lay interpretations of precaution 
and other expert interpretations, in order to think about what the precautionary 
principle might mean in practice, in particular with reference to contemporary 
environmental issues.
In English two of the most common proverbs relating to caution are ‘Look before you 
leap’ and ‘Don’t put all your eggs in one basket’. Many other cultures have proverbs, 
the sense of which is identical to these. In Israel they say ‘The wise man has eyes in 
his head, but the fool walks in darkness’52 and ‘The prudent man considers his steps’53
52Westermann, C. (1995). Roots o f  wisdom: the oldest proverbs o f  Israel and other peoples. Edinburgh:
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while in Japan they say ‘Adel caution to caution’.34 Two old Persian proverbs are 
‘Don’t jump into the water where there is no ford’55 and ‘Don’t cut without 
measuring’56 which equate with the Scottish ‘Look before ye loup, ye’ll ken better
c n
how to light’. And an American proverb is ‘He that will not look before him will 
have to look behind him’.58 All these proverbs are to do with direct, individual 
experiences related to local situations over which the individual has ability to take one 
course o f action or another. They are common sense and can be applied to local 
experiences and everyday situations. This contrasts with the more expert ‘scientific’ 
approach to decision-making which relies on indirect knowledge, through scientific 
theory and practice, and which promises extrapolation of understandings on an 
ambitious scale. The proverbial level of decision-making relies on a direct knowledge 
gained through experience and familiarity with the local. By highlighting the cultural 
diversity of proverbs I suggest that lay notions of precaution are not fixed in one 
culture, but are as global and broadly implied as the more political international 
agreements mentioned earlier.
In order to analyse the relevance of these proverbs to my thesis on the precautionary 
principle I now look at the meanings behind them. Although this does little to inform 
us as to how the precautionary principle might be implemented in practice it does
T&T Clark, p i02
53Westermann, C. (1995). Roots o f  wisdom: the oldest proverbs o f  Israel and other peoples. Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark. p55
54Galef, D. (1995). 'Even monkeys fa ll from trees' and other Japanese proverbs. Rutland, Vt and 
Tokyo: Charles E Tuttle Company, p i 28
55Elwell-Sutton (1954). Persian proverbs. London: John Murray. p23
56Elwell-Sutton (1954). Persian proverbs. London: John Murray. p23
57 Hislop, A. (1868). The proverbs o f  Scotland: with explanatory and illustrative notes and a glossary. 
Edinburgh: Alexander Hislop and Company. p217
58Mieder, W., (ed). (1992). A dictionary o f  American proverbs. New York, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. p384
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demonstrate the applicability of the notion of precaution to the case studies under 
examination in this thesis. The implication of Took before you leap’ is that it is 
common sense to be cautious and to try to work out in advance what the possible 
consequences of one’s actions are before engaging in potentially risky activities. The 
concept of Took before you leap’ (precaution), if it were to be applied to the issue of 
endocrine disrupting chemicals suggests there are unknowns waiting on the other side 
o f what is being leapt into (there may be consequences due to the use of certain 
chemicals in the environment).
Another common English proverb advocating caution is ‘Don’t put all your eggs in 
one basket’. A connection can be made between this concept and the radioactive 
waste disposal issue. The implication of the proverb is that investing everything in 
one enterprise (nuclear technology) could turn out to be dangerous, that is if the basket 
is dropped (the question of what to do with the created radioactive waste). Some 
proverbs about caution and foresight may be more relevant to the understanding of 
particular environmental problems than others. This is not surprising for proverbs are 
generally selected in order to make a particular point in a specific situation. This 
demonstrates both the versatility of proverbs and the parallels that can be drawn with 
the precautionary principle.
To give another example, the proverb ‘Don’t count your chickens before they’re 
hatched’ suggests that it is not wise to assume that all is as it appears (chemicals are 
safe) because surprises may be in store in that some of the eggs may not hatch or may 
be dropped (there may be effects that have not been tested for or mixtures of 
chemicals in the environment may create unanticipated toxins). Again there are a
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number o f other cultures with similar proverbs: The Japanese say ‘Don’t estimate the 
value of a badger skin before catching the badger’59, while the Scots say ‘Dinna gut 
your fish till ye get them’60; the Dutch echo the Scottish proverb with ‘Don’t cry 
herrings till they are in the net’ while the Italians have a similar proverb to the 
Japanese with ‘Don’t sell the bearskin before you have caught the bear’. The German 
proverb of ‘Unlaid eggs are uncertain chickens’61 echoes the English equivalent.
These proverbs advise caution against assuming there will be no unforeseen problems 
arising (nuclear power is a clean technology) and suggest that it is unwise to make 
plans about the future based on uncertain knowledge (ignoring the implications of 
radioactive waste disposal).
This thesis illustrates that there is a difficulty at the expert/institutional level of putting 
common-sense precaution into practice. Many of the agreements mentioned earlier 
embody a common-sense notion of precaution as can be seen from the view that 
scientific uncertainty should not stand in the way of taking a precautionary approach. 
Having situated the common sense concept of caution in popular culture I now 
identify specific elements of precaution identified within the rhetoric of formal 
agreements.
59Galef, D. (1995). 'Even monkeys fa ll from  trees' and other Japanese proverbs. Rutland, Vt and 
Tokyo: Charles E Tuttle Company. p70
60 Hislop, A. (1868). The proverbs o f  Scotland: with explanatory and illustrative notes and a glossary. 
Edinburgh: Alexander Hislop and Company. p79
61 Hislop, A. (1868). The proverbs o f  Scotland: with explanatory and illustrative notes and a glossary. 
Edinburgh: Alexander Hislop and Company. p79
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Formalised precaution
From the previous sections it can be seen that precaution is widely established as a 
documented principle in the environmental arena as well as a lay ethos. I now unpack 
some of the characteristics of precaution as embodied in the formal national and 
international agreements cited above in order to create a framework with which to 
analyse and compare the radioactive waste disposal case study and the study of 
endocrine disruption.
fS) •From the agreements I examined, I identify six situations in which the precautionary 
principle is expected to apply:
a) situations where a causal link to effects is unclear
b) where scientific evidence does not yet exist
c) where there is no scientific evidence
d) where cost is a factor
e) where the scale of the threat is a factor
f) where there are a diversity of situations to be accounted for.
These are not mutually exclusive but serve to indicate the range and reach of the 
concepts behind the rhetorical ‘precautionary principle’. Additionally, they are not 
unique to the idea o f the precautionary principle (they are factors relevant to many 
forms of hazard assessment) but as they are provided as caveats within the agreements 
identified, it is relevant to consider them as embodying the core ingredients of
62See Appendix 1
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precaution. I now look at each of these in turn in order to demonstrate the formal 
embodiment o f common-sense understandings and the tensions between these and 
science-based strategies.
a) where a causal link to effects is unclear
The Ministerial Declaration on the Protection of the North Sea in 1987 states that:
“ .. .in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of 
the most dangerous substances a precautionary approach is necessary 
which may require action to control inputs of such substances even 
before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific 
evidence.” (my emphasis)
This indicates a situation where it is already known that possible deleterious effects 
may occur by continuing with a given activity (deep-sea dumping). The unknowns are 
precisely what effects there might be and exactly what inputs might cause them. 
Applying the precautionary principle with this proviso allows for the possibility that 
action can be taken where scientific evidence is still in dispute. It sets up the 
possibility that something other than scientific evidence may be used as a basis for a 
decision. However, it stops short of addressing the question of what that other 
something might be and how the process of deciding what action might be required 
would be negotiated. Debate about the dumping of the Brent Spar, an oil platform, 
illustrates just such a case. The potential consequences of dumping one oil platform
63 Ministerial Declaration, Second International Conference on the Protection o f the North Sea, London, 
November 1987, quoted in Haigh, N. (1994). The introduction o f  the precautionary principle into the 
UK. In, O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle:229-251.
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were not so much in dispute as the consequences of setting a precedent that many 
more oil platforms would be dumped. The argument over precedence-setting was 
decisive in this instance.64
b) where scientific evidence does not yet exist
The preamble to the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of 
the Ozone Layer in 1987 states that:
“[The parties are] determined to protect the ozone layer by taking 
precautionary measures to control equitably total global emissions of 
substances that deplete it, with the ultimate objective of their 
elimination on the basis o f  developments in scientific knowledge, 
taking into account technical and economic considerations”65 (my 
emphasis)
This indicates a situation where, although evidence does not currently exist, there is an 
assumption that it will be found. Precaution in this example is equated with control of 
risky substances while science is equated with their elimination. There is an 
assumption that human behaviour will not be required to be modified because science 
will ultimately come up with a replacement for the pollutant in question. The 
Montreal Protocol allows for precautionary measures to dictate action on ozone 
depleting substances, although it also stops short of suggesting what those measures 
might be. It additionally accepts that scientific evidence will be required to justify the
London: Earthscan Publications Ltd. p244
64 ENDS Report (1996). NERC embarrasses DTI with report on Brent Spar. ENDS Report 256: 12.
65 Taken from Young, M.D. (1993). For our children's children: some practical implications o f  inter-
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most rigorous action toward ozone depleting substances, that of banning them. The 
implicit assumption is that ultimately decisions must be based on scientific evidence 
but in the meantime, common-sense precaution is advisable.
c) where there is no scientific evidence
Recommendation 89/1 of the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from 
Land Based Sources states that:
“[The contracting parties] accept the principle of safeguarding the 
marine ecosystem of the Paris Convention area by reducing at source 
polluting emissions of substances that are persistent, toxic and liable to 
bioaccumulate by the use of best available technology and other 
appropriate measures. This applies especially when there is reason to 
assume that certain damage or harmful effects on the living resources 
of the sea are likely to be caused by such substances, even when there 
is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between the emissions 
and effects (“the principle of precautionary action”) ...”66 (my 
emphasis)
This indicates a situation where some harms are known to exist but where there is no 
scientific evidence to link those harms to effects. By stating the intention to reduce 
substances that are persistent, toxic and bioaccumulative it is supposed that there is
generational equality and the precautionary principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service. November 1993. p40-43
66 The Paris Commission (PARCOM) established by the Convention for the Prevention o f Marine 
Pollution from Land Bared Sources, 22 June 1989, Recommendation 89/1, quoted in Young, M.D. 
(1993). For our children's children: some practical implications o f  inter-generational equality and the 
precautionaiy principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. November 1993. p40-
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some way of identifying which substances these are. Therefore, scientific evidence at 
least at that level is assumed to exist. The reference to there being no scientific 
evidence is related to evidence of a causal linkage, i.e. that there is no evidence o f a 
mechanism whereby the ‘polluting emissions’ are causing environmental effects. 
Again what is lacking in this convention as in the previous ones is any notion as to 
what the decision should be based upon given the lack of scientific evidence. This 
notion of not waiting for scientific evidence to prove causality before making a
fndecision is echoed in the Hague Declaration of 1990.
d) where cost is a factor
The UK Government White Paper ‘This Common Inheritance’ stated in 1990 that:
“... given the environmental risks, we must act responsibly and be 
prepared to take precautionary action where it is justified. ... Where 
there are significant risks of damage to the environment, the 
Government will be prepared to take precautionary action to limit the 
use of potentially dangerous materials or the spread of potentially 
dangerous pollutants, even where scientific knowledge is not 
conclusive, i f  the balance o f likely costs and benefits justifies it. This 
precautionary principle applies particularly where there are good 
grounds forjudging either that action taken promptly at comparatively 
low cost may avoid more costly damage later, or that irreversible
43
67 See Appendix 1
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effects may follow if action is delayed.”68 (my emphasis)
This indicates a situation where the use of potentially dangerous materials and 
pollutants will be restricted as a precautionary measure without full scientific evidence 
being available but with the added dimension that it can be justified with recourse to a 
cost-benefit analysis. It talks about significant risks of damage to the environment 
without indicating how a significant risk would be determined and it qualifies its call 
for action according to the costs that the action would involve. This takes the 
decision-making out of the realm of solely scientific determination and adds an 
additional factor (cost) into the equation. The Montreal Protocol also makes reference 
to economic considerations as a factor in applying the precautionary principle.
e) where the scale of the threat is a factor
The Bergen Ministerial Declaration of 1990 states that:
“In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based 
on the precautionary principle. Environmental measures must 
anticipate, prevent and attack the causes o f environmental degradation.
Where there are threats o f serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.”69 (my emphasis)
This indicates a situation where environmental degradation must be tackled by means 
of the precautionary principle. However it qualifies the type of degradation that must
68 Command Paper 2100 (1990). This common inheritance. London: HMSO. September 1990. p lO&ll
69 The Bergen Ministerial Declaration o f 1990, quoted in Young, M.D. (1993). For our children's 
children: some practical implications o f  inter-generational equality and the precautionaiy principle.
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be tackled by stating that it must be serious or irreversible. This introduces the notion 
that the scale of the potential degradation should be weighed up in order to judge what 
kind of action is most appropriate. It suggests that if the threat is serious or 
irreversible then action should not be postponed. What constitutes a serious threat is 
not explicated although again lack of scientific consensus is not to be used as a reason 
not to take action. Here the issue of scientific uncertainty is acknowledged although 
there is no discussion of how it could be handled. What is clearly important is when 
the threat is great something should be done to mitigate any potential effects. The 
difficulty comes in translating that into action.
f) where there are a diversity of situations to be accounted for
In Article 130r o f the “Maastricht Treaty” of 1992 it states that:
“Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of 
protection taking into account the diversity o f  situations in the various 
regions of the Community. It shall be based on the precautionary 
principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, 
that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source 
and that the polluter should pay. Environmental protection 
requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation 
of other Community policies.”70 (my emphasis)
This indicates that there are a myriad of situations within one area (the EU) and that
Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. November 1993. p40-43
70 “Maastricht Treaty”, Treaty on European Union, February 1992, Article 130r, paragraph 2, quoted in 
Young, M.D. (1993). For our children's children: some practical implications o f  inter-generational
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the precautionary principle must be prepared to deal with all of them. The Maastricht 
Treaty shows that each region may be exposed to different hazards and risks with the 
significant point in common being that they may all impact on the environment. It 
links the precautionary principle to other environmental protection requirements 
implying that it is not a principle that should work on its own. By associating it with 
the polluter pays principle it gives a first indication of how the precautionary principle 
might be implemented in practice.
Having identified these six situations it can be seen that the precautionary principle is 
invoked in a multitude of agreements which all claim to be for the benefit of the 
environment but which position the precautionary principle in different ways. It is 
important to recognise that these agreements reflect the specific circumstances for 
which they were drawn up. Scientific evidence, for example, is used as a criterion in 
many of the agreements but not in a uniform manner. Sometimes the fact that there is 
no scientific evidence is invoked as a reason to employ the precautionary principle.
On other occasions the fact that the evidence is not there yet is a good reason to 
invoke it although there is the assumption that science will eventually provide 
evidence that will justify the precautionary actions. In other agreements the fact that 
there is no clear link between cause and effect should not be used as a reason for not 
taking precautionary action and again there is an implicit assumption that decisions 
about action should, necessarily, be based on something other than scientific evidence. 
Even between agreements advocating the position that science cannot be relied on to 
provide answers when required there is still a rhetoric that comes back to science
equality and the precautionaiy principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
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being the eventual source of truth. In these agreements science remains the basis for 
decision-making, despite acknowledgement that actions need to be made prior to the 
point at which scientific knowledge offers such a foundation. Looking back, it may be 
said that the precautionary principle fills the vacuum created by a science that 
continually searches for certainty but which continually fails to deliver. Because 
‘certainty’ is created within boundaries on the basis of agreed assumptions and error 
margins science will never be able to offer undisputed truth. There will always be 
uncertainty because certainty is always contingent on other factors. It is the 
acknowledgment of this that the precautionary principle prompts. What is left after it
71is acknowledged that decisions will never be based on certainty is a risk society , i.e. 
a society in which the precautionary principle represents a practical conceptual 
corollary to science-based decision-making.
Reviewing formal agreements in this way illustrates the tensions that exist about 
scientific evidence and the differing levels at which the precautionary principle is 
invoked in relation to it. This gives me a place to start. In itself the precautionary 
principle offers little indication of how to undertake empirical research regarding its 
application. Due to a lack of situations in the UK where the precautionary principle 
has been explicitly used as the driving force behind environmental policy decisions I 
have had to consider alternative ways of understanding what the precautionary 
principle may mean in practice. The agreements identified suggest that understanding 
how scientific evidence is marshalled and how uncertainty is acknowledged and used
November 1993. p40-43
71 This is a term coined by Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: towards a new modernity. Translated by 
Sage Publications. London: Sage Publications.
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is key to the rhetoric of the precautionary principle. I therefore focus on these areas in 
relation to two case studies of radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disrupting 
chemicals. By doing this I reframe the emphasis from looking at ‘the precautionary 
principle’ about which there is little detailed discussion within deliberations on these 
issues, to analysing those factors that deliberators about these cases do find relevant 
and which are central to the theme of precaution, broadly defined. Through looking at 
scientific evidence and the factors related to its definition and deployment, I 
demonstrate how the interests of individuals and organisations involved influence the 
positions taken in the process of making decisions and implementing precautionary 
strategies.
While decisions based on common-sense or anticipatory precaution and those based 
on scientific evidence may be considered conceptual corollaries they both have 
something in common -  the contingent interests of those involved in making the 
decisions. In this thesis I identify differing interests and their consequences, both for 
the making and marshalling of scientific evidence, and its use in decision-making in 
environmental arenas. It is therefore important to understand the way in which 
scientific evidence is created and used by different players involved in making a 
decision, what they identify as relevant evidence to support or oppose and the ways in 
which concepts of relevance to the decision in question are constructed and used in 
order to serve particular purposes.
The foci of my empirical studies therefore centre on the nature of evidence with 
attention given to the nature of definitions, disputed evidence, sufficient evidence, 
scientific uncertainty and the interests of government, industry and NGOs at various
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institutional levels. In the following section I describe the empirical cases studied in 
this thesis and outline how these themes are relevant to each case.
Cases of precaution
In order to explore the proposition that decisions based on the precautionary principle 
are the theoretical corollary to decisions based on an uncertain science it has been 
necessary to identify environmental issues which are the subject of controversy and 
intrigue and which reflect something of the array of problems with which decision­
makers are faced. The chosen case studies illustrate different situations in which the 
precautionary principle is invoked and simultaneously depict areas of commonality. 
This sheds light on the question of whether there is any scope for a broad application 
of the precautionary principle and the degree to which its meaning is defined by the 
issue to which it is applied.
A number of potential candidates initially came to mind, including genetically 
manipulated organisms, particulate emissions from exhausts, climate change,
72radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals. The latter two were 
ultimately selected as the most feasible and relevant case studies. At the time of 
starting my PhD a public inquiry into a planning application by UK Nirex Ltd to 
excavate a Rock Characterisation Facility (RCF) at Longlands Farm near Sellafield in 
Cumbria was under way. Nirex is the company responsible for managing intermediate 
level radioactive waste in the UK. It had submitted this application to the planning
72 Full details o f the selection and rejection o f particular cases are discussed in chapter four
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office to construct an RCF to investigate the geology and hydrology of the site in 
order to assess the site’s suitability as a deep disposal site for intermediate level waste. 
At around the same time the subject of the potential endocrine disrupting 
characteristics of certain chemicals was making headlines in the media. A number of 
scientific studies were indicating that the reproductive development of humans and
• • 73wildlife was deteriorating. Suggestions that these effects were being caused by 
manmade environmental chemicals were escalating74 and demands were being made 
from various sectors including academia, environmental NGOs and government for 
further research into this area.
Certain features of these two issues made them suitable candidates for my empirical 
research.75 The radioactive waste issue provided an opportunity for an historical study 
dating back to the late 1940s. This contrasts starkly with the endocrine disrupting 
chemicals issue, which, by comparison, is a contemporary 1990s phenomenon (in 
terms of its recognition as an issue). Although decisions about radioactive waste 
disposal are ongoing they have a definite history with players in the debate having 
been established with identifiable positions. In comparison, positions in relation to 
potentially endocrine disrupting chemicals are still emerging.
73 See Carlsen, E., Giwercman, A., Keiding, N., and Skakkebaek, N.E. (1992). Evidence for decreasing 
quality o f semen during past 50 years. British Medical Journal 305, (6854): 609-613., Giwercman, A., 
Carlsen, E., Keiding, N., and Skakkebaek, N.E. (1993). Evidence for increasing incidence o f  
abnormalities o f the human testis: a review. Environmental Health Perspectives 101, (supplement 2): 
65-71., Berger, G. (1994). Epidemiology o f  endometriosis: modern surgical management o f  
endometriosis. New York: Springer-Verlag.
74 See Carson, R. (1962). Silent spring. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, and Colbom, T., 
Peterson Myers, J., and Dumanoski, D. (1996). Our Stolen Future. London: Little, Brown and 
Company.
751 discuss these in detail in chapter four
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Another key point of difference concerns the relationship between cause and effect. 
This relates to the availability (or non-availability) of scientific evidence relating 
identifiable consequences to specific causes. Many of the hazards and risks associated 
with the nuclear industry have already been acknowledged and stringent safety 
regimes put in place in order to control exposure to radioactivity. However this does 
not mean that the assessment of risk goes undisputed or that there is no conflict as to 
liability for particular radioactive releases. The Nirex Inquiry, discussed within this 
thesis, provides ample evidence that controversies still exist in relation to the role of 
scientific evidence with reference to decisions about radioactive waste disposal. In 
contrast many of the hazards and risks associated with environmental chemicals have 
not been determined and there is much debate over the causes of the many observed 
effects. Comparing the differences in the uses of scientific evidence with regard to 
understandings of causality in these two cases, and the deliberations over the need to 
wait for scientific consensus before action can be taken, is central to understanding the 
role and use of the precautionary principle more generally, given the aforementioned 
consensus that the precautionary principle should be implemented in situations where 
there is still (significant) scientific controversy. Looking at these case studies in the 
light of what has been gleaned from analysis of agreements in which the precautionary 
principle is invoked highlights differences between what has been agreed at a policy 
level and what is being discussed at the level of individual issues.
In both cases emphasis on scientific evidence and efforts to determine the potential 
scale of the threat involves the employment of terminology and concepts that may not 
be understood by all those involved in the deliberations. By investigating the way in 
which definitions become established and are used to construct arguments in defence
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of particular positions, both in discussions about radioactive waste disposal and 
endocrine disrupting chemicals, it can be shown how much reliance is placed on 
rhetorical manoeuvring in decision-making processes. This is instructive in 
understanding the potential of the precautionary principle. I illustrate the way in 
which background interests shape negotiating positions and thereby determine 
definitions and interpretations, which, in turn surround the precautionary principle 
itself.
An additional contrast concerns technical difficulties associated with detecting 
problems. Radiation, although not detectable with the naked eye, is readily detected 
with the right equipment. While this means that only specialists with access to this 
equipment can detect radiation it remains a relatively straightforward procedure. In 
contrast endocrine disrupting chemicals are not easily identified. Like radiation, 
endocrine disrupting chemicals are not detectable with the naked eye but nor are they 
easily detected with standard laboratory instruments. While the presence of certain 
chemicals may be detectable in water or air using specialist monitoring equipment, 
determining their potential endocrine disrupting capabilities is not so straightforward. 
The equipment, protocols and instruments for conducting such tests have not been 
fully developed nor agreed upon. The precautionary principle is invoked with respect 
to both types of problem -  those where detection of exposure is possible by scientific 
means and those where methods of detection have not been established.
These cases provide relevant arenas in which to investigate the ways in which 
scientific evidence is presented and re-presented in decision-making fora. This, in 
turn, is important in order to determine the interests lying behind the positions
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adopted. By investigating how scientific evidence is presented I develop an 
understanding of issues that are important to those involved in making decisions about 
the two cases in question. Having identified what is important I can then determine 
what factors help shape interpretations of relevance and significance. By determining 
the institutional or political interests of those involved, I am in a better position to 
analyse what the precautionary principle might mean in these two situations.
The precautionary principle is raised as something that should be applied to a range of 
heterogeneous environmental situations. The contrasting features of the two case 
studies illuminate both the problems and the benefits of prescribing a blanket 
application of the precautionary principle. For example endocrine disrupting 
chemicals are ubiquitous in the environment with all individuals exposed to them to 
some degree (although not necessarily to the same degree). In contrast radioactive 
waste disposal provides more immediate exposures. Not everyone will automatically 
come into contact with radioactive waste. If it is to be used as a generalised guide to 
action the precautionary principle must respond to both these situations. There is 
much stronger and more developed legislation regulating radioactive waste matters 
than endocrine disrupting chemicals yet the precautionary principle is expected to deal 
with situations in which there are strong, weak and undeveloped legislative powers.
Both the radioactive waste disposal issue and the endocrine disrupting chemicals issue 
are engulfed by uncertainty: there are uncertainties at a political level about what is 
the best course of action to take and uncertainties at a scientific level over whether the 
immediate and longterm effects of any proposed action can be determined. Scientific 
uncertainty and the way it is handled by scientists, by the public and by policy makers
53
is discussed in more detail in chapter three. Understanding that different 
interpretations of uncertainty co-exist is essential in analysing the application of the 
precautionary principle. Together these two case studies help reveal the complexities 
with which the precautionary principle is faced at the level o f making decisions about 
environmental issues. Comparing the way in which decisions are made about 
radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals reveals the importance 
of the embedded and intrinsic interests o f those involved.
It is important to recognise that the case studies are not being used as simple 
representations of the application of the precautionary principle, but rather as 
instances o f environmental problems about which there is wide ranging concern.
They are thus used to investigate the ways in which situations identified as being 
rhetorically relevant to the precautionary principle are addressed at a deliberative 
level. By identifying the main areas of deliberation with regard the two case studies in 
chapters five and six I relate these back to the six situations of precaution identified in 
this chapter. Critically, these issues concern the definition and uses of scientific 
evidence. What is consequently seen is that factors that are integral to the rhetoric of 
precaution are also discussed in deliberations about policy options with regard to 
environmental issues regardless of whether ‘the precautionary principle’ itself is being 
actively invoked. The implications of this for the meaning of the precautionary 
principle and how it might be applied to other environmental issues are varied and are 
discussed in chapter eight.
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Summary
Having established that the precautionary principle is vague and ill-defined I traced its 
origins from Vorsorgeprinzip in Germany through to its invocation in various formal 
international agreements. I identified that no agreed ground-rules exist regarding the 
complicated question of implementing the precautionary principle. I identified that 
the precautionary principle is required to operate in diverse situations and revealed 
that there is no established formula whereby consensus amongst the various 
stakeholders can be reached.
With reference to a review of formal agreements, I illustrated the evolution of 
precaution from a precautionary approach to the precautionary principle, an 
important distinction as it emphasises the definite article, the, which implies 
something tangible and unique that can be applied in a multitude of situations.
I went on to show that the precautionary principle can be understood at two levels: a 
common-sense level that suggests the environment should be protected, and a more 
expert level where risk, uncertainty and the weight of evidence play central roles. The 
former offers a generalised, but unspecific, guide to action while the latter implies that 
experts can weigh up the risks and uncertainties and determine what constitutes 
implementation. This ‘scientising’ of precaution arguably undermines the very 
reasons why formal agreements call for action to be based upon the precautionary 
principle, namely that risk cannot always be quantified and evidence is not always 
available.
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Through discussing the difference between common-sense precaution and scientific 
practice I show that the precautionary principle does not fit easily into the scientific 
paradigm. Scientific controversy is conventionally resolved through consensus and 
peer review and this process may take years, although it may be that dominant voices 
in the scientific field come to be accepted as the current position of scientific 
knowledge. In contrast the precautionary principle has no accepted set of practices 
and regulations and there is no established framework through which consensus can 
be reached. I show that the precautionary principle implies a move from a posteriori 
induction (on which science is based) to a priori deduction and that this is important 
because effects may be uncertain while causes may be identifiable.
Further analysis of formal precautionary agreements allowed me to identify six 
situations in which the precautionary principle is expected to apply: situations where a 
causal link to effects is unclear; where scientific evidence does not yet exist; where 
there is no scientific evidence; where cost is a factor; where the scale of the threat is a 
factor; and where there are a diversity of situations to be accounted for. By 
identifying these six situations I have shown the way in which scientific knowledge is 
included as an integral part of these agreements despite the fact that it has been 
acknowledged that decisions need to be made prior to science being in a position to 
offer any level of certainty. From this I have suggested that the precautionary 
principle is a practical conceptual corollary to science-based decision-making.
This line of reasoning explains the development of the following chapters. I have 
looked at scientific evidence and other related issues precisely because they are 
invoked in the same agreements that recommend the application of the precautionary
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principle. By looking at these issues I explore how the interests of individuals and 
organisations involved in making decisions influence positions taken with regard to 
scientific knowledge. By attempting to understand the way in which scientific 
evidence is created and used by different players involved in making decisions I start 
to identify their contingent interests. My empirical research concentrates on detailed 
investigation of the nature of definitions, disputed evidence, sufficient evidence, 
scientific uncertainty and the interests of government, industry and NGOs at an 
institutional level. These themes provide a platform from which to analyse what the 
precautionary principle means in relation to disparate and contrasting environmental 
problems.
This thesis is about understanding the rhetoric of precaution and the practice of 
decision-making in areas of environmental controversy. It untangles the rhetoric, as 
established in documented agreements referring to precaution, from the constituent 
ideas that embody it, as characterised by those who deliberate on its application. This 
is what connects my analysis of documents referring to the precautionary principle to 
my empirical work on radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals. 
By analysing the way in which the rhetoric of precaution is framed within these 
documents I have been able to identify different elements that make up the principle in 
theory. I then use these elements as the starting point for my analysis of radioactive 
waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals. By focussing on the constituent 
ideas behind the precautionary principle I am able to move forward from the stalemate 
of rhetoric that could become the focus of attention itself.
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Chapter Three
Uncertainty, Expertise and Interests
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Introduction
In the previous chapter I suggested that precautionary practices reflected 
interpretations of the nature of evidence, the nature of definitions, disputed evidence, 
sufficient evidence, scientific uncertainty, and the interests of government, industry 
and NGOs. In this chapter I analyse their connection to each other and attempt to 
draw out inter-relationships between these constituent themes. In addition I review 
some of the literature about uncertainty in order to get a sense of the breadth of 
meaning that this term conveys. I establish how the issue of uncertainty is related to 
scientific controversy and decision-making, and look at how expertise is defined and 
deployed in relation to scientific uncertainty. In the course of this chapter I introduce 
ideas from the sociology of science and relate these to debate about the precautionary 
principle. Science studies identifies ‘facts’ as social products rather than as objective 
entities and raises issues of social negotiation and interaction.1 Various authors assert 
that the concept of ‘fact’ is misleading in the sense that everything that is accepted as 
knowledge comes about through negotiation rather than objective discovery. 
Additionally they set up decision-making as something that has been socially 
constructed, viewing sites of controversy as points at which associated interests are 
brought together. By introducing these ideas from science studies and giving a brief
1 See Fujimura, J.H. (1991). On methods, ontologies and representation in the sociology o f science: 
where do we stand? In, Maines, D., (ed)., Social organization and social process: essays in honor o f  
Anselm L Slrauss:201-2A%. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter. p224. See also Jasanoff, S. (1989). 
Guest Editorial: Norms for Evaluating Regulatory Science. Risk Analysis 9, (3): 271-273. p272 where 
she says facts are accepted within a ‘system o f shared conventions’.
2 Collins, H.M. (1982). The replication o f experiments in physics. In, Barnes, B. and Edge, D., (eds), 
Science in context: readings in the sociology’ o f  science: 94-116. Milton Keynes: The Open University 
Press, p i 11-112; Pinch, T. and Bijker, W. (1984). The social construction o f fact and artefacts: or how 
the sociology o f science and the sociology o f technology might benefit each other. Social Studies o f  
Science 14: 399-441. p401-402; Campbell, B.L. (1985). Uncertainty as symbolic action in disputes 
among experts. Social Studies o f  Science 15: 429-453. p450. See also Rip, A. (1985). Experts in public
59
outline of the prevalent issues within the discipline that relate to my study of the 
precautionary principle I explain why I have adopted an interests approach as a 
theoretical framework for analysing my case studies.
Interests theorists are typically concerned to uncover the reasons behind the different 
positions taken on particular scientific controversies.3 What follows is a review of 
literature on the interests approach. This allows me to evaluate what the position has 
to offer and how it has been used by researchers of scientific controversy. I too argue 
that interests are socially constructed and that they are associated with institutional 
beliefs and over-riding paradigms. In order to justify my use of the interests approach 
in relation to the precautionary principle I address some of the criticisms that have 
been levelled against it. I use Woolgar’s work extensively in the penultimate section, 
as he has been a very outspoken and articulate critic of the approach. Finally I 
identify aspects of interests theory that are of use to me in this thesis and, stating 
where I stand with regard to its use, I provide a justification of my use of that 
approach. I close the chapter with a summary of the main points elucidated within it.
arenas. In, Otway, H. and Peltn, M., (eds), Regulating industrial risks: science, hazards and public 
protection:94-\\0 . London: Butterworths. where he talks about the ‘hard-fact’ myth.
3 See, for example, Collins, H.M. (1983). An empirical relativist programme in the sociology o f  
scientific knowledge. In, Knorr-Cetina, K.D. and Mulkay, M., (eds), Science observed: perspectives on 
the social study o f  science'.^ 5-113. London: Sage Publications Ltd. p85-l 13; Barnes, B. and 
MacKenzie, D. (1979). On the role on interests in scientific change. In, Wallis, R., (ed)., On the 
margins o f  science: the social construction o f  rejected knowledge:49-66. Keele, Staffs: University o f  
Keele. p49-66; Shapin, S. (1979). The politics o f observation: cerebral anatomy and social interests in 
the Edinburgh phrenology disputes. In, Wallis, R., (ed)., On the margins o f  science: the social 
construction o f  rejected knowledge: 139-178. Keele, Staffs: University o f Keele. p 139-178
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Questions of Uncertainty
In the previous chapter I identified six distinct situations in which the precautionary 
principle is expected to apply: in situations where a causal link to effects is unclear, 
where scientific evidence does not yet exist, where there is no scientific evidence, 
where cost is a factor, where the scale of the threat is a factor and where there are a 
diversity of situations to be accounted for. These led me to identify a number of 
themes (the nature of evidence, the nature of definitions, disputed evidence, sufficient 
evidence, scientific uncertainty and the interests of government, industry and NGOs) 
as being critical with regard to interpretations of the precautionary principle. In this 
chapter I develop a justification for concentrating on these in my empirical work. The 
aim here is to develop an argument about the relationship between academic literature 
on uncertainty and literature on interests. I do this by introducing various types of 
uncertainty and then discussing the role uncertainty plays within policy. The notion of 
interests is then introduced, with a subsequent sub-section on expertise, linking 
uncertainty and interests.
Types of uncertainty
According to O’Riordan and Cameron there are three fundamental forms of 
uncertainty with which science must cope: uncertainty as lack of data; uncertainty as 
variability of process; and uncertainty as indeterminacy.4 These notions of uncertainty 
need further explanation.
4 O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J„ (eds) (1994). Interpreting the Precautionary Principle. London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd. p62-66
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Lack of data is probably the most easily explained source of uncertainty and can occur 
because the systems and processes under consideration have not been monitored for 
long enough for ‘sufficient’ data to have accumulated. This could be due to lack of 
knowledge about what exactly should be monitored or because financial constraints 
have imposed a limit on the amount of monitoring possible or even because data is 
withheld due to commercial confidentiality or national security. The technique 
selected to collect data may itself be uncertain -  it may have been used successfully in 
a different situation but be inappropriate for the present requirements or it may be a 
new method that has not been tested before. The interpretation of data by different 
‘experts’ may also contribute to this form of uncertainty. Wynne and Mayer’s 
description of the British government and the Central Electricity Generating Board’s 
demands for more research on acid rain in the 1980s -  before they would consider 
imposing abatement measures -  exemplifies the uses of such an uncertainty 
argument.5 The British government and the CEGB argued that existing scientific data, 
which was good enough for most other countries, was ‘too’ uncertain. Their object 
was to stall making a decision until science ‘proved’ a link between emissions and 
acid rain.
One of the ways in which scientists have overcome this problem of lack of data is by 
means of extrapolation and modelling. As O’Riordan and Cameron put it:
‘This is the so-called Newtonian view of estimating uncertain 
outcomes, utilising the logic of extrapolation from careful
5 Wynne, B. and Mayer, S. (1993). How science fails the environment. New Scientist 5 June 1993: 33- 
35. p33-35
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observation and experimentation, coupled to experience and peer 
reviews.’6
This approach is, however, problematic as it involves assumptions about natural 
processes and causes and effects and the data used in the modelling may itself be 
extrapolated from a smaller sample of data.
‘Only by investing in more painstaking monitoring and careful 
collaborative comparisons of many ecological conditions, can any 
certainty be created.’7 
Other factors that must be considered are that the characteristics and qualities of the 
models used to ‘plug’ gaps in data inevitably simplify the systems they are supposed 
to represent and may leave out so many factors that this transforms the system in
o
question into something completely different. In any event, the key point is that 
observations and extrapolations are both taken to constitute ‘data’, some forms being 
more ‘sufficient’ and others more ‘uncertain’.
The second form of uncertainty, according to O’Riordan and Cameron, is ‘uncertainty 
as variability of process.’ By this I understand them to mean that the mechanisms and 
relationships which exist in the natural world are poorly understood, and that they are 
chaotic and variable in structure. This implies that it may be impossible to predict 
accurately the end results of an initial happening especially if the processes involved 
are unknown. An example of this kind of uncertainty is the issue of ‘global warming’
6 O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds) (1994). Interpreting the Precautionary Principle. London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd. p63
70'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds) (1994). Interpreting the Precautionary Principle. London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd. p63
8 See Funtowicz, S.O. and Ravetz, J.R. (1991). A new scientific methodology for global environmental 
issues. In, Costanza, R., (ed)., Environmental Economics: the science and management o f  
sustainability. 137-152. Columbia: Columbia University Press. p l39  for a discussion o f the data 
associated with computer models.
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where there is still no consensus as to the nature or dynamics of the problem. 
O’Riordan and Cameron underline the importance of peer review in managing this 
type of uncertainty:
‘There is always the danger of group fallibility in such exercises.
The only adequate answer is to ensure that such constellations of 
opinion have the widest range of views, and are open to 
examination, so that unusual interpretations get a proper airing’.9 
There are implications in this for policy making as any decisions based on an 
assumption about a particular ecological relationship, even if  that relationship is 
accepted by consensual agreement, must ultimately be a subjective decision. 
Concepts of subjectivity, values and interests are addressed later in this chapter.
Uncertainty as indeterminacy is a much more complex form. Wynne tells us that 
indeterminacy is not just uncertainty in the form of imprecision, which it is assumed 
will be narrowed down by more research, but rather a state of affairs which relates to 
whether things are classified as the same or different and on what specific properties 
or criteria.10 As O’Riordan and Cameron state:
9 O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds) (1994). Interpreting the Precautionary Principle. London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd. p64-65. See also Funtowicz, S.O. and Ravetz, J.R. (1991). A new scientific 
methodology for global environmental issues. In, Costanza, R., (ed)., Environmental Economics: the 
science and management o f  sustainability:131-\52. Columbia: Columbia University Press. p l49 . This 
point is acknowledged by the Office o f Science and Technology, Department o f Trade and Industry - 
Office o f Science and Technology (1997). The use o f  scientific advice in policy making. London: DTi. 
March 1997. p4, paragraph 6. However, for a fuller discussion on the merits o f peer review for 
regulatory science see Jasanoff, S. (1990). The Fifth Branch: science advisors as policym akers. 
Harvard, US: Harvard University Press. p 61 -83
10Wynne, B. (1992). Uncertainty and environmental learning: reconceiving science and policy in the 
preventive paradigm. Global Environmental Change 2, (June): 111-127. p l26
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‘Indeterminacy means that the systems being studied operate to 
processes that cannot be encapsulated in traditional scientific 
terms.’11
In developing a similar position, Wynne challenges Ravetz et a /’s notion of 
indeterminacy, which he states is simply a larger-scale uncertainty.12 He states that 
‘Ravetz et al imply that uncertainty exists on an objective scale 
from small (risk) to large (ignorance), whereas I would see risk, 
uncertainty, ignorance and indeterminacy as overlaid one on the 
other, being expressed depending on the scale of the social
commitments (‘decision stakes’) which are bet on the knowledge
1 ^being correct.’
Wynne argues that indeterminacy
‘underlies the construction of scientific knowledge, as well as the 
wider social world in which we create environmental effects.’14 
And continues:
‘...scientific knowledge proceeds by exogenizing some significant 
uncertainties, which thus become invisible to it.’
The point here is that scientific endeavour works by treating a system as if particular 
uncertainties are insignificant thereby building up a particular knowledge. It is
"O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds) (1994). Interpreting the Precautionary Principle. London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd. p65
12Wynne, B. (1992). Uncertainty and environmental learning: reconceiving science and policy in the 
preventive paradigm. Global Environmental Change 2, (June): 111-127. p i 16, referring to Funtowicz, 
S. and Ravetz, J., (eds) (1990). Uncertainty and quality in science fo r  policy. Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic.
I3Wynne, B. (1992). Uncertainty and environmental learning: reconceiving science and policy in the 
preventive paradigm. Global Environmental Change 2, (June): 111-127. p i 16
l4Wynne, B. (1992). Uncertainty and environmental learning: reconceiving science and policy in the 
preventive paradigm. Global Environmental Change 2, (June): 111-127. p i 12
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however, these very uncertainties that must be acknowledged before extrapolation can 
occur. Quoting MacKenzie, Wynne states that
‘Indeterminacy exists in the open-ended question of whether 
knowledge is adapted to fit the mismatched realities of application 
situations, or whether those (technical and social) situations are 
reshaped to ‘validate’ the knowledge.’15 
Wynne asserts that the distinction between uncertainty and indeterminacy is important 
‘because the former enshrines the notion that inadequate control of 
environmental risks is due only to inadequate scientific knowledge, 
and exclusive attention is focused on intensifying that knowledge, 
to render it more precise.’16
To summarise, indeterminacy can be understood as necessary uncertainty. It is a 
consequence of the unavoidable limits of scientific knowledge, not a result of the 
failure to adequately develop or apply scientific method to the problem at hand. This 
means that science cannot always provide answers for policy makers to use in 
determining policy.
15Wynne, B. (1992). Uncertainty and environmental learning: reconceiving science and policy in the 
preventive paradigm. Global Environmental Change 2, (June): 111-127. p i 15, quoting MacKenzie, D. 
(1990). Inventing accuracy: a historical sociology o f  nuclear missile guidance. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.
16Wynne, B. (1992). Uncertainty and environmental learning: reconceiving science and policy in the 
preventive paradigm. Global Environmental Change 2, (June): 111-127. p i 18
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Uncertainty and its place in policy
According to Ravetz there is a range of possible solutions to the policy problem of 
handling uncertainty.17 He classifies them as technical, political and moral and he 
defines what he calls policy science, also known as ‘post-normal science’,18 
‘...where, typically, facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes 
large, and decisions urgent.’19 
These issues are of obvious relevance to the precautionary principle. The ‘policy 
science’ discussed by Ravetz may not describe the kind of science which scientists 
consider they perform but it is the kind of science that is used in making policy 
decisions. Ravetz emphasises the need for scientists and policy makers to work in 
partnership to control uncertainty and to manage ignorance.
Ravetz describes the birth and growth of a new technology in order to illustrate the 
level of ignorance that exists in situations where longer-term effects cannot be 
estimated:
‘At that point, its effects on its natural and social environment 
cannot be realistically estimated so much depends crucially on such 
unknowable aspects as the rate and direction of growth, that all
17 Ravetz, J.R. (1987). Uncertainty, ignorance and policy. In, Brooks, H. and Cooper, C.L., (eds), 
Science fo r  Public Policy. Oxford: Pergamon Press. p78.
18 Funtowicz, S.O. and Ravetz, J.R. (1991). A new scientific methodology for global environmental 
issues. In, Costanza, R., (ed)., Environmental Economics: the science and management o f  
sustainability: 137-152. Columbia: Columbia University Press, p 138 defines ‘the post-normal situation 
is one where the traditional opposition o f ‘hard’ facts and ‘soft’ values is inverted.’
19 Ravetz, J.R. (1987). Uncertainty, ignorance and policy. In, Brooks, H. and Cooper, C.L., (eds), 
Science fo r  Public Policy. Oxford: Pergamon Press. p81; Funtowicz, S.O. and Ravetz, J.R. (1991). A  
new scientific methodology for global environmental issues. In, Costanza, R., (ed)., Environmental 
Economics: the science and management o f  sustainability.\31  -152. Columbia: Columbia University 
Press. p l37
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scenarios are speculative, with little to distinguish among them.
Hence, for policy purposes, they are not probability-based 
uncertainties but only thinly disguised ignorance. So social control 
is impossible because of ignorance; then the technology grows and 
eventually some effects are revealed. Then some might want to 
step in, but by that point the technology is realised in a collection of 
institutions, with inertia, vested interests in growth, and means of 
keeping critics in some degree of ignorance about their activities.
Hence, social control is now impossible because of impotence; the 
technology rides high.’21 
This description suggests that it is impossible to install checks on the early stages of 
technological development. Ravetz implies that technologies are likely to have 
become irretrievably embedded before potentially negative effects are discernible.
This makes policy decisions difficult, if not impossible, since there is no more than the 
idea of a technology at stake at the point when it is really possible to make a 
difference. This is significant in relation to the precautionary principle because it is 
inherently about making decisions regarding technologies that have emerging 
environmental consequences.
Policy makers, confronted with uncertainty, typically refer to experts and expert 
knowledge.22 However, as Ravetz argues, experts have expertise only in their small,
20 Ravetz, J.R. (1987). Uncertainty, ignorance and policy. In, Brooks, H. and Cooper, C.L., (eds), 
Science fo r  Public Policy. Oxford: Pergamon Press. p82
21 Ravetz, J.R. (1987). Uncertainty, ignorance and policy. In, Brooks, H. and Cooper, C.L., (eds), 
Science fo r  Public Policy. Oxford: Pergamon Press. p83
22 See Rip, A. (1985). Experts in public arenas. In, Otway, H. and Peltu, M., (eds), Regulating 
industrial risks: science, hazards and public protection: 94-110. London: Butterworths. p96
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select field and therefore they are unable to foresee adverse consequences in other 
fields in which they are not. trained.2-3 Pinch goes further than this. He states:
‘It appears that different perceptions o f certainty are' available and 
that such perceptions tend to be polarised between different 
specialities, with each blaming the other for die problem.524 
Experts in particular fields assume certain norms and relationships in their everyday 
work that may seem like wild assumptions to a person from outside that field — 
although they might equally hold certain norms and relationships to exist in their own 
specialist field. This means that for a given problem each expert will assume 
uncertainty to exist in a field other than her or his own.2" This is difficult for policy 
makers as they will probably have no expertise in any of the fields in question, and 
may be presented with conflicting information from different ‘experts5. Even so, 
policy makers are forced to act on the scientific knowledge and advice that is available 
to them.
MacKenzie suggests that policy makers’ distance from the immediacies o f knowledge 
production is critical. He recognises the difference between those close to the 
knowledge production and those committed to using the knowledge in what he terms 
the ‘certainty trough5 (see next page).26 He distinguishes between the ‘uncertainty of
23 Ravetz, J.R. (1987). Uncertainty, ignorance and policy. In. Brooks, H. and Cooper, C.L., (eds), 
Science fo r  Public Policy. Oxford: Pergamon Press. p81
24 Pinch, T.J. (1981). The Sun-Set: the presentation o f certainty in scientific life. Social Studies o f  
Science 11,(1): 131-158. p l3 6
25 Pinch, T.J. (1981). The Sun-Set: the presentation o f certainty in scientific life. Social Studies o f  
Science 11,(1): 131-158. p l39. However, Star, S.L. (1985). Scientific work and uncertainty. Social 
Studies o f  Science 15: 391-427. p407-408 offers a different explanation in her discussion o f  the 
transformation o f local uncertainty into global certainty at the institutional level. She says ‘researchers 
tended to attribute certainty to other fields ...'
26 MacKenzie, D. (1990). Inventing accuracy: a historical sociology’ o f  nuclear missile guidance. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. p370-372
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the alienated’ and the ‘uncertainty... of those closest to the heart of the production of
77knowledge of accuracy’. He says:
‘Between those very close to the knowledge-producing technical 
heart o f the programs, and those alienated from them or committed 
to opposing programs, lie the program loyalists and those who 
simply “believe what the brochures tell them”. These lie in what 













Source: (MacKenzie, D. 1990) p372
users rather than producers 
of knowledge
to different technology
In sum, the view is that policy makers who are removed from the production of 
knowledge minimise the degree of uncertainty because they lie in this trough.
27 MacKenzie, D. (1990). Inventing accuracy: a historical sociology’ o f  nuclear missile guidance. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. p371. This is what Ezrahi, Y. (1980). Utopian and pragmatic rationalism: 
the political context o f scientific advice. Minerva 18, (1): 111-131. p i 13-114, calls the ‘pragmatic 
rationalist’ approach: ‘The pragmatic rationalist knows that the ‘scientific knowledge’ ... used by 
politicians and others engaged in contentions over policy might not be what qualified scientists would 
be willing to acknowledge as valid.’
28 MacKenzie, D. (1990). Inventing accuracy: a historical sociology o f  nuclear missile guidance. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. p371
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Uncertainty, policy-making and interests
In the above two sections I have illustrated three types of uncertainty. I have shown 
that despite the uncertainties inherent in scientific knowledge, policy decisions still 
take this knowledge into consideration. Above, Ravetz showed how uncertainty is 
perceived by those in one scientific field to be something created in another scientific 
discipline, o f which they have little or no knowledge. In contrast to this MacKenzie 
shows that it is those both close to and distant from the scientific knowledge in 
question who acknowledge uncertainties, although for different reasons. Meanwhile 
those who have to make practical use of the scientific knowledge minimise the extent 
and impact of the uncertainties. This notion of a ‘certainty trough’ is useful in order 
to make a connection between uncertainty and the interests embedded in the positions 
of those involved in decision-making. In this view individual’s responses to 
uncertainty depends on their proximity to or distance from the source of knowledge 
production and on their need to use that knowledge to make decisions. Positions in 
turn relate to social hierarchies and interests.
Pinch has pointed out that
‘most scientists carry with them the notion of a prestige hierarchy 
of scientific disciplines. One factor related to this hierarchy is 
judgements as to the confidence to be placed in the knowledge 
produced by different disciplines.’29 
These judgements can also be said to be determined by the interests embedded at the 
different levels of the hierarchy. Extended beyond scientific disciplines, the question
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arises as to where values, subjective judgements, intuition and emotion are placed. 
This thesis investigates the embedded interests implicitly entrenched within these 
hierarchies and positions. By exploring these concepts through contrasting case 
studies of radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals I attempt to 
understand the precautionary principle in action. These case studies allow the 
multiplicity of science and diversities o f uncertainty to emerge and these, in turn, are 
explored through discussion of disputed evidence, sufficient evidence and definitions 
of scientific and policy ‘problems’.
In relation to these case studies I analyse documents produced for and by specific 
decision-making fora in addition to interviewing key players in those deliberations. 
This provides a strong basis for determining the level of uncertainty admitted by 
different players at different levels. By analysing this data in terms of my pre- 
established themes of definitions, sufficient evidence and disputed evidence I explore 
embedded institutional interests. These case studies, discussed in chapters five and 
six, also suggest that scientists admit to different types of uncertainty according to 
their audiences,30 lending further support to MacKenzie’s model of the certainty 
trough.
29 Pinch, T.J. (1981). The Sun-Set: the presentation o f  certainty in scientific life. Social Studies o f  
Science 11, (1): 131-158. p 142
30 Pinch, T.J. (1981). The Sun-Set: the presentation o f  certainty in scientific life. Social Studies o f  
Science 11, (1): 131-158. p l55 . See also van Eijndhoven, J. and Groenewegen, P. (1991). The 
construction o f  expert advice on health risks. Social Studies o f  Science 21: 257-278. who, in their 
discussion o f  experts, state that ‘they manage to build an assessment which incorporates within it the 
social situation for which their advice is being asked.’
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The concept of expertise
One of the ways that I demonstrate the connection between uncertainty and the idea of 
interests is through analysing expertise. The way that uncertainty is dealt with in 
decision-making is dependent on the different types of expertise involved. This is 
demonstrated more fully in my empirical chapters where I identify the interests 
associated with the key players in each process, key players who are considered to 
have expertise in particular areas either by others and/or by themselves. In this 
section I look at some of the literature on scientific expertise to identify how it is 
described and how different researchers use the concept.
Describing a person as an ‘expert’ gives no clue as to which area their expertise lies in 
nor does it shed light on the level o f expertise that they have. In policy domains the 
term expert has been appropriated and black-boxed to specify expertise from the 
academic, government or the commercial sector. These types of expertise may be 
commissioned for specific purposes and can be acted upon or ignored by those who 
receive it. Expertise may also be suppressed depending on the power structures 
involved. Committees of experts may, for instance, be established to advise on 
specific issues, such as the USEPA EDSTAC31 committee for advising on the testing 
and screening of potential endocrine disrupters, or they may be more formal bodies 
which meet on a regular basis and have long-term strategies such as Advisory 
Committees for new drugs or food safety.
In this respect it is relevant to note Webster’s view that
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‘[Sociologists have shown how expert scientists allow their 
anticipation o f what is likely to be more widely acceptable to 
influence the sort of technical judgements they offer those who 
have commissioned their advice. ... [Ejxpertise has more generally 
been associated with broad ideological positions which favour 
certain interests over and against others. ... More recently it has 
been an accusation levelled at expert advisers working ostensibly as 
independent scientists within government departments or state 
agencies: this is particularly so of the controversies that have
•3 9
surrounded nuclear power and radioactive waste disposal.’
The implication is that scientific advisors anticipate the political positions of those 
they advise. Government positions are sometimes easy to discern, as illustrated in 
the following statement made by the British government about its policy on disposal 
of radioactive waste in the sea:
“We recommend that the UK should continue to seek to develop 
realistic international standards for disposal of low and intermediate 
level waste at sea. We believe that there can be quantitative 
justification for an increased sea dumping programme and we 
recommend urgent research to build up a body of knowledge which 
will demonstrate this.”34
31 United States Environmental Protection Agency Endocrine Disruption Screens and Tests Advisory 
Committee
32Webster, A. (1991). Science, technolog)' and society. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. p49-50
33 See van Eijndhoven, J. and Groenewegen, P. (1991). The construction o f expert advice on health 
risks. Social Studies o f  Science 21: 257-278. who, in their discussion o f experts, state that ‘they manage 
to build an assessment which incorporates within it the social situation for which their advice is being 
asked.’
34Department o f the Environment (1979). A review o f  Command Paper 884: the control o f  radioactive 
wastes. London: Department o f the Environment. 1979. p i 18 In: Webster, A. (1991). Science, 
technology and society’. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. p51
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This policy makes it very clear to scientific advisors that sea dumping is considered 
desirable and that evidence can be provided to justify that position. The position that 
an alternative to sea dumping may be a preferred option is not up for negotiation.
This demonstrates the way in which the political interests of government indirectly
T c
shape and reinforce the advice that is obtained from experts. In this case the 
uncertainties inherent in the option of sea dumping are negated in order to validate a 
predetermined stance.
In industrialised society policy-makers tend to rely on expert scientific advice since 
this is regarded as authoritative and is accorded significant weight in government 
decisions. This is because governments want their decisions to be rational and based 
on the best advice available. Webster states,
‘[Tjhis presupposes that such advice is free from prejudice or self-interest, 
an image of science which ... resurrects the Mertonian picture o f science 
as ‘disinterested’ and ‘objective’.’36
He goes on to say that sociological research has found expertise to be what he calls 
‘socially contingent ', that is, perceived, evaluated, and rewarded
• 37according to the audience and the context in which it appears.’
He states that many case studies have explored scientific controversy and found that 
what counts as ‘good (expert) evidence’ or advice depends on the relative power of 
different groups to define some knowledge claims rather than others as more objective
35 See Barker, A. and Peters, B.G., (eds) (1993). The politics o f  expert advice: creating, using and 
manipulating scientific knowledge fo r  public policy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. plO who 
say ‘the most common use o f advice is to legitimate a decision that an organisation wanted to make 
anyway.’
36Webster, A. (1991). Science, technology’ and society’. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. p48
37Webster, A. (1991). Science, technology and society’. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. p49
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and so more acceptable and that it therefore comes about that experts will affiliate 
with interest groups whose collective ethic is in line with their own. Jasanoff says:
‘In areas of high uncertainty, political interest frequently shapes the 
presentation of scientific facts and hypotheses to fit different 
models of “reality”.’39 
This is a key idea that connects the concept of uncertainty in all its manifestations to 
the interests o f those involved in decision-making. Given the aforementioned types of 
uncertainty, as lack of data, as ignorance and as indeterminacy, Jasanoff is suggesting 
that interpretations of scientific evidence are not determined by these uncertainties but 
are significantly filtered by the political interests of the decision-makers who have 
their own paradigms and realities 40 In this thesis I extend the notion o f interests 
beyond the political to those that are more broadly socially determined in addition to 
those that arise through institutional affiliations and regulatory obligations (which are 
in themselves socially determined). In the following section I introduce the interests 
approach of the Edinburgh School, and explore its potential and relevance for 
understanding the links between expertise and uncertainty.
The Interests Approach
Much debate about the precautionary principle focuses on scientific uncertainty and 
on how much scientific evidence is necessary before action should be taken to protect
38 For example, see Nelkin, D. (1979). Controversy: the politics o f  technical decisions. New York:
Sage.
39 Jasanoff, S. (1987). Contested boundaries in policy-relevant science. Social Studies o f  Science 17, 
(12): 195-230.195-230
40 This is echoed by Gillespie et al who describe a situation where the US and UK governments reached 
contradictory conclusions to the same problem on the basis o f the same scientific evidence: Gillespie,
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the environment. The sociology of scientific knowledge provides tools for analysing 
the uses o f science and its development and application. Interests theory helps explain 
the way in which scientific uncertainty is managed and manipulated by decision­
makers. It sheds light on the way that decision-making processes are constructed and 
helps draw out the point that scientific uncertainty underpins discussions about 
definitions, sufficient evidence and disputed evidence without necessarily being 
explicitly named.
I now review and locate the interests approach within the wider disciplinary 
framework o f the sociology o f knowledge. Since Webster has produced a 
comprehensive review of the developments within the sociology of science I draw on 
his work in this section.41 Subsequently I discuss empirical research that has been 
carried out using the interests approach, focussing on work by Bloor and by Collins. 
This is followed by a review of critiques of the interests approach, especially those 
provided by Woolgar. Finally, I construct an argument for why, despite the critiques 
of the approach, I still find the interests approach to provide an appropriate theoretical 
framework for analysing the operation of the precautionary principle with respect to 
radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals.
As will become clear, my contribution to theoretical knowledge lies in the application 
o f interests theory to a new case i.e. the precautionary principle, rather than in the 
theoretical development of this position per se.
B., Eva, D., and Johnston, R. (1979). Carcinogenic risk assessment in the United States and Great 
Britain: The case o f Aldrin/Dieldrin. Social Studies o f  Science 9: 265-302.
41 Webster, A. (1991). Science, technology and society. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd.
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Interests in context
In 1949, American sociologist Robert Merton argued that there were four norms in 
science (universalism, communality, organised scepticism and disinterestedness) that 
together function to produce objective scientific knowledge.42 Although he proposed 
that this is how scientists behave he did not explain why they do so. Other sociologists 
challenged Merton’s notion o f a ‘scientific community’ conforming to a ‘scientific 
ethos’. In 1976 Mulkay reasoned that Merton’s ‘norms’ were actually ‘vocabularies 
o f justification’ used by scientists to justify their particular behaviour in particular 
contexts.43 Additionally he claimed that scientists are rewarded according to what 
other scientists find useful, and that this in turn varies according to the long-term and 
short-term interests of researchers, their financial circumstances and government and 
commercial attitudes.
Bourdieu also challenged the notion that scientific knowledge is based on a set of 
norms. In 1975 he wrote,
“The market in scientific goods has its laws and they are nothing to 
do with ethics or norms ... Claims of legitimacy [of ideas] draw 
their legitimacy from the relative strength of the group whose 
interests they express”.44
42 See Merton, R.K. (1968). Social theory' and social structure. New York: Free Press.
43 Mulkay, M.J. (1976). Norms and ideology in science. Social Science Information 15, (4): 637-656. 
reproduced in Mulkay, M. (1991). Norms and ideology. In, Mulkay, M., (ed)., Sociology o f  science: a 
sociological pilgrimage. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. p77
44Bourdieu, P. (1975). The specificity o f the scientific field and the social conditions o f the progress o f  
reason. Social Science Information 14: 19-47. 19-47, quoted in Webster, A. (1991). Science, technology 
and society. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. p8
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This supposes that some scientists will have favourable recognition which is 
independent of the quality of their research, based more on the recognition afforded 
them by their previous research and the institution to which they belong. This can be 
described as a credibility cycle where more prominent researchers’ work is recognised 
more readily and afforded more status than those researchers whose credibility has yet 
to be established.
The theme of scientific interests was further developed in the 1970s and 1980s 
through an academic focus on controversy in science, examples of which are provided 
by Barnes and MacKenzie45 and Shapin46 and are discussed later in this chapter.47
45Bames, B. and MacKenzie, D. (1979). On the role on interests in scientific change. In, Wallis, R., 
(ed)., On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  rejected knowledge:49-66. Keele, Staffs: 
University o f Keele.
46Shapin, S. (1979). The politics o f  observation: cerebral anatomy and social interests in the Edinburgh 
phrenology disputes. In, Wallis, R., (ed)., On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  
rejected knowledge: 139-178. Keele, Staffs: University o f Keele.
47 Other examples include: Crenson, M.A. (1971). The un-politics o f  air pollution: a study o f  non­
decisionmaking in the cities. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins Press.; Habermas, J. (1971). 
Knowledge and human interests. Boston: Beacon Press.; Barnes, B. (1974). Scientific knowledge and 
sociological theoiy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.; Wynne, B. (1976). C.G Barkla and the J 
Phenomenon: a case study in the treatment o f deviance in physics. Social Studies o f  Science 6, (3&4): 
307-347.; Bames, B. (1977). Interests and the growth o f  knowledge. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul.; MacKenzie, D. (1978). Statistical theory and social interests. Social Studies o f  Science 8: 35-83.; 
Barnes, B. and Shapin, S., (eds) (1979). Natural Order: historical studies o f  scientific culture. Beverly 
Hills and London: Sage Publications Ltd.; Dean. J. (1979). Controversy over classification: a case 
study from the history o f botany. In, Barnes. B. and Shapin. S., (eds), Natural Order: historical studies 
o f  scientific culture: 210-230. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications Ltd.; Parssinen, T.M. 
(1979). Professional deviants and the history o f medicine: medical mesmerists in Victorian Britain. In, 
Wallis, R., (ed)., On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  rejected knowledge: 103-120. 
Keele, Staffs: University o f Keele.; MacKenzie, D. and Barnes, B. (1979). Scientific Judgement: the 
Biometry - Mendelism controversy. In, Barnes, B. and Shapin, S., (eds). Natural Order: historical 
studies o f  scientific culture: 191-210. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications Ltd.; Pinch, T.J. 
(1981). The Sun-Set: the presentation o f certainty in scientific life. Social Studies o f  Science 11, (1): 
131-158.; Collins, H.M. (1981). Knowledge and controversy: studies o f modern natural science. Social 
Studies o f  Science 11, (1 special issue): 158.
Collins, H.M. (1983). An empirical relativist programme in the sociology o f scientific knowledge. In, 
Knorr-Cetina, K.D. and Mulkay, M., (eds). Science observed: perspectives on the social study o f  
science:85-113. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
Collins, H.M. (1985). Changing Order. London: Sage.; Pickering, A. (1982). Interests and analogies. 
In, Barnes, B. and Edge, D., (eds). Science in context: readings in the sociology o f  science: 125-146. 
Milton Keynes: The Open University Press.; Shapin, S. (1988). Following scientists around. Social 
Studies o f  Science 18: 533-550.;
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This work showed how scientific knowledge was dependent on negotiation and debate 
between interested parties: practitioners of science and ‘lay’ people.48
To give just one example, Dorothy Nelkin has written on the theme of controversy 
and she has shown how publicly controversial issues involve participants in claims 
and counter-claims that cannot be easily resolved by an appeal to the ‘evidence’, since 
there may be no consensus on what the ‘facts’ are. She writes,
“In all disputes broad areas of uncertainty are open to conflicting 
scientific interpretation. Decisions are often made in a context of 
limited knowledge about potential social or environmental impacts 
and there is seldom conclusive evidence to reach definitive 
resolution. Thus power hinges on the ability to manipulate 
knowledge to challenge the evidence presented to support particular 
policies, and technical expertise becomes a resource exploited by 
all parties to justify their political and economic views.”49 
Empirical analyses of scientific controversies have since underlined the point that 
uncertainties are embedded in scientific knowledge and that these uncertainties mirror 
the interests of those both constructing and interpreting that knowledge. Arguments 
about the socially constructed nature of knowledge and the interests attached to it are 
central to understanding how the precautionary principle can be/is being applied in the 
UK. Recognition of these continually constructed systems of ideas and the interests of
48Webster, A. (1991). Science, technology and society. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. p i 1
49Nelkin, D. (1979). Controversy: the politics o f  technical decisions. New York: Sage, p i 6, quoted in 
Webster, A. (1991). Science, technology and society. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. p l2 . Also on 
the theme o f controversy Rip, A. (1985). Experts in public arenas. In, Otway, H. and Peltu, M., (eds), 
Regulating industrial risks: science, hazards and public protection:94-\ 10. London: Butterworths. 
p i 02-103 talks about ‘the myth o f  consensual objectivity.’
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relevant decision-makers is central to understanding how the value of precaution is or 
is not being incorporated into decision-making.
The following section introduces the interests approach of the Edinburgh School and 
illustrates the interpretation and use of interests theory with reference to a number of 
empirical studies. The aim is to show how the interests approach has helped elucidate 
the dynamics of scientific controversy.
Interests theory
Based on ideas from sociologists at Edinburgh University the interests approach 
maintains that scientists’ knowledge-claims will embody or be informed by certain 
social or political interests.50 This is a sub-set of what is known as the Edinburgh 
School. Shapin,51 and Barnes and MacKenzie52 provide some of the more detailed 
empirical illustrations of the interests approach and I discuss their work in more detail 
later in this chapter.
50Webster, A. (1991). Science, technology' and society'. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. p l6
51 Shapin, S. (1984). Talking history: reflections o f DA. Isis 75, (276): 125-130.
Shapin, S. (1979). The politics o f observation: cerebral anatomy and social interests in the Edinburgh 
phrenology disputes. In, Wallis, R., (ed)., On the margins o f  science: the social constniction o f  
rejected knowledge: 139-178. Keele, Staffs: University o f  Keele.
52Bames, B., (ed). (1972). Sociology o f  science. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd.
Barnes, B. (1974). Scientific knowledge and sociological theoiy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Barnes, B. (1977). Interests and the growth o f  knowledge. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Barnes, B. and MacKenzie, D. (1979). On the role on interests in scientific change. In, Wallis, R., (ed)., 
On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  rejected knowledge:49-66. Keele, Staffs: 
University o f Keele.; MacKenzie, D. (1978). Statistical theory and social interests. Social Studies o f  
Science 8: 35-83.
MacKenzie, D. and Barnes, B. (1979). Scientific Judgement: the Biometry - Mendelism controversy. 
In, Barnes, B. and Shapin, S., (eds), Natural Order: historical studies o f  scientific culture: 191-210. 
Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications Ltd.
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The interests approach to scientific knowledge is associated with the ‘strong 
programme’53 in the sociology of scientific knowledge due to the fact that it adopts a 
strongly relativist position indicating that scientific knowledge is itself open to 
sociological analysis. Exemplifying this position, Bloor challenged the position of 
sociologists as solely looking at the ‘sociology of error’, claiming that, regardless of 
whether science produced what was labelled as ‘true’ or ‘false’ knowledge, 
sociologists should aim to understand how that knowledge is produced. Woolgar tells 
us that Bloor
‘.. .complained that the insistence of rationalist philosophy on the 
inherently (given) true or false character of knowledge was directly 
opposed to attempts to study the social determination of ‘truth’ and 
‘falsehood’.’54
According to Woolgar, Bloor’s position is that rationalism only addresses whether 
knowledge can be regarded as true or false in a reasoned way without addressing why 
some knowledges come to be accepted as true and some as false. Bloor believes that 
the social construction of these knowledges also need to be analysed.
Those embracing this position believe it is possible to show how social interests are 
embedded within the very construction and defence of knowledge-claims, and how 
these social interests determine just which ideas get adopted as ‘science’ and which 
are discarded.55 Social interests can stem from political and institutional affiliations as 
well as from more personal and community-based customs. The idea of social and
53 Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and Social Imagery. London, Henley and Boston: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul.; Woolgar, S. (1981). Interests and explanation in the social study o f science. Social Studies o f  
Science 11: 365-394.; Rose, H. (1985). Hand, Brain and Heart: a feminist epistemology for the natural 
sciences. Signs: Journal o f  women in culture and society 9, (1): 73-91.
54Woolgar, S. (1993). Science: the veiy  idea. London: Routledge. p42
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institutional interests are not discrete in a relativist context since all interests can be 
said to be constructed by social arrangements which form and shape the pattern of 
those interests.
Assuming that knowledge is a result of consensus amongst individuals, the next step is 
to identify what influences those individuals’ positions. Bloor identifies four tenets 
that he argues must be present in the sociologist’s thoughts in order to understand how 
knowledge is produced:
‘... causality, impartiality, symmetry and reflexivity [which] define 
what will be called the strong programme in the sociology of 
knowledge.’56
Bloor challenges the received status which causality is afforded in analytical 
philosophy. He argues that it is not enough to look for causes to explain error and 
falsehood but that causes should also be identified to explain accuracy and truth. He 
states that
‘They all divide behaviour or belief into two types: right and 
wrong, true or false, rational or irrational. They then invoke causes 
to explain the negative side of the division. Causes explain error, 
limitation and deviation. The positive side of the evaluative divide 
is quite different. Here, logic, rationality and truth appear to be 
their own explanation. Here causes do not need to be invoked.’57
55Webster, A. (1991). Science, technology and society. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. p l9
56Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and Social Imageiy. London, Henley and Boston: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul. p5
57Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and Social Imageiy. London, Henley and Boston: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul. p6
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Bloor concludes that if  this teleological model is true then the strong programme is
C O
false because they are two opposed metaphysical standpoints. He qualifies this by 
saying that
‘ . .it is unlikely that any decisive, independent grounds could be 
adduced ‘a priori’ to prove the truth or falsity of such major 
metaphysical alternatives. ... All that can be done is to check the 
internal consistency of the different theories and then see what 
happens when practical research and theorising is based upon 
them.’59
His point here is that the two distinct theoretical positions that causality should be 
invoked to explain both truth and falsehood (Bloor’s proposition) and the opposite that 
truth is given and that causality should be invoked to explain only falsehood can only 
be investigated through empirical studies and not solely deduced through reasoning.
He points out that if, through this process, the teleological model is consequently 
rejected then all its associated distinctions, evaluations and asymmetries go with it.
The empiricist take on knowledge asserts that the only source of knowledge is 
experience.60 Bloor also rejects this. He asks
‘Does not individual experience, as a matter of fact, take place 
within a framework of assumptions, standards, purposes and 
meanings which are shared?’
And continues
58Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and Social Imageiy. London, Henley and Boston: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul. p9
59Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and Social Imageiy. London, Henley and Boston: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul. p9
60Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and Social Imageiy. London, Henley and Boston: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, p i2
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‘Society furnishes the mind of the individual with these things and 
also provides the conditions whereby they can be sustained and 
reinforced. If the individual’s grasp of them wavers, there are 
agencies ready to remind him; if his view of the world begins to 
deviate there are mechanisms which encourage realignment.’61 
Bloor argues that an individual’s views are always shaped and enforced by the 
‘society’ s/he is part of. Bloor asserts that what is considered ‘scientific knowledge’ is 
predominantly ‘theoretical’ and that theories give meaning to experience by offering a 
story about what underlies, connects and accounts for that experience.62 In other 
words theories of scientific knowledge are created in order to make sense of what is 
experienced by the individual. In this way, experience, knowledge and interests are 
inter-linked.
Bloor was one o f the original advocates of the interests approach and the above brief 
account has been important in order to illustrate his ideas about the social construction 
of scientific knowledge.63 Bloor refutes the notion of a natural or given ‘truth’ in 
favour o f the notion that knowledge is constructed from external stimuli and that 
interests, both institutional and disciplinary, play a role in that construction.
In the following section I review some of the literature that applied interests theory to 
the analysis of empirical studies.
6lBloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and Social Imageiy. London, Henley and Boston: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, p i2
62Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and Social Imageiy. London, Henley and Boston: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul. p l2
63 For other examples o f  work that assumes the social construction o f scientific knowledge see 
Campbell, B.L. (1985). Uncertainty as symbolic action in disputes among experts. Social Studies o f  
Science 15: 429-453.; Michael, M. (1996). Constructing Identities. London: Sage Publications Ltd. 
Thompson, M., Ellis, R., and Wildavsky, A. (1990). Cultural theoiy. Oxford: Westview Press.
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Interests theory in action
Collins, who is a social realist, is also an advocate of the interests approach and has 
focused his empirical studies on the ‘core-set’ o f scientists who are involved in 
particular controversies.64 The core-sets studied include those individuals who form 
the small expert elite group lying at the heart of any scientific speciality and who 
typically hold prestigious academic and research positions.63 Collins has 
demonstrated that it is they who play the principal role in determining the outcome o f  
scientific debate.66 Collins shows how in practice a consensus over scientific 
knowledge-claims only emerges by way of negotiation and debate.67 He claims that 
science can only make perceptible ‘progress’ precisely because its practitioners draw 
on a wide range of socio-technical strategies to produce an ultimate consensus out of
/: O
controversy.
This does not mean focussing only on agreement. The interests approach can also 
look beyond internal scientific debates to debates over scientific ‘expertise’1 in public 
settings such as public inquiries. As Webster puts it
64 Collins, H.M. (1981). Knowledge and controversy: studies o f  modem natural science. Social Studies 
o f  Science 11, (1 special issue): 158.: Collins, H.M. (1983). An emp ideal relativist programme in the 
sociology o f  scientific knowledge. In. Knorr-Cetina. K.D. and Mulkay. M.. (eds). Science observed: 
perspectives on the social study o f  scienceSSA  13. London: Sage Publications Ltd.; C olins. H.M. 
(1985). Changing Order. London: Sage.
65Webster. A. (1991). Science, technology and society'. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. p20
66Collins, H.M. (1981). Knowledge and controversy: studies o f  modem natural science. Seemd Smdses 
o f  Science 11, (1 special issue): 158. and Collins. H.M. (1983). An empirical relativist programme in 
the sociology o f  scientific knowledge. In, Knorr-Cetina. K.D. and Mulkay. \L . (eds). Science observed: 
perspectives on the social study o f  sciencc:S5-113. London: Sage Publications Ltd.. cited in Webster.
A. (1991). Science, technology and society.  Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. p20  
6 "' Collins, H.M. (1985). Changing Order.  London: Sage. It is tins idea that I  exploit in order to show  
the interests at play in controversial decision-making processes about radioactive waste disposal and 
endocrine disrupting chemicals.
68Webster, A. (1991). Science, technology and society.  Basingstoke: Macmillan Press LteLplC!
‘core-sets not only involve ‘allies’ but also ‘enemies’ who contest 
their claims.’69
Those involved in the core-set are not necessarily all in agreement. This is 
particularly the case when there is still controversy about the scientific knowledge in 
question. Situations such as public inquiries arguably represent moments when the 
knowledge o f those included in the core-set is open to question. This raises the 
ambiguous nature of ‘science policy’. The term science policy is used to mean two 
distinct things. On the one hand it is used to describe policy regulating scientific 
practice and endeavour while conversely it is also used to describe the use of scientific 
knowledge as a basis for policy decisions. The interests approach is primarily 
concerned with the latter, the use of scientific knowledge as the basis for making 
policy decisions.
In public inquiries as in other situations the key question is how negotiation is ended
70in practice and how closure of debate and scientific consensus comes about. This is 
important in terms of policy making since the scientific knowledge on which policy is 
based is a product of social determination and interests. Subscribers to the interests 
approach believe they can show how scientists’ investment in certain ideas, their use 
of cognitive and social resources to advance those ideas and the network of 
relationships they have with power-brokers or decision-makers in the wider society
71 *are all implicated in the eventual closure of scientific debate. This is an explanation 
that I exploit in my empirical research. I show, in the following empirical chapters, 
how the interests of those involved in making decisions about radioactive waste
69Webster, A. (1991). Science, technology and society. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. p21
70Webster, A. (1991). Science, technology and society. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. p30-31
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disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals are instructive in determining the terms 
of the decision-making process as well as its outcome.
I now introduce some of the relevant empirical uses of the interests approach within 
the sociology of scientific knowledge. I focus particularly on work by Collins,72 
Shapin73 and Barnes and MacKenzie74 as they provide examples of early uses of 
interests theory.
In their paper ‘On the role of interests in scientific change’ Bames and MacKenzie75 
distinguish between instrumental interests and social interests. They say that it is 
plausible to hypothesise that when a sub-culture evaluates knowledge the process 
should be understood to some extent in terms of the goal-orientated character of its 
thought and activity, rather that in a totally abstract contemplative way. It is this goal- 
oriented-ness which they refer to as ‘instrumental interests’. They claim that scientific 
paradigms are evaluated against each other in relation to some set of context- 
dependent (situated) instrumental interests.
7lShapin, S. (1984). Talking history: reflections o f DA. Isis 75, (276): 125-130.125-128, cited in: 
Webster, A. (1991). Science, technology and society>. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. p31
72 Collins, H.M. (1983). An empirical relativist programme in the sociology o f  scientific knowledge. In, 
Knorr-Cetina, K.D. and Mulkay, M., (eds), Science observed: perspectives on the social study o f  
science:85-113. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
73 Shapin, S. (1979). The politics o f observation: cerebral anatomy and social interests in the Edinburgh 
phrenology disputes. In, Wallis, R., (ed)., On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  
rejected knowledge:\39-\12>. Keele, Staffs: University o f Keele.
74 Bames, B. and MacKenzie, D. (1979). On the role on interests in scientific change. In, Wallis, R., 
(ed)., On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  rejected knowledge:49-66. Keele, Staffs: 
University o f Keele.
7:>Bames, B. and MacKenzie, D. (1979). On the role on interests in scientific change. In, Wallis, R., 
(ed)., On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  rejected knowIedge:49-66. Keele, Staffs: 
University o f  Keele.
‘Where scientists disagree in their choice of paradigms one should 
hence check whether they do not differ also in the instrumental 
interests which pre-structure their evaluations.’76 
They go on to claim that instrumental interests are generally related to a set of, what 
they describe as, social interests which they define as the consequence of the ongoing 
activity of a group of scientific specialists.77 These social interests, they state, 
modulate conceptions of what counts as prediction or problem solution which partially 
define the situated instrumental knowledge-constituting interests of the scientists.
Bames and MacKenzie go on to state that the instmmental interests that inform 
scientific evaluation need not be related solely to those social interests that are internal 
to science:
‘They may relate to more general social interests, either directly, or 
indirectly in the sense that the social interests of some esoteric 
scientific sub-culture may themselves be expressions of more 
general social interests. ... What we wish to show is that opposed 
paradigms and hence opposed evaluations may be sustained, and 
probably are in general sustained, by divergent sets of instrumental
7 0
interests usually related in turn to divergent social interests.’
76Bames, B. and MacKenzie, D. (1979). On the role on interests in scientific change. In, Wallis, R., 
(ed)., On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  rejected knowledge:49-66. Keele, Staffs: 
University o f  Keele. p52
77Bames, B. and MacKenzie, D. (1979). On the role on interests in scientific change. In, Wallis, R., 
(ed)., On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  rejected knowledge:49-66. Keele, Staffs: 
University o f  Keele. p53
78Barnes, B. and MacKenzie, D. (1979). On the role on interests in scientific change. In, Wallis, R., 
(ed)., On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  rejected knowledge:49-66. Keele, Staffs: 
University o f  Keele. p54
The key point here is that the instrumental interests at play within a particular 
discipline may relate specifically to the social interests of that disciplinary culture or 
they may relate more broadly to the interests o f a larger culture or society.
Bames and MacKenzie make these points with reference to a controversy within the 
small community of British statisticians early in the twentieth century over the 
measurement of association. The controversy centred on the merits o f two alternative 
kinds of solution to the association problem, those of Karl Pearson and those of 
George Udny Yule. Bames and MacKenzie claim that Yule’s evaluation of measures 
of association was pre-stmctured by an instrumental interest in nominal data as 
distinct separate phenomena whilst Pearson’s evaluation of measures was pre- 
stmctured by an instrumental interest in prediction and technical control defined by 
existing work on interval data.79 This polarisation of their instmmental interests 
continued, and they and their followers remained in a state of controversy for many 
years. Pearson and Yule had started from a position of shared assumptions, meanings 
and competences -  Yule having been a student of Pearson -  but their positions 
diverged. In seeking to understand why that divergence occurred Bames and 
MacKenzie claim that
‘... the most likely answer would seem to be that it was generated
Q A
and sustained by contrasting social interests. ’
Q 1
These social interests were identified with the ‘biometric school’ on the part of 
Pearson, whose work built the characteristic hereditarian assumptions o f eugenics into
79See Bames, B. and MacKenzie, D. (1979). On the role on interests in scientific change. In, Wallis, R., 
(ed)., On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  rejected knowledge:49-66. Keele, Staffs: 
University o f  Keele. p55-60 for a fiill description o f this controversy.
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its basic structure and circumvented any systematic consideration of the influence of 
environment on the phenomena he studied.82 In contrast, Yule’s work indicated no 
concern with eugenics and his ideas on association were developed in connection with
• • 83vaccination and its efficacy. This distinction might have been explained in terms of 
disciplinary interests except that both men started from the same disciplinary 
backgrounds and so both understood the underlying paradigms within that discipline. 
It was their social interests that caused their controversy to remain unresolved.
Having illustrated instrumental and social interests Bames and MacKenzie conclude 
that controversy cannot be explained solely in terms of disciplinary paradigms 
because controversies may still evolve even when the disciplines are shared. Social 
interests offer a partial explanation for the difference in position taken by the different 
players.
In his paper, ‘The Politics of Observation’, Shapin analyses disputes over the validity
O A
of phrenology in Edinburgh in the 1800s with particular focus on the two main
80Bames, B. and MacKenzie, D. (1979). On the role on interests in scientific change. In, Wallis, R., 
(ed)., On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  rejected kno\vledge:49-66. Keele, Staffs: 
University o f  Keele. p59
8'Biometry is the application o f statistical analysis to biological data and this school was dominated by 
Karl Pearson and based upon the biometr ic and eugenic laboratories at University College London. See 
Bames, B. and MacKenzie, D. (1979). On the role on interests in scientific change. In, Wallis, R., (ed)., 
On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  rejected knowledgeA9-66. Keele, Staffs: 
University o f  Keele. p59
82Bames, B. and MacKenzie, D. (1979). On the role on interests in scientific change. In, Wallis, R., 
(ed)., On the ?nargins o f  science: the social construction o f  rejected kn o 11 'ledge:49-66. Keele, Staffs: 
University o f Keele. p60
83Barnes, B. and MacKenzie, D. (1979). On the role on interests in scientific change. In, Wallis, R., 
(ed)., On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  rejected kno\vledge:49-66. Keele, Staffs: 
University o f Keele. p61-62
84 Phrenology is the study o f the shape and size o f the cranium as a supposed indication o f  character and 
mental faculties. Pearsall, J. and Tmmble, B., (eds) (1996). The Oxford English Reference Dictionary. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p i094
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proponents, Gall and Spurzheim. His argument is that social interests act upon 
knowledge in ways rather different from those usually assumed and that they may 
therefore have a more pervasive influence on knowledge. He states that 
‘In the Edinburgh disputes over phrenology, as in most other 
scientific contexts, a participant could hope to discredit the 
knowledge of his opponent by detecting the presence o f social 
interests in it. Where the effect of social interests on knowledge is 
held to be corrupting, the display of the presence of such interests 
in knowledge seems a sound strategic move. ... Each party’s 
reaction may then well be to produce accounts in which it becomes 
more and more difficult for its opponents to expose interests’.
Strategically, there may be advantages to be gained from detecting the presence of 
social interests in an opponent’s position if the presence of such interests is considered 
to be a corruption of scientific knowledge. If this is the case players will be motivated 
to disguise their interests in order that their accounts appear to be more objective. 
Shapin suggests that this may be a reason why interests are so embedded and difficult 
to identify. He is not suggesting that it be inferred from the absence of apparent 
interests that they are really present, but he is introducing the notion that it may be the 
operation of such interests which brings about their very invisibility.86 This notion of 
discrediting opposing knowledge is important in understanding the application of the 
precautionary principle. I show in my empirical chapters on radioactive waste 
disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals the tactics and methods employed by
85 Shapin, S. (1979). The politics o f observation: cerebral anatomy and social interests in the Edinburgh 
phrenology disputes. In, Wallis, R., (ed)., On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  
rejected knowledge:\39-17&. Keele, Staffs: University o f  Keele.
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opposing groups to bring the discussion around to their point of view and the attempts 
they make, often by rhetorical appeal, to make their interests invisible. Additionally I 
reveal the often hidden and embedded interests associated with these viewpoints.
In summing up, Shapin suggests that it is often easier to detect explicit interests 
regarding new and especially deviant bodies of knowledge, and that it is harder to do 
so for institutionalised established fields. In accord with Bloor he says 
‘Indeed, there is some evidence that this is what is developing in 
the social history of science: a sociology of error, o f deviance and 
of rejected knowledge but not, as yet, much in the way of a 
sociology of ‘truth’.’87 
He is saying that evidence can be found that a sociology of error exists where interests 
are identified to explain deviance from ‘truth’ but that ‘truth’ itself is accepted without 
recourse to explanational causal factors. He wants to work towards such a sociology 
of ‘truth’ which means questioning how accepted scientific knowledge comes to be 
accepted because focusing on a sociology of error is inadequate. This is important for 
my analysis as it is a focus on the way in which controversy is resolved or at least the 
way in which attempts are made to resolve controversy that I analyse in order to 
uncover the factors involved in decision-making about environmental problems. 
Focusing on error is not adequate for my analysis since some of the issues have been 
agreed upon, at least within certain disciplines and institutions. Focusing on how 
those agreements have been reached and what is left to be resolved and the individuals
86Shapin, S. (1979). The politics o f observation: cerebral anatomy and social interests in the Edinburgh 
phrenology disputes. In, Wallis, R., (ed).. On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  
rejected know ledge:\39-\18. Keele, Staffs: University o f Keele. p l40
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involved in reaching those agreements is what is relevant to an understanding of the 
implementation of the precautionary principle.
To conclude Shapin asserts that
‘Science does not guarantee its growth towards esoteric naturalism 
by systematically immunising itself from the action of social 
interests. Rather, it may be the action of conflicting social interests, 
and actors’ ability to assign ideological concerns to knowledge 
claims, which provide a significant push towards the development 
o f increasingly naturalistic forms. ... Hence, social conflict and 
ideological considerations may be seen as an important element in 
the development of bodies of knowledge valued as ‘interest-free’, 
rather than as a feature o f the environment which retards such
o o
development.’
Shapin is saying that it is the very existence of conflicting social interests that help 
bring about an image of scientific knowledge as ‘interest-free’ and that helps produce 
the illusion of the objectivity of science. Though a plausible claim, this presents 
practical problems for empirical analysis. There are, however, other more theoretical 
difficulties associated with the interests approach. Some of these are reviewed below.
87 Shapin, S. (1979). The politics o f  observation: cerebral anatomy and social interests in the Edinburgh 
phrenology disputes. In, Wallis, R., (ed)., On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  
rejected knowledge:\39-l7S. Keele, Staffs: University o f Keele. p i 71
88Shapin, S. (1979). The politics o f  observation: cerebral anatomy and social interests in the Edinburgh 
phrenology disputes. In, Wallis, R., (ed)., On the margins o f  science: the social construction o f  
rejected knowledge: 139-178. Keele, Staffs: University o f Keele. p 171
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Critics of interests theory
Interests theory is not without its critics. Of these, Steve Woolgar has been especially 
vocal and eloquent. One of his main points is that it claims that the content of science 
should be amenable to social study89 yet he argues that attempts to ‘identify’ interests 
neglect important features of scientific practice. He is uncertain about the precise 
form of empirical work that could be said adequately to follow the strong 
programme90 implying that it is conceptually flawed if a research method can not be 
identified. Woolgar is particularly concerned about which specific aspects of the 
social are to be studied and how they can be incorporated into an understanding of the 
mechanisms of knowledge generation.91 He states that
‘In the writing of those who recommend interests explanations 
there is a recurrent appeal to the need for a ‘naturalistic’ approach 
to the social study of science. Indeed, the notion of naturalistic 
inquiry goes hand in hand with the idea of explaining scientific 
action in terms of interests. This suggests that an examination of 
the use of the concept of ‘naturalism’ is prerequisite to an 
appreciation of some of the deficiencies of interests explanation.’
89 Woolgar, S. (1981). Interests and explanation in the social study o f  science. Social Studies o f  Science 
11: 365-394.
Woolgar, S. (1988). Science: the very idea. Chichester: Ellis Horwood.
90Woolgar, S. (1981). Interests and explanation in the social study o f  science. Social Studies o f  Science 
11: 365-394. p365
9lWoolgar, S. (1981). Interests and explanation in the social study o f  science. Social Studies o f  Science 
11: 365-394. p366
92Woolgar, S. (1981). Interests and explanation in the social study o f  science. Social Studies o f  Science 
11: 365-394. p367
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Woolgar provides a critique of Bames’ use of ‘naturalism’ maintaining that the 
concept is never explicated or clearly defined in Bames’ work.93 He states that this 
confusion over the use of ‘naturalism’ extends to the invocation of interests as a 
primary explanatory resource. His understanding of how the strong programme 
employs the notion of interests is that interests are regarded as an explanatory resource 
whose existence is taken for granted and which is separate and distinct from the 
scientific content they are said to explain. My own view is that this is not a good 
interpretation of what interests theory is about. I agree that interests are invoked as an 
explanatory resource, indeed this is exactly what advocates of the interests approach 
are trying to do. By attempting to uncover the interests at stake, advocates of the 
approach are attempting to deconstmct controversy and consensus. However, as has 
been shown in the previous section, there are different types o f interests at play and 
some of them are intricately linked to the content of the scientific knowledge being 
scrutinised whilst others are dependent on wider social ideologies and the uses to 
which scientific knowledge is put. Thus, we can use interests whilst not reifying 
them.
Woolgar claims that
‘Interests can be used to explain knowledge generation. This is not 
to suggest that the scope of the game is restricted to simple causal 
determination ... This means that interests can be shown to 
influence rather than determine knowledge production, or that
93Woolgar, S. (1981). Interests and explanation in the social study o f  science. Social Studies o f  Science 
11: 365-394. p367-368
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particular scientific episodes can be better understood in the light o f  
the particular interests of the involved parties...’94 
He points out that users of the interests approach frequently play down arguments 
about causality. He says
‘To say, for example, that a discussion of interests ‘helps to shed 
light on’ a particular series of scientific actions is significantly 
different from saying that these actions ‘resulted from’ or ‘were 
caused by’ these interests.’95 
Having explained his understanding of what the interests approach means he then 
demonstrates how it is used:
‘The general strategy is to reveal interests as a kind of backcloth of 
attendant circumstances, and to imply that this revelation throws 
into better perspective the knowledge claim or event which is at 
issue. In its weakest form the job can be managed merely by 
juxtaposing, in the same report, the knowledge event and the 
revealed circumstances, preferably with cautious caveats about the 
difficulty of speculating on the precise causal mechanisms at 
work.’96
Woolgar’s main criticisms are that invoking interests is not sufficient to adequately 
explain how knowledge production is determined and that at its most significant level 
interests can only hope to shed light on the knowledge claim in question rather than 
explain it. He criticises users of interests theory for simply juxtaposing what is
94Woolgar, S. (1981). Interests and explanation in the social study o f  science. Social Studies o f  Science 
11: 365-394. p369
95Woolgar, S. (1981). Interests and explanation in the social study o f  science. Social Studies o f  Science
11: 365-394. p387
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determined as knowledge with some interests that they associate with the 
determination of that knowledge whilst simultaneously giving careful explanations as 
to why interests may not be adequate to explain the causality of knowledge 
production.
Woolgar elaborates on the problematic of the assumed existence o f interests in 
constructing explanation. He is concerned that if  knowledge can always in principle 
be explained by recourse to the interests of the actors involved then those interests can 
eventually be discovered and hence an explanation of the knowledge will be found. 
Central to Woolgar’s critique of Barnes’ use of interests is his desire for greater
97reflective attention to be given to the explanatory form  of interests explanations.
The key point here is that Woolgar wants the user of interests theory to be more 
reflexive about the interpretation they, as researcher, place on the knowledge they 
examine in order to demonstrate their awareness o f their role as the constructor o f the 
explanation for the knowledge event being evaluated.
Woolgar states that the interests approach is simply an ‘alternative construction’ to a 
deficient philosophical model that portrays scientists as ‘rationality-dopes’. He 
contends that
‘To replace one by the other misses at least two important 
questions: what counts as legitimate construction in practical
%Woolgar, S. (1981). Interests and explanation in the social study o f  science. Social Studies o f  Science 
11: 365-394. p369-370
97 Woolgar, S. (1981). Interests and explanation in the social study o f  science. Social Studies o f  Science 
11: 365-394. p373, W oolgar’s emphasis.
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argument; and what counts as adequate grounds for substitution of
QO
one construction for another?’
This is an important criticism as it identifies the difficulties involved in replacing one 
theoretical explanation with another without addressing the underlying question of 
whether the new theoretical explanation is more legitimate than the first.
A further criticism by Woolgar is that
‘Proponents of the interests model obviously begin with some 
notion of the nature and variety of desires they will ‘identify’. ... 
my point is ... that it is clear that a very large (if not infinite) 
number of alternative desires is in principle discernible; the 
selection and construction of a set of desires from the number 
potentially available thus involves complex argumentative work.’
This is a key point, as the approach itself provides no criteria for identifying relevant 
interests, values and desires. It is difficult therefore to determine which interests are 
indeed in play and it may indeed be the inclinations and biases of the researcher that 
define what they are. However, to contextualise this is important as, without 
necessarily assuming the pre-existence of interests, it is possible to observe that 
individuals and organisations all operate within social spheres which, through 
regulations and legislation, impact on the manner in which they behave. Since 
regulations and legislation reflect shared cultural norms it is misleading to suggest that 
it is solely the researcher who identifies underlying desires and interests. Collective 
convention attributes desires and interests to particular individuals and organisations 
in specific circumstances. Interests theory recognises what some of these interests are
98Woolgar, S. (1981). Interests and explanation in the social study o f  science. Social Studies o f  Science
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and uses them to attempt to understand the nature of negotiation and consensus 
forming in decision-making.
Woolgar concludes by claiming that the methodological difficulties inherent in using 
the interests approach have been backgrounded, minimised and otherwise made to 
seem inconsequential by the use of various rhetorical and argumentative strategies and 
recommends that a more reflexive approach to methodology is undertaken." He 
argues that proponents and opponents of the strong programme draw upon 
preconceived ideas about science in order to defend their position in relation to the 
programme.100 To illustrate this he recounts one of Bloor’s own arguments:
‘Bloor says that the principles of the strong programme “embody 
the values which are taken for granted in other scientific 
disciplines The strong programme, he says, “possesses a certain 
kind of moral neutrality, namely the same kind as we have learned 
to associate with all other sciences ” and denial of its tenets would 
be a betrayal “... of the approach of empirical science”. “If 
knowledge could not be applied in a thorough-going way to 
scientific knowledge it would mean that science could not 
scientifically know itself’. ... “If we want an account of the nature 
of scientific knowledge, surely, we can do no better than adopt the 
scientific method itself’.’101
11: 365-394. p379
"Woolgar, S. (1981). Interests and explanation in the social study o f  science. Social Studies o f  Science 
11: 365-394. p388-389
100 Woolgar, S. (1993). Science: the very idea. London: Routledge.
101 Woolgar, S. (1993). Science: the very idea. London: Routledge. p44, quoting Bloor, D. (1976). 
Knowledge and Social Imagery. London, Henley and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. p 4 ,10,40, ix.
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To Woolgar this demonstrates an uncritical acceptance o f ‘what science is (actually) 
like’. He argues that although the interests approach is right to show how judgements 
about knowledge are always socially informed, its supporters fail to recognise that 
their own judgements about science are also constructions and versions o f ‘reality’ 
that cannot be given any special authority.102 He claims that the interests approach is 
based on an unwarranted assumption that it is possible to produce an authoritative 
statement about ‘the world’ which does not embody any particular interests position 
i.e. that the sociologists interpretation is not itself constrained by the sociologists’ 
interests.103
In the following section I discuss the aspects of the interests approach that are of 
relevance to my research, highlighting the points about the approach that make it 
suitable for analysing decision-making about environmental issues, specifically in 
order to ascertain how aspects of the precautionary principle are embodied in current 
practices. Additionally I address many of the criticisms raised above in order to 
justify my continued use of the approach.
Interests Theory and the Precautionary Principle
Developments in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge have moved away from a 
theory of interests that had its heyday in the late 1970s and early 1980s. I am 
currently reviving the use of the interests approach because of its value in 
understanding scientific negotiation and controversy.
l02Woolgar, S. (1981). Interests and explanation in the social study o f  science. Social Studies o f  Science 
11: 365-394. and Woolgar, S. (1988). Science: the very idea. Chichester: Ellis Horwood.
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There are six key factors about the approach that are relevant to my research on the 
precautionary principle. Firstly, the interests approach suggests that scientists’ 
knowledge-claims embody, or are informed by, social and political interests and these 
may reflect disciplinary, professional and ideological interests and objectives. This is 
important in relation to the precautionary principle due to the range of different 
players involved in decision-making processes about environmental issues. This 
approach offers a way in to understanding what shapes the positions of those taking 
oppositional stances on the issue in question. A criticism of this is that it is difficult to 
determine what empirical research should be carried out in pursuit of the interests 
approach. My strategy was to conduct semi-structured interviews with individuals 
explicitly involved in deliberations about radioactive waste disposal and endocrine 
disrupting chemicals. By conducting these interviews and supporting the data 
obtained from them with documentary material from other sources, I analysed the 
self-stated interests lying behind different positions. Some of these interests were 
related directly from the individuals interviewed whilst others were suggested by third 
parties or related literature. Whilst this does not exempt me from the criticism of 
identifying the interests myself it provides a stronger basis for their determination than 
solely my suggestion.
Secondly, the interests approach aims to understand how knowledge is produced as 
opposed to simply understanding what knowledge is taken to exist. This is important 
in relation to the precautionary principle, as it is the factors involved in shaping 
decisions about environmental issues that are relevant, rather than the outcomes of 
those decisions. Understanding the roles of different players is essential in
103Webster, A. (1991). Science, technology> and society. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. p22
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understanding what the precautionary principle might mean. A criticism of this is that 
proponents of the interests approach take the existence of interests for granted and 
simply look for examples of such interests in order to support their position about how 
knowledge is produced. I rebuke this criticism in relation to my research by saying 
that it was a not a thesis that I started out with. I followed the positions of groups and 
individuals which expressly allied themselves with the debates I investigated.
Thirdly, the interests approach reasons that knowledge is the result of consensus 
amongst individuals rather than being inherently ‘true’. This is particularly relevant to 
an analysis o f the precautionary principle since decision-making about environmental 
matters revolves around establishing that controversy exists over the knowledge that is 
relevant to the decision at hand. Exposing the fact that any agreement is the result of 
negotiation and consensus amongst interested parties allows me to establish that 
decision-making invoking precaution is not unusual in the extent to which it involves 
the promotion of values and interests. Another criticism of the interests approach is 
that the analyst must make a connection between the observed action and the desire or 
interests that prompted the action, and that this involves a judgement by the analyst.
By claiming that knowledge is the result of consensus the analyst is making a 
judgement about how that knowledge came about and is forcing a rationalist 
explanation onto the process. I again defend my use of this approach by saying that 
all theory is about finding an explanation for the observed phenomenon.
Fourthly, the interests approach asserts that frameworks of assumptions, standards, 
purposes and meanings exist which are shared by individuals and which are reinforced 
by conditions within society. Additionally it maintains that science is a social process,
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which follows a set of procedures in order to modify or elaborate a previous theory, 
and this establishes and reinforces institutional and disciplinary interests. This is 
important in relation to the precautionary principle as it implies that individuals 
associated with particular institutions and disciplines are influenced by social 
frameworks outside those institutions as well as by interests associated with the social 
framework of the discipline itself. Understanding the precautionary principle is about 
determining how the value of precaution underlies current decision-making and it is 
therefore important to uncover the social frameworks and interests of participants in 
the decision-making process. A criticism levelled at this is that proponents o f interests 
start out with a notion of the nature and variety of desires they will identify and 
neglect the fact that an infinite number of alternative desires are in principle 
identifiable. In response to this I would say that while the researcher may start out 
with some idea of what she or he will find, is this not the case in all scientific 
research? Apart from using grounded theory104 all theoretical positions start out with 
a notion of what might be encountered. This will be informed by the experience of 
the researcher in tandem with other research conducted in the same field. In relation 
to my work on the precautionary principle, while I expected to identify certain 
institutional and disciplinary interests I did not limit my analysis to these. Thus other 
interests also manifested themselves in the course of my research.
Fifthly, much of the empirical work that follows the interests approach looks at 
debates over scientific ‘expertise’ in public settings. The relationships between 
scientists, power-brokers and decision-makers are all involved in the closure of 
scientific debate. This is another key aspect in relation to the precautionary principle
104 Glaser, B.G. (1978). Theoretical sensitivity: advances in the methodology o f  grounded theory.
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as decision-making about environmental issues involves a wide range o f ‘experts’. 
The point to identify here is that it is the relationships between these players that are 
important as well as establishing what their individual expertise is based upon. A 
criticism levelled at proponents of the interests approach is that there is little 
reflexivity on their part regarding their own research. This implies that although 
relationships are identified and analysed between scientists, power-brokers and 
decision-makers, the researcher often leaves herself out o f the picture, thus implying 
that her presence has no role in the identification of those relationships and no impact 
on the relationships themselves. In contrast to this, I am well aware of my impact as a 
researcher and address some of the issues regarding my impact in chapter seven on 
science, interests and uncertainty. Whilst it is important to be reflexive about one’s 
work and to recognise the impact one has on the researched it is also necessary to be 
aware that whatever the theoretical stance taken and whatever the methodologies used 
to obtain data the researcher will always have an impact. That is why choice of 
methodology is important along with an understanding of the limitations of that 
methodology.
Sixthly and finally, it has been pointed out by advocates of the interests approach that 
opponents of a particular scientific paradigm often attempt to discredit that knowledge 
by identifying the presence of social interests in it. This harks back to a notion that 
scientific knowledge should and can be purely objective in nature. This notion is 
discredited by advocates of the interests approach who show that interests can be 
identified in all forms of scientific knowledge. O f relevance to my research is the 
view that the presence of interests is not therefore unique to decision-making
California: The Sociology Press.
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involving implementation of the precautionary principle, indeed it is present at all 
levels of scientific knowledge formation and implementation. A criticism that 
addresses this point is made by Woolgar when he says that the sociology of science 
has no special authority and that any analysis it produces is only one of many possible 
representations of the world. Advocates of the interests approach produce one 
representation of the world that suggests that the identification of interests is not 
sufficient to discredit a knowledge claim because all knowledge claims have 
embedded interests. Opponents of the approach suggest that this is only one 
representation and there are others that may produce equally satisfactory explanations. 
In response to this I say that while I agree that there are many other sociological 
representations that could have been drawn upon to help explain the interactions 
observed with regard to decisions about radioactive waste disposal and endocrine 
disrupting chemicals, the data I obtained supports the contention that those involved 
themselves recognise the interests at play at the site of scientific controversy and 
consensus forming. Therefore interests theory provides many useful and relevant 
insights into an analysis of the application of the precautionary principle.
The above section details the reasons why the interests approach is an appropriate 
theoretical tool to use in my thesis and justifies my use of it despite the critiques that 
have been levelled at it. I now reiterate that the contribution I make theoretically in 
this area of interests theory is to link interests with uncertainty. This is due to a data- 
driven re-discovery of interests theory. This connection between interests and 
uncertainty has not been explicitly made before, hi many ways interests have been 
used in an over-simplistic way. I expand on these previous uses by analysing two case 
studies to show how self-stated interest groups interact in decision-making processes,
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in negotiations over uncertainty, and thus with regard to the interpretation and 
application of the precautionary principle.
Summary
Building on a science studies approach I have reviewed some of the literature on 
uncertainty in order to establish a connection between uncertainty and interests as 
understood in the context of the Edinburgh School’s Strong Programme. I focused on 
three types of uncertainty: uncertainty as lack of data, uncertainty as ignorance and 
uncertainty as indeterminacy and discussed the distinctions between these in order to 
show how uncertainty is of relevance to a discussion of the precautionary principle. 
Following this I reviewed a selection of the literature that relates scientific uncertainty 
to policy, establishing the distinction between the uncertainties understood by those 
close to the production of scientific knowledge and those more distant from it. I 
illustrated this with reference to MacKenzie’s ‘certainty trough’, which indicates that 
it is the users of scientific knowledge, namely policy makers, who assume a reduced 
level of uncertainty in their interpretation of scientific advice. Following this I made 
the connection between uncertainty and interests.
This led me to review interests theory itself. I started by placing interests theory 
within the context of the sociology of science. Subsequently I considered the work of 
Bames and MacKenzie, Shapin, and Collins, which provides useful insights into the 
way in which interests theory has been used at an empirical level, and I reviewed 
some of their case studies in order to show this. As with any other theory, the 
interests approach has many critics and I identified Woolgar as a particularly articulate
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opponent. I reviewed many of his criticisms in order to position myself clearly within 
the debate and used his criticisms as a measure against which to evaluate my use of 
the theory.
The following chapter describes the evolution and development of my research and 
methodology. In it I explain the collaborative nature of my PhD funding and account 
for the choice of case studies undertaken. Additionally I justify my choice of 
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Introduction
In this chapter I introduce the way my research was designed and constructed. I 
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of having collaborative funding through an 
ESRC CASE Award and consider the selection of the case studies I chose to 
investigate the application of the precautionary principle, those being radioactive 
waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals. This section explains why those 
particular cases were most appropriate and discusses the justification for not 
researching other, perhaps also relevant, cases. I then detail how these two case 
studies are used in the subsequent two chapters to explore the themes that are relevant 
to the precautionary principle, as identified in chapter two. Following from this I 
outline my methodology, which involved semi-structured interviews with key players 
in the decision-making fora on radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disrupting 
chemicals. I give a justification for why semi-structured interviews as opposed to 
alternative forms of qualitative data gathering were appropriate in the context of this 
research and discuss the appropriateness of my strategy for selecting interviewees. In 
addition I used documentary sources of data and I justify my use of this material as a 
support to my primary data. Issues of access are considered in the last section.
CASE Awards and Collaboration with Friends of the Earth
CASE Awards are research studentships awarded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) in conjunction with a collaborating body. My studentship, 
in collaboration with Friends of the Earth and based at the Centre for Science Studies 
at Lancaster University, was designed to examine the evolution and application of the
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precautionary principle. This attracted me because of my interest in environmental 
policy along with my desire to create links with an environmental NGO and because I 
wanted my research to be of practical value. The precautionary principle was 
something that I already knew about, and I was, even then, aware of the ambiguity 
surrounding its implementation.
Being a CASE student is quite different from being in receipt of an ordinary ESRC 
studentship. I think it is important to detail here some of the benefits and limitations 
that this has had on my research. Additionally, my relationship with my collaborative 
body, Friends of the Earth, has had an impact on my work. Being associated with 
Friends of the Earth has, for example, allowed me open access to their resources. This 
has been invaluable, especially at the outset of my research into the precautionary 
principle and when designing my case studies.
The corollary of this is that having a CASE award has also made the scope of my PhD 
more restricted. Being tied to Friends of the Earth has meant that deviation from the 
initially agreed PhD and timetable has had to be negotiated. In the beginning there 
was a lack of definition about what they wanted from my PhD. The field was open for 
negotiation but the parameters were extremely broad. The basic proposal was drawn 
up by Friends of the Earth in conjunction with the Centre for Science Studies and I 
elaborated on this in my application. The advantage was that I had a basic idea of 
what Friends of the Earth wanted in terms of empirical research and the field was left 
open for me to decide on theoretical argument and methodology. This also had its 
disadvantages as I discovered that there are many different ways of looking at the 
subject of decision-making involving uncertainty, which is what my research on the
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precautionary principle evolved into. That Friends of the Earth gave me the freedom 
to choose my own methodology and theory has had advantages and disadvantages. 
Where CASE bodies have been very instrumental in defining the parameters of work, 
as is the case with some of my colleagues, there is limited scope for manoeuvre.
There is a real tension therefore between the advantages of having a definite target to 
be reached and having a target that is always moving and being re-negotiated.
Selecting Case Studies
Given the nature o f the precautionary principle, as detailed in chapter two, it soon 
became obvious that determining its application would not simply be a matter of 
looking at how it was adopted in the UK. It was apparent that it was not something 
tangible, and I would have to find some means of attempting to understand its 
application in decision-making processes. I decided that the best option would be to 
conduct a number of case studies of environmental issues in order to ascertain how the 
precautionary principle was being conceived in those situations. In order to do this I 
attempted to select contrasting issues that provided a range of situations to which the 
precautionary principle was applicable.
I initially agreed with Friends of the Earth that I would conduct three case studies that 
would be of interest to myself, of campaigning significance to Friends of the Earth 
and of relevance to an understanding of the precautionary principle. We agreed that 
radioactive waste disposal would be one of them. Having chosen to come to 
university in a town only four miles from two nuclear reactors and living just down 
the coast from one of the largest nuclear sites in England which buries and stores
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domestic civilian radioactive waste, imports foreign radioactive waste and undertakes 
reprocessing of spent fuel I was convinced that this was an industry worth looking at 
in terms of how the precautionary principle applied to it. A more long-standing 
personal reason for being interested in this study is that while growing up on the east 
coast of Ireland I was constantly being made aware of the potential dangers from 
Sellafield (then known as Windscale), of the dangers of swimming in the Irish sea, of 
eating sea-food from the Irish sea and of leukaemia clusters along the east coast 
allegedly connected to the nuclear industry’s radioactive emissions. I wanted to know 
more about what happens to radioactive waste. At the time of starting my PhD 
(October 1995) Friends of the Earth was involved in giving evidence at a public 
inquiry into a planning application to excavate a Rock Characterisation Facility (RCF) 
at Longlands Farm near Sellafield in Cumbria. Nirex, the company responsible for 
the disposal of intermediate level radioactive waste, had selected this site as a suitable 
repository for intermediate level radioactive waste and had submitted a planning 
application to construct what they called an RCF to investigate the geology and 
hydrology of the site further. A long public inquiry ensued with Cumbria County 
Council, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, amongst others, opposing the 
application. This meant that there was a lot of knowledge and experience that I could 
draw on from Friends of the Earth. Dr Rachel Western, Nuclear Researcher in the 
Energy, Nuclear and Climate Team at Friends of the Earth, gave me a lot of her time 
and full access to all the resources that she had gathered together. This was invaluable 
to me at the start of my research. Additionally she was able to supply me with names 
and contacts for people who would be relevant interviewees.
As a case study for the precautionary principle radioactive waste disposal was an ideal 
choice as it provided a historic study dating back to the late 1940’s. I was able to
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follow the debate as it had taken place through records such as white papers and 
government reports, and later through advisory committee reports and government 
panel reports. Far-reaching decisions about the ultimate disposal route for 
intermediate level waste (ILW) had already been taken and it is currently government 
policy that this should involve deep underground burial. This case study enabled me 
to look at how decisions had already been taken and also, in light of the Nirex inquiry, 
to ponder on how precautionary decisions are being made at present. Now, with the 
new labour government conducting a review on policy regarding the disposal of 
radioactive waste, this case study of mine has become more topical.
A second case study was more difficult to select. At the beginning of my research I 
was very interested in PM 10s -  the tiny particulates emitted from vehicle exhaust -  
because they were being discussed locally and nationally as an issue of urban air 
quality. I undertook some work critiquing a couple o f reports that had come out about 
the health effects of PM 10s.1 Another important issue in the media at this time was 
Genetically Manipulated Organisms (GMOs). This was a very topical subject as 
some genetically altered products had just been allowed on the market in the UK. 
There was (and currently still is) a lot of discussion about the labelling requirements 
of products containing GMOs. One of the contentious issues is that not much is 
known about the medium to long-temi effects of these products either on human 
health or on the wider environment and so the safety of the products cannot be
1 Department o f Health - Committee on the Medical Effects o f Air Pollutants (1995). Non-biological 
particles and health. London: HMSO. and Department o f  the Environment - Expert Panel on Air 
Quality Standards (1995). Particles. London: HMSO.
2 Greenpeace Business (1997). European opposition to genetically modified organisms (GMOs) gains 
momentum. Greenpeace Business 36, (April/May 1997): 6-7.
Grove-White, R., MacNaghten, P., Mayer, S., and Wynne, B. (1997). Uncertain world: genetically 
modified organisms, food and public attitudes in Britain. Lancaster: Lancaster University. March 1997. 
Levidow, L. (1996). Regulating GMO releases: Britain's precautionary dilemmas. Natures-Sciences- 
Societes 4, (2): 131-143.
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demonstrated. More recently a crop of genetically altered soy beans were produced in 
the US which were developed because they had a resistance to a particular herbicide 
that was used to spray the crops. A big debate followed, the outcome of which was 
that the genetically altered soybeans would be mixed in with non-genetically-altered 
beans as there was deemed to be no significant biological difference between them.3 I 
felt this would make a suitable case study for researching the application of the 
precautionary principle. Duncan McLaren, Senior Research Co-ordinator in the 
Sustainable Development Research Unit, my supervisor at Friends of the Earth, 
agreed but was hesitant due to the fact that at that time Friends of the Earth did not 
have a campaigner working on biotechnology or food issues.
Another topical issue, causing a media sensation at the time, was endocrine disrupting 
chemicals. These are chemicals that have been implicated as disrupters of the 
hormone systems of animals, both human and non-human. A number of studies have 
been conducted that have shown a link between particular chemicals and particular 
reproductive dysfunction. I became fascinated by this topic, as the chemicals in 
question are pervasive in today’s society. In fact no society, whether they actively use 
these chemicals or not, is free of their potential effects as can be seen from the fact 
that chemicals have been observed in animals living in the Arctic.4 This seemed to me 
to be a suitable contrast to the radioactive waste disposal case study, which is much 
more local in its potential effects. Friends of the Earth were also interested in 
environmental chemicals and agreed that I should conduct a second case study on this 
theme. At the same time as starting this case study, Michael Warhurst, who had been
3 GenEthics News (1996). Genetic engineering, ethics and the environment. GenEthics News 13, 
(Sep/Oct 1996): 12. p i
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working with Friends of the Earth Scotland on endocrine disrupters moved to London 
to work with Friends o f the Earth in the Industry and Pollution team there. He has 
subsequently given me a lot of help in terms of material and contacts.
Conducting a case study on endocrine disruption was timely given media concerns 
about reproductive health.5 Additionally, it provided a significant contrast to the 
radioactive waste study. Where the radioactive waste debate has been an historic one 
with an abundance of information on the subject readily available, the debate about 
endocrine disrupting chemicals is still relatively new, meaning that there is much less 
publicly available information on the topic. Conducting a study on endocrine 
disrupting chemicals gave me the opportunity to talk to decision-makers whilst 
positions were still be negotiated and ‘decisions’ still being taken. It provided an 
opportunity to look at a subject where the state of the knowledge was disputed, where 
there was little consensus about the scientific facts and where there was little 
consensus about what action needed to be taken immediately, if any. Information 
about radioactive waste disposal comes from a wide variety of disciplines including 
physics, geology, hydrology, engineering, sociology, epidemiology and toxicology 
whereas information about endocrine disrupting chemicals tends to come from 
toxicological and ecological studies. As yet there has been little in terms of 
sociological research conducted into endocrine disrupting chemicals. This issue about 
the amount of information and expertise available is significant because, as has been 
identified in the precautionary principle chapter, the precautionary principle is about 
making decisions even when there is a lack of scientific evidence. An additional
4 PCBs have been found in the body fat o f polar bears on the Norwegian Svalbard Island. Colbom, T., 
Peterson Myers, J., and Dumanoski, D. (1996). Our Stolen Future. London: Little, Brown and 
Company, p 101 -104
5 Pinchbeck, D. (1996). Downward motility. Esquire January 1996: 79-84.
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contrasting feature between these two cases is that while there are pressure groups in 
existence that are dedicated to campaigning on nuclear issues there are (as yet) no 
dedicated pressure groups campaigning on issues of endocrine disruption. This limits 
the amount of exposure the public may have to these two issues although there are 
some multi-issue environmental groups campaigning on both issues. This is also 
significant in relation to the precautionary principle as it is often through efforts by 
pressure groups that wider society is made aware o f such controversial issues. 
Invocation of the precautionary principle relies on there being an indication of a 
problem to start with.
Another contrasting feature was the ability to identify key players in decision-making 
processes about the two issues. With radioactive waste disposal this was relatively 
straightforward whereas with endocrine disrupting chemicals it involved more 
research and personal judgement. Because the precautionary principle is about 
making decisions about environmental harms it is relevant that with some issues 
decision-makers are easily identifiable whilst with others they are more obscure, 
dispersed and harder to pin down.
Other features of contrast between the two case studies were the level of scientific 
consensus about the link between what caused particular observed effects, whether 
scientific equipment was sophisticated enough to look for particular known effects, 
whether the effects were felt by particular individuals in specific locations or more 
ubiquitously by everyone, whether individuals could control their own exposure 
through personal choice and the current level of government policy with regard to the
Ryder, R. and Allen, R. (undated). Are chemicals affecting male fertility? Toxcat Special - Part 1: 1-6.
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two issues. These are all significant in that it must be recognised that the 
precautionary principle has to be applied to all these diverse situation.
Initially we had agreed that I would do three case studies, in order to get a broad 
perspective of the issues to which the precautionary principle might be applied, but we 
had not decided on what the third would be. Friends of the Earth suggested that 
climate change would make a good study because it was the focus of their main 
national campaign. I wasn’t so keen on this because I felt that issues where there are 
scientific controversies would make more suitable studies. Although there is still a lot 
o f controversy within the climate change debate, with the establishment of the IPCC 
there is at least consensus among scientists that there is a problem. The climate 
change debate has been going on for a long time and a huge amount of literature had 
been produced about it. Practically every government in the world has a position on it 
and I felt that tackling it would not provide as much useful data as the other two 
studies already selected. On top of that I was keener to focus on GMOs, as I am more 
attracted to subject areas that members of the public can identify with in some way. 
There seems to be an immediacy about endocrine disruption that people can identify 
with due to the fact that people are concerned about things that could possibly affect 
their or their children’s reproductivity. Similarly with GMOs, people have a direct 
interest in what they consume. In contrast climate change seems to be a step removed 
from the ordinary person, more of a global issue than a local one. Although both 
radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals have global relevance 
they’re not being dealt with globally. My main interest was to look at issues that are 
being dealt with at a UK decision-making level. For this reason I pushed for my third 
case study to be on GMOs.
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However, it soon became apparent to me that undertaking three case studies was an 
extremely ambitious proposal and not entirely necessary due to the significant 
differences between the two case studies already conducted. I felt that the radioactive 
waste disposal study and the endocrine disrupting chemicals study provided sufficient 
examples of the contrasting range of problems and situations that the precautionary 
principle would be faced with to eliminate the necessity for a third one. I therefore 
decided that two detailed case studies would be more beneficial to my research than 
three less detailed ones. This was one of the decisions where I had to negotiate with 
Friends of the Earth as my CASE sponsor, in order to change our initial agreement 
about the content of the research. Fortunately Friends of the Earth and my supervisors 
agreed with this analysis of the situation, hence my thesis draws on two case studies 
rather than three.
From the above, and from chapter two, it can be seen that radioactive waste disposal 
and endocrine disruption make useful case studies from which to examine the 
precautionary principle because they effectively demonstrate the wide range of 
contrasting problems associated with environmental issues. Despite the fact that the 
precautionary principle itself is not a major component of the deliberations about 
either radioactive waste disposal or endocrine disruption, useful understandings can 
still be deduced from their examination. Rather than exploring how the precautionary 
principle is applied in practice in the UK this thesis is about examining to what extent 
the themes established in chapter two as constituent parts of rhetorical precaution (i.e. 
as identified from the agreements listed in Appendix 1) are in fact elements of current 
deliberations about two specific environmental issues. From this I am able to consider 
the implications precautionary rhetoric might have for other environmental issues.
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Having shown in chapter two, through analysing six situations that can be identified 
from agreements referring to the precautionary principle, that the key to understanding 
what lies behind the precautionary principle is an understanding of how scientific 
evidence is organized and how uncertainty is acknowledged and used, I use the two 
case studies of radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disruption to explore these 
issues in some detail.
Both case studies offer useful insights into the day to day operation o f precautionary 
ideals, and the role of evidence and uncertainty. In chapter five on radioactive waste 
disposal I organise ideas about the marshalling of evidence with regard to the Nirex 
Inquiry into sections that cover how definitions of radioactive waste and related 
concepts are created and used by the different participants at the inquiry; how 
information, data and argument are deployed; and the ways in which uncertainty is 
exploited by participants to variously support or undermine the claims of themselves 
or others. In chapter six I follow deliberations on endocrine disrupting chemicals 
from the point where the Department of the Environment commissioned a workshop 
to discuss environmental oestrogens. In that chapter I argue that subsequent 
deliberations about endocrine disrupting chemicals were framed around issues of 
scientific uncertainty, weight of evidence and the definition of terms, as established by 
the setting up of that initial workshop. Both these case studies show that the themes 
that are implicit within rhetorical precaution at the level of formal agreements are also 
implicit at the empirical level of deliberations about environmental problems, despite 
there being little explicit reference to the precautionary principle itself within those 
deliberations. This lends weight to my decision to focus on these areas.
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Interviews and Interviewees
I chose to undertake approximately twenty semi-structured interviews for each case 
study. I selected particular individuals on the basis that I wanted to track the history 
and arguments of the issues in question. I felt that structured interviews were too 
restricting and would not allow me to obtain the type of data I was looking for. May 
considers that structured interviews are dependent upon good pilot work and upon the 
interviewer being similar to the target group in terms of sharing a similar culture so 
that the interpretation of the questions and the dynamics of the interview do not vary 
to a great extent.6 He quotes Benney and Hughes as saying
‘Where languages are too diverse, where common values are too 
few, where the fear of talking to strangers is too great, there the 
interview based on a standardised questionnaire calling for a few 
standardised answers may not be applicable. Those who venture 
into such situations may have to invent new modes of 
interviewing.’7
For these reasons semi-structured interviews seemed more appropriate. Although I 
still had a list of pre-set questions, I used these as the basis for the ensuing discussion 
rather than making coverage of these issues an end in its own right. This allowed me 
to probe the interviewee about particular points that I considered relevant as the 
interview progressed. As May points out
6 May, T. (1993). Social research: issues, methods and process. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open 
University Press. p92
7 Benney, M. and Hughes, E. (1984). Method: evidence and inference - evidence and inference in 
ethnomethodology. In, Button, G., (ed)., Ethnomethodology and the human sciences',218. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press., quoted in May, T. (1993). Social research: issues, methods and process. 
Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press. p92
121
‘Qualitative information about the topic can then be recorded by the 
interviewer who can then seek both clarification and elaboration 
on the answers given. This allows the interviewer to have more 
latitude to probe beyond the answers.’8 
May also considers that the context of the semi-structured interview is an important 
aspect of the process. He says
‘Given this greater degree of latitude offered to the interviewer and 
the greater need to understand the context and content of the 
interview, while trained interviewers may be used, researchers 
themselves often conduct the interviews.’9 
I arranged the interviews in the location of choice of the interviewees. This usually 
meant they took place in their work environment although sometimes it took place in 
their homes, depending on whom the interviewee was representing. Although this 
meant a lot of travel on my part it was beneficial in that the interviewees were more 
relaxed in familiar surroundings and it gave me an opportunity to evaluate their 
surroundings.
While focused interviews or unstructured interviews may have provided detailed 
accounts of the interviewee’s particular concerns, and allowed them more freedom to 
expand in areas of interest to themselves, given the time constraints involved in my 
interviewing schedule it was important to at least have the bones of the information I 
hoped to elicit. As Robson states:
8 May, T. (1993). Social research: issues, methods and process. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open 
University Press. p93
9 May, T. (1993). Social research: issues, methods and process. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open 
University Press. p93
122
‘Interviewers have their shopping list of topics and want to get 
responses to them, but as a matter of tactics they have greater 
freedom in the sequencing of questions, in their exact wording, and 
in the amount of time and attentions given to different topics.’10 
Again, I felt that semi-structured interviews were the best format to use as they 
allowed me the control of pre-set questions with the freedom to deviate and address 
issues which I had not foreseen arising. In this way I was able to obtain a huge 
amount of relevant data.
Another method I considered being inappropriate was self-completed questionnaires. 
An advantage of these is that they are time and effort efficient for the researcher as 
they can be copied, circulated and completed in a lot less time than it takes to conduct 
the same number of interviews. However, for my purposes there are many 
disadvantages. I would have had to conduct a postal survey which generally has a 
high rate of non-response. The questions would have to be very precise and could not 
allow for the respondent to expand in a lot of detail on every question. Given the 
range of people I interviewed one standard questionnaire would not have been 
appropriate and so a number o f different questionnaires would have had to be created 
for the different interviewees. This would have been extremely time-consuming and 
potentially counter-productive as I would have been anticipating the answers from the 
different interviewees in the questions I asked.
As this was my first venture in conducting interviews I was a little anxious about my 
first few. In order to minimise any potential problems I carefully selected who I
10 Robson, C. (1993). Real world research: a resource fo r  social scientists and practitioner- 
researchers. Oxford: Blackwell. p237
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would interview first. I chose people who I felt would be sympathetic to the aims of 
my research and who would be open in their replies to my questions. These were 
environmentalists and academics. After these first few interviews I went on to 
conduct interviews with representatives of industry, of government and regulatory 
bodies. By this stage I had refined the way in which I raised particular topics and was 
confident in my ability to inteiject when the content of the interview appeared to be 
wavering.
I interviewed approximately 20 individuals for each case study.11 These people were 
selected on the basis of their involvement with the issue in question. Friends of the 
Earth gave me a lot of names and contacts of people who would be relevant to talk to.
I also looked at the participants lists of various conferences and workshops in order to 
ascertain whether I had missed any important voices. With regards the radioactive 
waste disposal case study I contacted a lot of people who had been involved in the 
Nirex Inquiry (discussed in detail in chapter five on radioactive waste disposal) as 
well as organisations who have dealings with the nuclear industry in the UK who were 
not directly involved with that inquiry. With regards the endocrine disrupting 
chemicals case study I selected people based on their involvement in workshops on 
endocrine disruption or their statutory obligations for particular areas of public 
concern, for example, water or food. I interviewed people from a broad range of 
organisations in order that I had representations from a range of different interest 
groups. These people were individuals who have been fairly vocal in the discussions 
of the issues of concern and who could be said to be the key players in the debate. All 
the people I interviewed I spoke to in their capacity as a representative o f a particular
II See Appendix 2
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organisation as opposed to their ‘individual selves’. I was not trying to obtain 
individual’s accounts of what the key issues were but rather I wanted to know what 
particular organisations and statutory bodies had to say on the issues. In order to 
acquire an broad range of opinions I ensured that I had representatives who could 
speak for government, industry and non-governmental organisations.
I used a combination of tape-recording the interviews and taking notes as I found this 
the most effective method of eliciting detailed responses from my interviewees. 
Leaving a tape running meant that I did not miss anything that was said and the 
majority of my interviewees were happy to be recorded. Taking notes myself seemed 
to encourage the interviewees to forget about the tape and to concentrate on the 
questions. It also had the advantage of prompting the interviewees to continue talking 
while I was note-taking as I had observed that when I was solely taping the interviews 
the interviewee would stop more quickly in anticipation of the next question.
My choice of methodology relates very clearly to my theoretical use of interests 
theory. By conducting semi-structured interviews I gave my interviewees the 
opportunity to talk about the issues they felt were relevant to the decision-making 
process. This meant that some of their interests were expressly identified by 
themselves, a factor that addresses one of the criticisms aimed at the interests 
approach, that the researcher identifies pre-determined interests of their own 
conjuring. Additionally, some interviewees expressed opinions about the embedded 
interests of other participants in the decision-making processes under study and this 
gave me a starting point for identifying the underlying interests in the rest of my data. 
Had I conducted structured interviews or used questionnaires the criticism of
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searching for particular interests would be more real as it would have been very 
difficult to construct questions that would not be seen as leading the interviewee in a 
particular direction. Semi-structured interviews supported by documented material 
was the obvious methodology to use so as not to fall into this trap as identified by 
critics of the interests approach.
Other Data
In addition to my interview data I used lots o f published and grey material. In order to 
obtain a significant background of the details of the two case studies it was necessary 
to undertake a thorough literature review of material published on the issues. This 
gave me a significant understanding of the scientific issues involved in the discussions 
about the two cases as well as leading me to other appropriate material. An advantage 
o f using published material is that it provides a record of research in a certain field and 
can reveal the public position of particular organisations. As May says:
‘Documents inform the practical and political decisions which 
people make on a daily and longer-term basis and may even
1 9construct a particular reading of past social or political events.’
The types of documentary material I consulted includes historical documents such as 
government White Papers, European Directives, journal articles, official reports, 
internal memos, letters, newspaper articles, press releases, pamphlets, evidences to 
public inquiries, government records including Hansard, government committee 
records and reports. Some of these documents were public documents which made 
access easy while others were private and were either given to me by the people I
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interviewed or were passed on to me through another source. May also issues a 
warning about relying on documented material:
‘.. .what people decide to record, to leave in or take out, is itself 
informed by decisions which relate to the social, political and 
economic environment of which they are a part. History, like all 
social and natural sciences, is amenable to manipulation and 
selective influence.’13 
It would not have been appropriate to base all my research on documented material as 
often the issues that inform decision-making come from other sources. However it 
has provided an extremely useful supplementary source of detailed information which 
has been valuable both in helping to identify the position of my interviewees prior to 
the interviews and in providing enough background information so that I did not have 
to cover those issues during the interviews.
Questions of Access
With any research involving interviewing selected individuals there is always an issue 
about access. Although I was interviewing people involved in decision-making 
processes about two distinct environmental issues I was not a witness to any of the 
actual deliberations. I relied on both documented information about those 
deliberations in addition to verbal accounts by those who were involved. I had very 
little difficulty obtaining access to individuals in order to interview them. Most 
people seemed very willing to talk about their own work and experience. However,
12 May, T. (1993). Social research: issues, methods and process. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open 
University Press, p i33
13 May, T. (1993). Social research: issues, methods and process. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open 
University Press, p i49-150
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not having access to the actual decision-making operations meant that I was unable to 
observe the negotiations that led to the resolution of controversy (when they did), or 
that clarified that no consensus had been reached. Therefore, when obtaining 
governments and regulators perceptions I targeted particular individuals and have used 
their words as representative of the department or body they work for.
It must be remembered that decisions made in particular workshops and inquiries will 
depend on a lot of behind-the-scenes deliberation, as will decisions about particular 
institutional stances. Reading reports does not give access to this material, as it is 
usually the outcomes rather than the process that are discussed. Similarly, speaking to 
particular individuals may not give access to this process, as they themselves may not 
have been involved in the behind-the-scenes deliberations. Conversely they may have 
been personally involved in meetings at which informal agreements were recognised 
but may not be willing to acknowledge this either to me as a researcher or even to 
themselves. I decided that it was not possible to acquire an understanding of these 
internal processes without undertaking a genuinely ethnographic study. I felt that it 
would be impossible to access some of those areas save as an insider and, in the 
context of my two cases, becoming an ‘insider’ would be time-consuming if not 
impossible. Therefore I do not make reference to internal deliberations unless through 
reference to internal documents. However, even internal documents don’t detail 
everything. Due to the range of individuals and institutions I was interviewing these 
problems could not have been overcome in a study of this size. Obtaining inside 
information from every organisation would in any event require the liberty to follow 
the interviewee around and witness all their deliberations, formal and informal. This 
method of research has numerous drawbacks and limitations due to the pressure the
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interviewee can feel from being under such close scrutiny. This may in turn affect the 
way discussions and deliberations take place. For these reasons my research was 
limited to one-to-one semi-structured interviews supplemented by additional 
documented material.
Summary
The previous chapter on uncertainty, expertise and interests helped inform my 
research design, a design also influenced by the process of obtaining an ESRC Case 
Award in conjunction with an external organisation (Friends of the Earth). Together 
these considerations led to a discussion of the pros and cons of collaboration in terms 
of the focus of the work involved, and from there to the identification of the two case 
studies used in this thesis, namely radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disrupting 
chemicals. I then introduced the methodology used to obtain my data, justifying it in 
terms of my goal of eliciting as much information as possible on the positions of the 
individuals interviewed, taking these to be representative of the institutions they were 
associated with. Due to the limitations on the data obtained through interviewing I 
supported this with documented material obtained from various sources. In this 
chapter I have justified the use of the various types of documents I have used and have 
given structured reasons as to why other means of obtaining information were 
inappropriate to this study.
Additionally, I have shown that analysing the precautionary principle itself is not an 
empirical possibility and to get around this I use the themes identified from analysing 
documented agreements that refer to the precautionary principle as a position to start
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from. These themes were determined in chapter two and are shown to be significant 
elements of both ‘rhetorical’ precaution, that is the core concepts invoked in formal 
agreements, and in real-life environmental deliberations.
The following two chapters review my empirical work on radioactive waste disposal 
and endocrine disrupting chemicals. In these chapters I show how the issues of 
evidence, definitions and uncertainty are discussed in relation to these case studies. 
The relationship between the two case studies, the relevance of an interests approach 
and the implications of the case studies for the implementation of the precautionary 




‘Radioactive waste management is a profoundly serious issue, central 
to the environmental evaluation of a nuclear power programme. There 
must be a clear, identifiable, policy centre and a means to ensure that 
the issues posed by waste management are fully considered at the 
outset of a nuclear programme, not dealt with many years after the 
decisions on developments that lead to the wastes have been made and 
when options may have been effectively foreclosed.’1
1 Command Paper 6618 (1976). Nuclear pow er and the environment: Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution, 6th report: (The Flowers Report). London: HMSO. 1976. p l64
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Introduction
In this chapter I identify the characteristics of the radioactive waste management 
problem that make it a suitable case study for analysing what application of the 
precautionary principle might mean. I introduce the main players in this arena and 
make a case for reviewing their deliberations and positions in terms of their prior 
institutional interests. On this basis I distinguish between the three sectors of 
government, industry and non-governmental organisations.
At the beginning of this section I introduce the Nirex Inquiry -  a public inquiry into an 
application by UK Nirex to build a Rock Characterisation Facility as a first stage 
towards the building of a radioactive waste repository in Cumbria. I have used details 
from and interviews with people involved in this inquiry extensively throughout this 
chapter. There was very little explicit reference to the precautionary principle at the 
inquiry (Greenpeace mentioned it in their closing submissions) and no detailed debate 
about how it should or could be applied in the particular context. Therefore it has not 
been possible to analyse the application of the precautionary principle itself to this 
case and I have had to take the less direct route that I outlined in the previous chapter. 
Therefore, the main body of this chapter compares interpretations of definitions of 
radioactive waste and the nature of evidence deployed in radioactive waste related 
controversies, as these are themes that I identified in chapter two as being significant 
aspects of rhetorical precaution. Understanding the way in which evidence is used to 
inform decision-making about radioactive waste management is key to understanding 
the extent to which precaution is a factor in decision-making processes. I have broken 
the first sub-section on definitions into three in order to assess the extent of
institutional polarisation on this issue. The most apparent distinctions that I found, 
both in documentation and by my respondents, were to do with definitions of 
plutonium as an asset, or a waste product, or weapons material; to do with 
interpretations of the scale o f the radioactive waste ‘problem’ in terms of the 
quantification of waste by half-lives or volume; and to do with the characterisation of 
radioactive waste as risk. The sub-section on evidence addresses the way in which 
‘evidence’ was defined, used and deployed by each of the involved parties at the Nirex 
public inquiry. The resulting discussion shows how this aspect of precaution, namely, 
the reliance on and definition of evidence worked out in practice.
Finally I look at the formal structure and process of a public inquiry showing how this 
‘event’ structures debate and reveals contrasting perspectives on the themes that 
constitute rhetorical precaution. A second aim is to identify the benefits and 
limitations of the public inquiry as a potential forum for precautionary decision­
making and to investigate the way in which evidence, definitions and their attendant 
interests shaped the outcome of this particular process.
Characteristics of Radioactive Waste
Radioactive waste has a number of distinctive characteristics that make it an especially 
revealing subject to study with regard to the application of the precautionary principle.
Firstly, there is a well-established framework within which decisions about radioactive 
waste policy are made and the roles of key institutions are fairly explicit. Although 
government policy is continually being reassessed and changed there are strict
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guidelines to which the nuclear industry must adhere through licensing and monitoring 
processes. There has been explicit policy on radioactive waste disposal since the 
1970s, and various government departments continue to play a central role in its 
development and implementation.
Within the structured framework of the UK policy process “the public” are able to 
have their say and the many public inquiries into the development of nuclear 
installations have heard self-confident members of the public expressing their views. 
These frameworks may be restrictive in the extent to which ordinary members of the 
public feel they can participate and in the issues allowed to be discussed but the fact 
remains that a platform exists for expressions of discontent and support.
The key actors in the debate about radioactive waste disposal are easily identified as 
many of the roles and issues have been in existence for a long time. Within 
government and the regulatory bodies specific departments and sub-divisions are 
responsible for particular areas of nuclear policy with identifiable individuals filling 
distinct roles. Within industry, key individuals are also readily identified as again 
specific roles exist within company structures.
Opponents to nuclear energy are also easily identified due to their vociferousness and 
their commitment to communicating their beliefs to a wide audience. Over the years 
specific pressure groups have been set up to campaign on nuclear issues. These 
include groups such as CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) and CORE 
(Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment). Additionally, multi-issue 
environmental groups such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace also campaign
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about nuclear issues. These groups have had a lot o f time to develop and consolidate 
their position on these issues, and this has enabled them to actively engage in decision­
making processes about the future of nuclear power and radioactive waste.
It must be acknowledged however that the nuclear industry was established long 
before environmental concerns were recognised and radioactive waste was not 
publicly acknowledged as a serious problem until the end of the 1950s.2 This was 
partly due to the culture of secrecy within which the nuclear industry operated due to 
its military origins. Despite this history a significant amount of information about 
radioactive waste is now in the public domain, which means that anyone interested in 
or concerned about nuclear issues has access to it.
Stories about radioactive waste and the nuclear industry make news due to the 
emotional response that they elicit in people. This means that the public often gets 
sensationalised coverage of nuclear incidents.3 This is important since the way in 
which the public responds to nuclear issues is of great concern to the nuclear industry
2 Command Paper 884 (1959). The control o f  radioactive wastes. London: HMSO.
3 See, for example, the headlines associated with the following newspaper articles: Brown, P. (1998). 
Atom waste bill £355m. The Guardian , Wednesday April 1 1998, 5.
Brown, P. (1997). Turmoil over nuclear safety: threat to 2bn disposal project. The Guardian, Thursday 
16 January 1997, 1.
Nuttall, N. (1997). Leak fuels nuclear dump fears. The Times, January 1997.
Boulton, L. (1997). Leaked memo puts nuclear waste plan at risk. Financial Times, Thursday 16 
January 1997.
King, T. (1997). Leaked memo questions safety o f plans to bury atomic waste at Sellafield. Telegraph, 
Thursday 16 January 1997, 6.
Leake, J. (1998). 'Nuclear dustbin' fears could force Sellafield to close. Sunday Times, 25/01/98, 6. 
Anon (1998). Mox weapons warning. Whitehaven News, 21/05/98.
Siddall, D. (1998). Thorp's terror potential. Carlisle News Star, 03/08/98.
Beavis, S. and Brown, P. (1996). New fears on design o f reactors. Guardian, 19/03/96.
Brown, P. (1996). Never say nuclear: the risks we choose to fear. The Guardian, Wednesday 29 May 
1996.
Smythe, D.K. (1996). Nirex 'lost the scientific debate'. The Scotsman, 21 November 1996.
Lean, G. (1998). Soil tests condemn Sellafield. The Independent on Sunday, 6.
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which aims to promote a particular way of thinking. One of the industry’s key 
arguments is that there are such large social benefits tied in with the current state of 
electricity generation that it would be impracticable to close the nuclear industry 
down.4 In contrast opponents of nuclear power insist that enough is known about 
alternative energy production to make substitution feasible.5 They claim that if  as 
much money was invested into research and development of alternative energy 
production it would be able to compete with nuclear on an equal footing. Both sides 
need public support to legitimate their positions, and both enlist the media for their 
own ends.
One of the reasons why radioactive waste is such an emotive issue is because radiation 
is invisible and can cause serious long term damage to people and wildlife. Many 
studies have established a direct link between radiation and specific physiological 
effects.6 However establishing a link between specific geographical pockets of 
observed effects and a specific radiation source is more problematic. Clusters of 
leukaemia have been identified around some nuclear sites7 although in these cases the
4 See British Nuclear Industry Forum (1994). Environment and Nuclear Power. Didcot, Oxfordshire: 
AEA Technology. 1994.
British Nuclear Fuels pic (1992). Nuclear waste: what's to be done about it? Warrington, Cheshire: 
BNFL. 1992.
British Nuclear Fuels pic (1994). Don't be left in the dark. Warrington, Cheshire: BNFL. January 1994.
5 See Aubrey, C., Grunberg, D., and Hildyard, N., (eds) (1996). Nuclear Power: Shut it Down!: an 
information pack on nuclear pow er and the alternatives. Vol 2: The Ecologist.
6 See Bertell, R. (1996). Estimates o f uranium and nuclear radiation casualties attributable to activities 
since 1945. In, Crispin, A., Grunberg, D., and Hildyard, N., (eds), Nuclear Power: Shut it Down!: an 
information pack on nuclear pow er and the alternatives. Vol I, 1:82-87: The Ecologist.
Bertell, R. (1999). Victims o f the nuclear age. The Ecologist 29, (7): 408-411.; Nomura, T. (1982). 
Parental exposure to x-rays and chemical tumours induces heritable tumours and anomalies in mice. 
Nature 196, (8 April 1982).
7 See Gardner, M.J., Snee, M.P., Hall, A.J., Powell, C.A., Downes, S., and Terrell, J.D. (1990). Results 
o f a case-control study o f leukaemia and lymphoma among young people near Sellafield nuclear plant in 
West Cumbria. British M edical Journal 300, (6722): 423-429.; Green, P. (1996). Low level radiation: 
questions and answers. In, Crispin, A., Grunberg, D., and Hildyard, N., (eds), Nuclear Power: Shut it 
Down!: an information pack on nuclear power and the alternatives. Vol / ,  1:53-72: The Ecologist.
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nuclear industry argues that there is not enough evidence to link the cause to the 
observed effect and suggests other factors may be involved.
This inability to determine aetiology is exacerbated by the fact that individuals cannot 
detect exposure to radiation with the naked eye and may be exposed unknowingly. 
However equipment does exist which allows the presence of radiation to be identified 
easily which allows suspect sources of radiation to be monitored and tested.
Since sources of radiation resulting from radioactive waste are localised rather than 
generic, some members of the public will be closer to the source of risk than others. 
Individuals who are close to the source will not be able to minimise their exposure, as 
they have no way of controlling their intake of radiation. An important fact to bear in 
mind about radiation is that manmade radiation adds to natural background levels 
creating a cumulative effect. Whilst natural radiation exists everywhere, the 
background level will be different from place to place. Any reasoning that manmade 
emissions are close to background levels disguises this fact and also ignores any
o
potential additive effects.
p71; Mihill, C. and Morris, M. (1990). Sellafield fathers' cancer link: Ministers concerned as study 
tracks leukaemia risk. Guardian , 16 February 1990.; Downs, S. (1996). The ten years o f  investigation 
into the health impact o f the Sellafield reprocessing plant on local communities in Cumbria. In, Crispin, 
A., Grunberg, D., and Hildyard, N., (eds), Nuclear Power: Shut it Down!: an information pack  on 
nuclear pow er and the alternatives. Vol I, 1:93-96: The Ecologist.
Cook-Mozaffari, P.J., Darby, S.C., Doll, R., Forman, D., Hermon, C., Pike, M.C., and Vincent, T. 
(1989). Geographical variation in mortality from leukaemia and other cancers in England and Wales in 
relation to proximity to nuclear installations, 1969-78. British Journal o f  Cancer 59, (3): 476-485. 
Kinlen, L. (1988). Evidence for an infective cause o f childhood leukaemia: comparison o f a Scottish 
new town with nuclear reprocessing sites in Britain. Lancet 2, (8624): 1323-1327.
8 See Green, P. (1996). Low level radiation: questions and answers. In, Crispin, A., Grunberg, D., and 
Hildyard, N., (eds), Nuclear Power: Shut it Down!: an information pack on nuclear pow er and the 
alternatives. Vol / ,  1:53-72: The Ecologist, for a discussion o f background radiation, p66-68
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Finally, there are many uncertainties regarding the health effects of exposure to 
radioactive waste. At this point, a distinction should be made between low-dose 
chronic exposure and high-dose one-off exposures. The effects of chronic exposure to 
low doses of radiation are not well understood, partly because many studies have been 
aimed at high-dose one-off exposures (for example studies of Hiroshima survivors). 
Such cases are easier to monitor since the exact cause is known and the effects on 
particular individuals can be seen. Low dose chronic exposure, by contrast, is more 
difficult to monitor because the exposed populations are harder to identify.
All of the above characteristics of radioactive waste and the framework within which 
decisions about its management are made are important factors in helping to 
understand how the themes that make up rhetorical precaution relate to current 
environmental applications. Having described these features of radioactive waste that 
make it a relevant case study, I now identify the stakeholders involved in debating the 
future of radioactive waste disposal and identify the specific precautionary issues that 
this issue raises.
Cast of Players
In order for a discussion on the ways in which definitions, disputed evidence and 
scientific uncertainty (as identified in chapter two from the six situations that make up 
rhetorical precaution) to have meaning with regard to the precautionary principle and 
radioactive waste disposal, it is important to distinguish between the actors involved. 
Identifying the cast of players helps in understanding how the interests associated with 
institutional arrangements and social practices influence the way decisions are made
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and how controversy is closed. The Nirex Inquiry (a public inquiry held in Cumbria in 
1995-1996 at which UK Nirex Ltd appealed against the decision of Cumbria County 
Council not to allow planning permission for their proposed Rock Characterisation 
Facility)9 reveals a particular cohort of interests and their interaction. Detailed 
analysis of these underpins this chapter.
Reviewing documentation of the Nirex Inquiry enabled me to identify fifteen key 
players: the Department of the Environment Radioactive Substances Division; the 
Environment Agency; the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; the National 
Radiological Protection Board; the Health and Safety Executive’s Nuclear 
Installations Inspectorate; the Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee; 
the Planning Inspector; the Secretary of State; UK Nirex Ltd; the United Kingdom 
Atomic Energy Authority; British Nuclear Fuels Ltd; Friends of the Earth;
Greenpeace; the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament; and Cumbrians Opposed to a 
Radioactive Environment. I have organised the following review of the positions 
adopted by these groups under the headings of government, industry and NGOs.
Government
There are many different voices within the UK government concerned with nuclear 
matters. Some, although not all, were involved in the Nirex Inquiry. Each of the 
government departments or bodies involved had specific functions and responsibilities 
and I detail some of these below.
9 Details o f  this public inquiry are discussed further later in this chapter.
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Both ministers and officers are involved in decision-making at government level. 
Officers in government departments must advise ministers on appropriate courses of 
action in particular circumstances. They must have a knowledge and understanding of 
current scientific controversies including whether and how consensus has been 
reached regarding these controversies. Their roles include the translation of scientific 
knowledge into potential policy and advising on possible policy measures when there 
is a lack of scientific certainty. They inform ministers who are ultimately responsible 
for enacting policy. Officers will normally be attached to particular departments and 
their advice will be geared toward potential effects or consequences in certain sectors, 
for example officers associated with MAFF will be concerned with public health and 
food production. Whilst there may be overlap between some departmental interests, 
departments are typically responsible for particular issues, hence the need for 
interdepartmental liaison in order to avoid potentially conflicting priorities and advice.
The Radioactive Substances Division of the Department of the Environment10 looks 
after the DoE's interests on radioactive matters primarily under the Radioactive 
Substances Act (RSA). One of its concerns is radioactive waste management and 
related radioactive discharges and policy. The Division is not responsible for 
authorisations of particular radioactive waste projects, which are dealt with by the 
Environment Agency, but if the applicant thinks the conditions applied are 
unreasonable they can appeal to the Secretary of State who will then make a decision. 
The Secretary of State has the power, under the RSA, in conjunction with MAEF, to
10After the 1997 General Election when the Labour Party came to power the Department o f  the 
Environment (DoE) and the Department o f Transport (DoT) merged to become the larger Department 
o f Environment and Transport (DETR). At the time o f  my fieldwork they were still separate and to
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take certain cases away from the Environment Agency. This hasn't happened since the 
inception of the RSA but if it did it would be part of the job of the Head of the 
Radioactive Substances Division to advise the Secretary of State on the particular 
case. There are no standard criteria by which to decide what would be an appropriate 
case for the Secretary of State to get involved in so it would be the role of the Head of 
the Radioactive Substances Division to advise on that in their role as a civil servant.11 
The primary responsibility of the Radioactive Substances Division is to deal with 
policy that needs to be adopted in the UK for radioactive waste management and also 
on legislation. The Division’s interest is in proposing policy that is accepted by 
society whilst simultaneously making decisions based on available scientific evidence. 
As the top government advisors it is important for those at the Division to be seen to 
give objective, clear advice.
The Environment Agency (previously Her Majesty’s Inspector of Pollution) is the 
principal environmental regulator in England and Wales and has a major role under 
the RSA 1993 in regulating disposal and storage of radioactive wastes in the UK. The 
Agency is responsible for authorising discharges and disposals of radioactive wastes 
from nuclear sites as well as from small non-nuclear premises such as hospitals and 
universities. It provides the enforcement function and has inspectors on the ground 
who issue authorisations and registrations. A spokesperson from the Environment 
Agency told me that under Statute they must now take the costs of regulation into 
account and the company being investigated must not incur expenditure grossly in
avoid any confusion I refer to them as separate departments in this thesis, 
"interview 16/10/96, transcript p2
141
12excess of benefits. The Environment Agency has responsibility for protecting the 
environment on behalf of the public. It is clear that the Environment Agency is 
subject to potentially opposing interests, being responsible for maintaining a cost- 
benefit balance on behalf of the industry they regulate whilst simultaneously 
maintaining the safety of the public.
The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), under their own legislation, 
are concerned with radioactivity in foodstuffs and are also a statutory consultee for any 
authorisations to dispose of radioactive wastes. MAFFs main interest with regard to 
radioactive waste is the protection of public health and it is with this in mind that 
MAFF is consulted by government about radioactive waste disposal.
‘The National Radiological Protection Board was created by the Radiological 
Protection Act, 1970 to give advice, to conduct research and to provide technical 
services in the field of protection against both ionising and non-ionising radiations.
The NRPB is responsible for advising government departments on radiological 
protection criteria to be applied to the disposal of all types of solid radioactive waste, 
including wastes arising in gaseous or liquid form which will be converted to solid 
form prior to disposal.’13 The NRPB has no regulatory role and is limited to giving 
advice on the effects of radiation on people, dose implications, risk limits and 
targets.14
^Interview 16/12/96, transcript pi
I3Statement o f purpose printed in all documents published by the NRPB, e.g. National Radiological 
Protection Board (1992). Board Statement on Radiological Protection Objectives fo r  the Land-Based 
D isposal o f  Solid Radioactive Wastes: NRPB. 1992. p i 
^Interview 27/11/96, transcript p i
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The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (Nil), which is part of the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE), is concerned with licensing the operation of nuclear plant. Their 
primary objective is to protect workers and the public from work activities. They 
operate under the Nuclear Installations Act (1965) which is the responsibility of the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTi). Nil is concerned with activities inside the 
boundary fence of the site in contrast to the Environment Agency which is concerned 
with what goes out into the environment. ‘It’s slightly confused because the HSE was 
recently transferred to DoE as a sponsoring department but they're still answerable to 
the DTi for their operation of nuclear licensed sites.’15 The N il’s interests are tied to 
radioactive concerns within any nuclear site boundary. This includes the storage and 
management of radioactive waste. Once radioactivity crosses the site boundary it 
comes under the jurisdiction of the Environment Agency. The Nil are concerned 
about the rights of the workers at the site and their exposure to radiation, and it is their 
interests that they represent.
The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee (RWMAC) is an 
independent body that advises the Secretaries of State for the Environment, Scotland 
and Wales, on the technical and environmental implications of major issues 
concerning the development and implementation of an overall policy for all aspects of 
the management of civil radioactive waste, including research and development.16 
Although independent it is dominated by pro-nuclear members. This means that as a 
body its interests are defined by an institutional framework which accepts nuclear 
power.
^Interview 16/10/96, transcript p2
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An additional role of the government comes at the level of the public inquiry where a 
Planning Inspector has the responsibility of sieving through evidence in order to write 
a report summing up the material presented, which is then submitted, together with a 
recommendation, to the Secretary of State, an elected Minister. The Secretary of State 
has been invested with the authority to grant or deny permission for any application, 
even going against the recommendation made by the Inspector who co-ordinates the 
inquiry. In the case of the Nirex Inquiry, which is discussed later in this chapter, the 
Inspector recommended that permission be denied to the applicant and the Secretary of 
State followed this advice. The Inspector is embedded in the Local Government 
planning system and therefore has a particular way of viewing evidence and sifting 
thorough what she or he considers to be relevant and irrelevant. The Secretary of 
State, as an elected Member of Parliament, may have little formal knowledge of the 
issues under question but nevertheless has a powerful position in the planning process. 
Local MPs such as those with a stake in the Nirex Inquiry are interested in making 
decisions that are publicly acceptable in order that they are viewed in a positive light 
in future elections. However they also have the conflict of wanting to support industry 
and development and promote employment opportunities within their constituencies.
Government, as can be seen from the above, encompass a diverse collection of 
interests and responsibilities. As a collective the divisions, departments and bodies 
involved have interests in public health and safety, industrial safety and development. 
However, due to the fact that the many departments work independently of each other 
there can be situations where the interests of one clashes with the interests of another.
I6RWMAC (1994). Annual Report: Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee. 1994. p8
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Industry
The nuclear industry in the UK is very closely associated with government due to its 
military past but also due to the fact that it was, until recently, completely government 
owned. Privatisation has now separated industry from government although the 
historic link has influenced the cultures within both organisations. The nuclear 
industry is keen to establish a safe management system for radioactive waste. The 
problem of radioactive waste management must be sorted out if there is to be any 
future expansion of nuclear energy. A number of different organisations now make up 
what I generically call the ‘nuclear industry’ each with distinct responsibilities.
The Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Executive (Nirex) was set up in 1982 by four 
organisations working in partnership -  British Nuclear Fuels pic, the Central 
Electricity Generating Board (now Nuclear Electric pic), the South of Scotland 
Electricity Board (now Scottish Nuclear Ltd), and the UK Atomic Energy Authority.
It was reconstituted as UK Nirex Ltd in November 1985 with all shares held by the 
partner organisations and with one special share being held by the Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry on behalf of the Government. UK Nirex’s task is to implement 
the Government’s strategy for the disposal of most low and intermediate-level 
radioactive waste produced by the UK nuclear industry and by users of radioactive 
materials in hospitals, industry, research and defence.17 It is important to Nirex to 
maintain a high public service profile due to the controversial nature of the product
i7UK Nirex Ltd (1991). Safe fo r  all time: the sto iy  o f  research into radioactive waste disposal. Didcot, 
Oxon: UK Nirex Ltd. October 1991.p3 and UK Nirex Ltd (1987). Facts on Nirex: the disposal o f  
radioactive waste. Didcot, Oxon: UK Nirex Ltd.
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with which it deals. However, due to the fact that Nirex’s business is radioactive 
waste management, it relies on activities that continue to produce radioactive waste. It 
therefore has a dual interest in managing radioactive waste and in managing public 
perceptions of the safety issues around radioactive waste.
The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) is responsible for managing 
nuclear sites at Dounreay, Windscale, Dunfrith, and Harwell and for undertaking a
programme of decommissioning on facilities where government funded research was
18undertaken. The UKAEA used sea disposal as its method of disposing of 
Intermediate Level Waste until 1982/83. Now it is drummed at source and put in 
purpose made stores at the site where it is produced. UKAEA’s interests lie in 
determining the safety of particular sites according to established risk assessment 
procedures and in undertaking the decommissioning of sites in order to allow them to 
be managed into the future. UKAEA also wants the public to be trusting of its 
decommissioning skills.
Another important player in the UK is British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) which 
produces fuel for all the nuclear power stations in Britain; manufactures and enriches 
uranium fuel; transports and reprocesses spent fuel; and is responsible for the 
management of waste products, and, ultimately for decommissioning. It has been 
constituted as a public limited company in which the government holds all the shares.
It operates from five sites: Risly near Warrington where it has its Head Offices; 
Springfields near Preston where it manufactures uranium fuel; Capenhurst near
^Interview 10/12/96, transcript p i
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Chester where it enriches uranium; Sellafield in Cumbria where it reprocesses spent 
nuclear fuel and manages waste and Annan in Scotland where it operates the 
Chapelcross nuclear power station. Due to the multitude of activities with which it is 
involved BNFL is clearly interested in the continuation of the nuclear industry. BNFL 
has responsibilities at all levels of the nuclear process and has chosen to diversify 
activities in order to keep future options open. By being involved at so many levels in 
the nuclear cycle the company is in a strong position to shape decisions.
BNFL and Nirex have built up a body of experience on nuclear matters that far 
exceeds the knowledge of others not involved in the industry. Where others may have 
generalised knowledge of nuclear matters, BNFL and Nirex have the advantage of 
understanding the precise operation of specific plants and processes. They do, 
however, have a credibility problem with the public and have often sought the 
corroboration of ‘independent experts’ in order to improve their public image 
especially on issues of safety.
As can be seen from the above there are two main industrial players in the UK 
involved in radioactive waste management -  UK Nirex Ltd and BNFL. Their interests 
are closely tied together and between them they are responsible for all levels of the 
nuclear cycle. While they are concerned about nuclear safety and potential liabilities 
they are also dependent on the continued existence of nuclear power production.
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Non-Governmental Organisations
The third group of voices heard in discussions of radioactive waste is that of non­
governmental organisations (NGOs). Commonly they tend to speak with a collective 
voice, opposing nuclear energy and advocating particular storage methods for 
radioactive waste. However, they each have their separate agendas, and it is this 
which distinguishes one from another.
Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace are both environmental NGOs with a history of 
campaigning against the nuclear industry, particularly against nuclear power and 
reprocessing of spent fuel.19 The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) is 
another NGO and it campaigns against nuclear weapons and nuclear installations. 
Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment (CORE) is an anti-nuclear group
set up in Cumbria specifically to campaign against the nuclear industry’s activities at
20Sellafield and Drigg. CORE is primarily concerned with effects of radiation on the
19 See Friends o f the Earth (1992). The M OX myth: why British Nuclear Fuels has got it wrong on 
plutonium and mixed oxide fuels'. Friends o f  the Earth. December 1992.
Friends o f the Earth (1993). Nothing ventured, nothing gained: failing to invest in the future. Friends 
o f  the Earth's response to the draft UK strategy’ fo r  sustainable development. London: Friends o f the 
Earth.
Friends o f the Earth (1996). The international shipment o f  radioactive waste in the context o f  UK 
national policy: Friends o f  the Earth response to the RWMAC consultation. London: Friends o f the 
Earth. September 1996.
Friends o f the Earth (undated). British Nuclear Fools pic: the case against reprocessing. London: 
Friends o f the Earth.
Wallace, H. (1996). Our radioactive legacy. London: Greenpeace.
Greenpeace (1995). Nirex’s rock characterisation facility. London: Greenpeace. November 1995. 
Greenpeace (undated). Deep crisis: Britain's nuclear waste: who's buiying who? London: Greenpeace. 
Friends o f the Earth (1991). Profits before safety: radioactive discharges from the British Nuclear 
Fuels Springfields works. London: Friends o f the Earth. November 1991.
Greenpeace (1995). Jobs and Nirex's nuclear waste dump. London: Greenpeace. November 1995. 
Friends o f the Earth (1998). FoE demands end to British nuclear farce:2. London: Friends o f the Earth.
20 See CORE (1996). Proof o f  evidence by M.G Forward on behalf o f  CORE (Cumbrians Opposed to a 
Radioactive Environment': Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Town and Country Planning 
(Inquiries Procedure) Rules 1992. Appeal by United Kingdom Nirex Limited. Rock Characterisation
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local Cumbrian population.21 Despite their differences all these NGOs have the 
ultimate, more generic, aim of closing down the nuclear industry, focusing on the 
long-lived nature of radioactive waste in pursuit of that goal. Greenpeace and Friends 
of the Earth employ scientists and campaigners to promote this agenda.
NGOs frequently claim to speak on behalf of the ‘public’, a constituency which rarely 
has a strong or coherent voice in complex decision-making processes. A definition of 
‘public’ is difficult to pin down in this context and it is sometimes said that, in a 
democracy, elected government ministers speak on behalf of ‘the public’. Since the 
public is an amorphous entity it is difficult to determine exactly what it wants.
Despite this ambiguity, industry seeks to keep it on its side in order to avoid costly 
disputes. In order to assess public perceptions of particular issues, various polls have 
been undertaken. Nirex commissioned one such poll from Gallup in 1995,22 the 
results of which were used in evidence to the public inquiry, showing that there was 
public support in Cumbria for the development of the Rock Characterisation Facility.23 
Polls such as these are used to authenticate claims about the ‘public’. Gallup has a 
history and an impressive reputation in survey research, and represents another type of 
‘expertise’ used by various sides in a debate in support of divergent claims. Because 
the public is such a heterogeneous group there is always scope for ambiguity. For 
example, some members of the public will be more affected by safety issues around
Facility Longlcinds Farm, Gosforth, Cumbria: CORE. 23/01/96.
CORE (undated). The environmental impact o f Sellafield:8.
CORE (undated). Cumbria - nuclear dustbin:4.
21 CORE (undated). The health effect o f Sellafield:4.
22 See UK Nirex Ltd (1996). D isposal o f  radioactive waste. New Malden: The Gallup Organisation. 
March 1996.
UK Nirex Ltd (1994). Attitudes towards the storage/disposal o f  radioactive waste. London: The Gallup 
Organisation. October 1994.
149
radioactive waste whereas others will be more interested in their own job security.24
Due to the heterogeneity of the public it is impossible to represent everyone 
simultaneously. Between them, the above mentioned NGOs cover most of the issues 
about radioactive waste which may be of concern, despite having their differences.
For example, at the Nirex Inquiry, Greenpeace’s case was that current scientific and 
technical knowledge was not detailed enough to justify creating the Rock 
Characterisation Facility at present and that other potentially more suitable sites which 
may offer higher levels of radiological protection should also be examined.25 Like 
Friends of the Earth they had interests in undermining the Nirex case on a political as 
well as a scientific level in order to attempt to get their question of indefinite storage 
back onto the agenda.
Summary
There are many voices contributing to the debate about radioactive waste 
management. Such voices represent a wide range of disciplines and backgrounds each 
with their own interests at stake. Those interests can be split along the institutional 
lines of government, industry and NGOs, as shown above. In the following section I 
show how these voices polarise on the issue on the nature of evidence. I do this by 
looking at how definitions of radioactive materials are used and the way in which
23Interview 07/01/97, transcript p4
24 See Wynne, B., Waterton, C., and Grove-White, R. (1993). Public perceptions and the nuclear 
industry in West Cumbria. Lancaster: CSEC, Lancaster University. September 1993. for a discussion o f  
the complexity o f ‘public attitudes’.
25Tripley, D. (1996). Closing submissions on behalf o f Greenpeace Limited. In, Haszeldine, R.S. and 
Smythe, D.K., (eds), Radioactive waste disposal at Sellafield, UK: site selection, geological and
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evidence is disputed.
The Nature of Evidence
In this section I limit my discussion of what constitutes evidence (of radioactive waste 
and of radioactive waste as a problem) to the analysis of one particular public inquiry, 
the Nirex Inquiry, that took place in Cumbria in 1995-1996. On 17 March 1997 the 
Secretary of State for the Environment dismissed Nirex’s appeal against Cumbria 
County Council’s refusal to grant planning permission for their proposed Rock 
Characterisation Facility(RCF) at Longlands Farm near Sellafield in Cumbria. This 
was the culmination of a long process that started when Sellafield was identified as 
one of twelve potential sites for an Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) repository.26 
Nirex had intended to submit a planning application for the ILW repository in the 
autumn of 1992 but revised its plans in the light of concern about the hydrogeological 
inadequacies of the site. It submitted an application for a Rock Characterisation 
Facility (RCF) instead. This was to be the first stage in the process of creating a final 
repository. Nirex wanted to have firm data available by the time it came to apply for 
permission for the repository and the development of the RCF, Nirex felt, would 
provide that. As mentioned already, planning permission was not granted for the 
RCF. This was on the grounds that the evidence given by Nirex was ‘too uncertain’ 
for the Secretary of State to have confidence in the safety of the proposal.27
engineering problems'. 197-205. Glasgow: Glasgow University Print Unit. p l97-198
26See Kelling, G. and Knill, J. (1997). The Nirex Story: a geological perspective. Geoscientist 7, (7):
10-13. p i 0-11 for a summary o f the events leading up to the identification o f these sites.
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This analysis of contrasting interpretations of evidence is important in relation to the 
precautionary principle, since such definitions formed a significant part of the Nirex 
Inquiry. In this section on ‘the nature of evidence’ I show how definitions are created 
and used and the manner in which evidence is disputed. Under the sub-heading of 
‘definitions of radioactive waste’ I look at how different players involved in the 
radioactive waste issue define radioactive waste and associated concepts and how 
these definitions shape their positions on what should be done with regard to its 
management. Under the sub-heading of ‘disputed evidence’ I look at how 
information, data and argument are used by different players and identify particular 
areas of controversy surrounding potential solutions to the disposal o f radioactive 
waste. These issues are both relevant to an analysis o f the application of the 
precautionary principle for they draw out associated interests and values embedded in 
the decision-making framework under scrutiny.
Definitions of radioactive waste
It is instructive to compare definitions typically offered by the key players in the Nirex 
Inquiry. Radioactive waste is a generic term that covers a multitude of activities and 
products. This is due to the diverse origins of the materials that constitute it as well as 
the potential options for its ‘disposal’ or ‘end uses’. Definitions range from 
‘hazardous waste’ to ‘useful by-products’ with various in-between positions reflecting 
the institutional, political and social ideologies of the individuals or institutions 
involved. The ‘official’ definition of radioactive waste breaks the term down into
27 See Greenpeace (1997). John Gummer refuses Nirex planning appeal - news release:2: Greenpeace.
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three main component parts: High Level Waste, Intermediate Level Waste and Low
28Level Waste. Elements included in these definitions are plutonium, spent fuel, 
uranium, buildings, clothing, and machinery which arise at all stages of the nuclear 
cycle, from the mining of the uranium ore through the use of the uranium as a fuel to 
the eventual decommissioning of nuclear infrastructure, and these items are classified 
according to the level o f radioactivity present and their heat generating capacity. 
However, actual uses of the term radioactive waste do not follow these official 
conventions, as shown in the following sub-sections.
a) Plutonium -  asset, waste or weapon?
Answers to the question of whether plutonium is an asset, a waste product or a 
potential weapons material depend on who is being asked and when. In 1955 the 
government did not see plutonium as waste but as a valuable asset which would free 
Britain from dependency on uranium imports.29 This reflected the post-war desire to 
be self-sufficient in energy. At that time the government did not consider that 
radioactive waste disposal would present a major difficulty because ‘The volume of 
waste will be small...’30 The complexities surrounding decommissioning and 
management of spent fuel were not understood adequately and at that point the 
government was optimistic that a solution to waste problems would materialise when 
necessary. One of the ways in which the industry intends to reduce plutonium
28 See British Nuclear Industry Forum (1994). Environment and Nuclear Power. Didcot, Oxfordshire: 
AEA Technology. 1994.
UK Nirex Ltd (1987). Facts on Nirex: the disposal o f  radioactive waste. Didcot, Oxon: UK Nirex Ltd. 
British Nuclear Fuels pic (1992). Nuclear waste: what’s to be done about it? Warrington, Cheshire: 
BNFL. 1992.
29Command Paper 9389 (1955). A Programme o f  Nuclear Power. London: HMSO. February 1955. p4
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stockpiles is through the creation of Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) which they view as a
o  1
commercial asset.
The industry, in the form of BNFL, talks about plutonium as ‘a valuable source of 
energy’, and plays down its 24,000 year half-life, concentrating on explaining strict 
protection measures and the fact that plutonium is an alpha emitter which ‘cannot 
penetrate even thin layers of materials’.32 Alpha particles are toxic if inhaled or 
ingested and there have been public concerns in Cumbria about the levels of alpha 
radiation near the Ravenglass Estuary which have been shown to be higher than 
official readings suggest.33 By defining plutonium as valuable, the industry has 
translated it from a problematic product to a resource, and by emphasising its inability 
to penetrate thin layers of material the industry attempts to re-define the perceived 
characteristics of the stuff itself. By re-defming plutonium as a valuable asset, the 
industry reduces the quantity of radioactive waste that it has to manage.
BNFL also compare plutonium to other toxic substances:
‘There are also other radioactive substances found in nature which are 
more toxic than plutonium’ and ‘There are also many well known 
substances in everyday use which are very toxic if they are not handled 
properly.’34
30Command Paper 9389 (1955). A Programme o f  Nuclear Power. London: HMSO. February 1955. p4
31 British Nuclear Fuels pic (undated). The use o f  plutonium in the civil nuclear fuel cycle. Warrington, 
Cheshire: BNFL.
British Nuclear Fuels pic (undated). Reprocessing. Warrington, Cheshire: BNFL.
32British Nuclear Fuels pic (undated). The use o f  plutonium in the civil nuclear fuel cycle. Warrington, 
Cheshire: BNFL. p i
33Aubrey, C. (1993). Thorp: The Whitehall nightmare. Oxford: Jon Carpenter. p24
34British Nuclear Fuels pic (undated). The use ofplutonium in the civil nuclear fuel cycle. Warrington,
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By highlighting other, potentially more dangerous, substances the nuclear industry 
tries to reduce the perceived dangers from its processes and products. BNFL quote the 
Hon. Mr Justice Parker in order to offer reassurances on this point:
‘“It is not true that an escape of plutonium would be a unique disaster,
The damage done ... by the breaking open of a tanker of chlorine of the 
size which regularly travels by road and rail would be a great deal more 
damaging than the breaking open of a container of spent fuel with its 
plutonium content”.’35 
By defining plutonium against other markers which are as, or more, toxic the nuclear 
industry is attempting to show that their product is not uniquely dangerous. The above 
example is used to suggest that the nuclear industry is a clean industry. The example 
of a chlorine disaster fails to explicate the full range of risks associated with a chlorine 
spill. Mr Justice Parker fails to say why it is to be considered more damaging. This 
example illustrates the way in which the nuclear industry re-defines plutonium by 
reference to what it is not, or what can be considered worse than it in order to 
relativise the specific risks associated with radioactive waste.
Interpretations o f plutonium as waste or not also revolve around whether it could be 
used to create nuclear weapons. The nuclear industry dismisses this possibility on the 
basis that ‘civil’ plutonium contains a different mixture of isotopes from that used in 
nuclear weapons, and that even if it were to be used to create a crude explosive devise
Cheshire: BNFL. p i. See also British Nuclear Industry Forum (1994). Fission fusion and safety and 
nuclear power. Didcot, Oxfordshire: AEA Technology. 1994. p i 8-19
35British Nuclear Fuels pic (undated). The use ofplutonium in the civil nuclear fuel cycle. Warrington, 
Cheshire: BNFL. p7, quoting ‘The Windscale Inquiry’, report by the Hon. Mr Justice Parker, January 
1978.
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the creator would need specialist skill and knowledge which are not generally 
available. BNFL also contend that because it would take so long to create such a 
device it would be impossible to do so secretly.36 By calling their plutonium the 
‘wrong kind of plutonium’ the nuclear industry diverts attention from a potentially 
contentious issue that could cause serious commercial and political harm. However, 
CND and other NGOs fear that if plutonium fell into the wrong hands it could be used 
to create nuclear weapons. NGOs dismiss claims by the nuclear industry that it is the 
wrong type of plutonium arguing that with the right skill it could be used to make a 
bomb. Additionally they believe it is dangerous to assume that the expertise to make a 
bomb could be kept secret until such a device was produced.
As can be seen from the above examples how plutonium is defined depends on who is 
doing the defining. It is defined as a valuable asset by those who want to exploit its 
energy potential (government and industry) and as weapons material by those who 
want to highlight the negative uses to which it could be put if  in the wrong hands 
(NGOs). These definitions, re-definitions and non-definitions are used emotively by 
different ‘voices’ and interest groups in order to support their own agendas.
b) Representing radioactive half-lives
Divergent interpretations of what plutonium is are matched by contrasting 
representations of the waste ‘problem’. Concentrating on the volumes of waste that 
need to be managed as opposed to their long-lived and life-threatening effects has
36British Nuclear Fuels pic (undated). The use ofplutonium in the civil nuclear fu e l cycle. Warrington,
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allowed industry to minimise the public perception of the risk. Volumes are 
measurements with which many people are familiar whilst radioactivity levels and 
half-lives are not. The nuclear industry employs this strategy of referring to waste 
levels in terms of volumes by equating waste levels to football pitches, double decker 
buses and taxis.37
In contrast to the nuclear industry’s definitions of radioactive waste local 
environmentalists are very concerned about the radioactive half-lives and long-lived 
nature of nuclear waste products. As a member of a local Friends of the Earth group 
who was involved in the Nirex Inquiry told me:
‘... obviously we’re dealing here with something that’s going to be 
dangerous for a long long time and has to be kept out of the human 
environment for a long long time so we can’t do anything that we can’t 
prove to be safe -  and Nirex can’t prove that what they want to do with 
the waste is safe because they’re not going to have monitoring equipment 
or the ability to retrieve the waste once the dump is sealed...’38 
Here the threat posed by the waste is being defined in terms of how long it stays active 
in the environment, but this raises a further problem with definitions o f safety in terms 
of risk assessment and dose limits (see next sub-section on the risks o f radioactive 
waste). Although it may be politically expedient for government, and commercially 
expedient for industry, to talk about radioactive waste in terms of volume, such
Cheshire: BNFL. p2
37British Energy (1996). British Energy share offer:39. UK: Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry, 
p i2-13; British Nuclear Industry Fomm (1994) p i 7-18; UK Nirex Ltd (1987). Facts on Nirex: the 
disposal o f  radioactive waste. Didcot, Oxon: UK Nirex Ltd.; British Nuclear Fuels pic (1992). Nuclear 
waste: what's to be done about it? Warrington, Cheshire: BNFL. 1992. p4-5
38Interview 01/10/96, transcript p4
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discourse does not satisfy the environmentalists.
The above illustrates the way in which scientific measures are appropriated by 
different interest groups to advance their positions. The measurement o f radioactive 
half-lives in thousands of years is an emotive tool that can be exploited by NGOs 
wanting to persuade others of the inter-generational consequences of poor 
management of radioactive waste and it reflects their own concerns and paradigms. 
This is the very reason why the nuclear industry tends to focus instead on volumes of 
waste rather than half-lives, for volumes are measurements which are readily 
understood and clearly limited. These contrasting representations of ‘the problem’ are 
congruent with the agendas of the defining parties.
c) The risks of radioactive waste
Finally I consider how radioactive waste is defined in terms of risk. The Department 
of the Environment places a lot of weight on statistical analysis in order to establish its 
position regarding the level of acceptable risk associated with radioactive waste. A 
spokesperson from the Radioactive Substances Division told me:
‘The dose/risk relationship in terms of the radiation exposure to which 
people are exposed can be translated into risk, and actually that's 
something that we did do in our White Paper ... that's how dose limits 
are indeed set -  by considering a level of risk.’39 
By defining radiation exposure in these terms the government is able to set out
39Interview 16/10/96, transcript p3
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concrete policy positions. It is then possible to create parameters within which the 
nuclear industry must operate. The government justifies its actions on the basis of 
‘scientific evidence’.
The nuclear industry is also careful to ensure that their definitions of different levels of 
waste and nuclear emissions are scientifically grounded. The industry quotes 
recommended dose levels and talks about percentage points above background levels 
of radiation in order to try to persuade a seemingly sceptical public that their activities 
do not pose a significant threat.40 By using definitions which refer to statistical 
assessment of risk the nuclear industry also seeks to legitimate its position in a way 
which disallows contradiction or disagreement.
In contrast, NGOs resist debates framed by pre-determined levels of risk. A 
representative of a local Friends of the Earth group told me:
‘... there isn’t a level of radiation that’s safe, therefore it’s very hard to 
say that there’s a level of risk that’s acceptable ... and I suppose 
because there’s no safe level of radiation and we’ve got an awful lot of 
radioactive waste, in effect we’re going to have to come to some kind 
of acceptable risk level because there’s no other way to go forward.
But it’s got to be as low as possible and that doesn’t just mean building 
the Nirex dump and keeping the risk as low as possible, it means 
deciding to do something with the waste that is going to make as low a 
risk as possible.’
40British Nuclear Fuels pic (1992). Nuclear waste: what's to be done about it? Warrington, Cheshire:
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The concern here is that a decision should not be made about a particular management 
option without judging the risks associated with other options. This ties in with the 
NGOs’ general argument about radioactive waste management options and their 
concerns about the risks associated with all such strategies.41
All three groups, government, industry and NGOs see the risks associated with 
radioactive waste as something that can be managed, but differ in the ways in which 
they see that management taking place. This illustrates the different ways in which 
risk can be defined, such that it can be considered unproblematic once a numerical 
value is determined as in the case of government and industry, or that it can be seen as 
something that must be minimised to whatever extent possible as in the case of the 
NGO.
To summarise, the above examples show how definitions of radioactive waste are 
made and strategically deployed by the various parties involved in the debate. Those 
who manage to influence the dominant definition put themselves in a stronger position 
by setting the terms of subsequent debate. By focusing on a narrow definition relating 
to radioactivity and heat content, the whole controversy about plutonium, half-lives 
and associated risks can be sidelined and the problem can be defined as a narrowly 
technical issue. This, in turn, sets the scene in which evidence is marshalled, defined 
and disputed.
BNFL. 1992. p 18-19
4lWallace, H. (1996). Our radioactive legacy. London: Greenpeace.; Green, P. and Western, R. (1994). 
Time to face the inevitable: a submission from  Friends o f  the Earth Ltd to the UK Department o f  the 
Environment's review o f  radioactive waste management policy. London: Friends o f the Earth. 25 




This section offers an interpretation of what evidence was seen to be important and 
relevant for the different players involved in the Nirex Inquiry. In it I look at the 
nature o f evidence, from what counts as evidence through more general questions 
about whether evidence exists or not to more specific questions of whether there is 
evidence that particular options are safe or not. It is helpful therefore to sub-divide 
this section into reviews of the positions each of the three main institutional groupings 
o f government, industry and NGOs take on the question of evidence.
A public inquiry forces some of the meanings of contested evidence into the open and 
in this section I review the evidence in dispute at the Nirex Inquiry. Most, but not all, 
of the evidence that is disputed in the context of radioactive waste disposal is of a 
scientific nature. At the Nirex Inquiry there was an initial assumption on the part of 
those giving ‘evidence’ that they were not allowed to discuss the possible future 
repository because the inquiry was solely about the Rock Characterisation Facility. 
Because the inquiry in question was about the RCF and not about a radioactive waste 
repository, planning procedures could disallow evidence about the future repository.
In the event the Inspector at the inquiry allowed people to say whatever they wanted, 
explaining that it was then up to the Secretary of State to decide what was or was not 
relevant. His reason for doing this was to allow individuals who wished to speak 
about emotive subjects to do so. However, one consequence of this approach was that 
no one knew exactly what the Secretary of State would take into consideration in his 
final decision. The fact that the Secretary of State has such discretionary power means 
that there was an element of guesswork involved when presenting evidence to the
inquiry. What counted as relevant evidence was not fixed and unchanging, and this 
worked to the advantage and disadvantage of different players as detailed in the 
following sub-sections.
a) Industry’s position
The nuclear industry in general and Nirex in particular are under enormous pressure to 
find a suitable location for a repository due to the large quantity, in terms of both 
volume and radioactive half-lives, of radioactive waste that still has an undetermined 
resting place. It is important to bear in mind that it is currently government policy that 
intermediate level waste (ILW) should be put into a deep underground repository. The 
nuclear industry is therefore under pressure to identify a suitable location. The Nirex 
Inquiry was the culmination of a series of events that led to the selection of Longlands 
Farm in Cumbria as the site with greatest potential in the eyes of the nuclear industry. 
In this discussion I review Nirex’s evidence of geological complexity and safety as 
presented at the inquiry as well as their reactions to evidence of radioactive discharges 
on a broader level.
One of the criteria for determining whether a site is suitable for burial of radioactive 
waste is the geological stability of the site. It was essential for Nirex to show that 
knowledge of geological characteristics was uncontroversial. When I spoke to one of 
Nirex’s technical support witnesses at the inquiry I was told that although the 
Sellafield site is geologically complex the same could be said of all possible sites:
‘It’s okay provided you can handle that complexity and the Sellafield 
site can be handled. ... There will always be uncertainty -  you can’t get
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rid of it. There seems to be a lot of talk amongst the opposition that 
uncertainty is always wrong. As long as you know what the impacts of 
the uncertainties are you can make a case.42 
It was absolutely necessary for Nirex to persuade anyone with doubts about the Rock 
Characterisation Facility that the complexity of the geology could be ‘managed’ and 
that it was not a problem. Providing evidence in the form of a consultant’s report 
showing that all potential sites have inherent geological uncertainties allows Nirex to 
claim that this is not a characteristic unique to the proposed site. By employing a 
consultant who states that these uncertainties are also ‘manageable’ Nirex draws on 
the credibility of an independent authority. However, by employing a consultant who 
does a lot of work for the nuclear industry, Nirex provides opponents with the 
opportunity to say such a view merely supports the paymaster’s position. Nirex’s 
‘evidence’ that geological complexity is manageable is not conclusive, as will be seen 
in the following sub-sections on the positions of government and NGOs, but it is 
nonetheless evidence deployed in support of a particular position.
The inquiry also focused on the question of the safety of a repository that was sealed 
versus one that was retrievable. Nirex’s evidence to the public inquiry stated that the 
material that would be used to seal the repository would be excavatable. Their 
technical witness told me that this was serendipitous in that they needed that particular 
material anyway. The fact that it is also easy to dig out was a bonus. However my 
informant believed that it would be better to ‘seal it up and throw away the key’ 43 
Politically, he believed that would not be possible but technically he felt closure to be
42Interview 29/11/96, transcript p i
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the best option. Additionally he argued that people won’t know what to do if the 
repository was monitored. He pointed out that the solution Nirex opted for is designed 
to perform when completely backsealed and closed. This shows that Nirex 
constructed a convenient rationale in order to promote their preferred option. By 
acknowledging the opposition’s wish for retrievability and given the fact that the 
material which they have to use is excavatable, Nirex can provide evidence that their 
repository meets their safety case (that it is sealed) whilst simultaneously meeting 
opposition demands (that it is retrievable). The official I spoke to from Nirex 
supported this position:
‘There are certain types of retrievability that would compromise safety 
... our safety case must stand up on the understanding that it is sealed 
and not opened up. It’s difficult ground if one wanted to incorporate 
retrievability that impinged on longterm safety. Other things being 
equal we think that if  we can prove that retrievability is possible 
without compromising longterm safety we’d look at it’.44 
This demonstrates a very subtle use of what could be considered inconsistent 
evidence. It is important that the industry is seen to take the safety issue seriously and 
therefore evidence is produced to show how safe the repository will be when it is 
completely backsealed. On the other hand the industry is aware that it may be 
politically unacceptable for the waste not to be retrievable and so they produce 
evidence to show that the backfill is excavatable as well as being permanent. The 
important thing to recognise here is that Nirex is able to offer whatever evidence is 
deemed necessary to support their position.
43Interview 29/11/96, transcript p3.
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Moving on from Nirex, we can observe similar evidence-based controversy with 
regard to nuclear discharges from BNFL. BNFL have often been criticised for 
pumping low-level radioactive waste out to sea but the industry claims the amount of 
radioactivity is negligible. However, the Swedes:
could identify radioactive traces in fish off their coasts being largely 
attributable to Sellafield, greater even than contamination from 
adjacent Swedish nuclear power stations.’45 
This indicates the distance these emissions have travelled without dispersing. 
BNFL’s response to this is that
‘this is more a reflection o f the sensitivity of their measuring 
instruments than an indication of high levels, as these are in fact 
negligible.’46
The problem here is a conflicting interpretation of data. On the one hand the Swedes 
have monitored the fish in their waters and have reached the conclusion that 
radioactive traces have come from Sellafield rather than their own nuclear stations. 
On the other hand the British nuclear industry is stating that ‘the problem’ is that the 
monitoring equipment used is too sensitive and that the levels of radiation are not a 
threat. It is interesting to consider why this dispute arose. The Swedes, who have 
stronger environmental policies, are concerned about radioactive pollution in their 
waters and are concerned that the source of the problem is Britain’s BNFL. Despite 
the distance, radioactivity from Sellafield is greater in their waters than radioactivity 
from Sweden. BNFL, in a country with less stringent environmental policies and an
44Interview 07/01/97, transcript p4
45 King, P. (1990). Nuclear Power: the facts and the debate. London: Quiller Press. p78
46King, P. (1990). Nuclear Power: the facts and the debate. London: Quiller Press. p78
165
historic commitment to nuclear power, is concerned not to introduce an expensive 
clean-up process. By ‘blaming’ the monitoring equipment BNFL attempt to pass ‘the 
problem’ back to the Swedes.
Similar differences of measurement, policy and practice are identified by Aubrey who 
reports that
‘Readings taken along the creek of the nearby Ravenglass Estuary have 
shown large variations in the levels of alpha radiation, suggesting that 
official monitoring, taken at greater distances, may miss out hot 
spots.’47
These readings were taken by the environmental group Cumbrians Opposed to a 
Radioactive Environment (CORE). I asked a representative from BNFL whether this 
finding was significant and was told
‘The levels around Ravenglass are not unsafe -  it’s a headline catching 
sentence. ... They’re quite right in the sense that the levels at 
Ravenglass are higher than background radiation.’48 
The representative explained that this was due to past military activities and that 
although it might be a useful campaigning tactic against Sellafield it was not BNFL’s 
responsibility or anyone else’s to clean it up. While the evidence that there are higher 
levels of radiation at Ravenglass than elsewhere is not disputed the responsibility for 
them is absolutely denied by BNFL. The costs associated with cleaning up the 
Ravenglass estuary would be huge and are costs that the industry would wish to avoid. 
In this case BNFL accepts that the evidence exists but rejects the attribution of
47 Aubrey, C. (1993). Thorp: The Whitehall nightmare. Oxford: Jon Carpenter. p24
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liability.
These few examples show how evidence and uncertainties have been handled by the 
nuclear industry both at the Nirex Inquiry and more generally, and how the 
management of scientific expertise is framed by competing interests in the nuclear 
industry. The following section examines similar issues from government’s 
perspective.
b) Government’s position
There are various levels at which government operates with regard to radioactive 
waste disposal. In this sub-section I look at the way in which scientific evidence is 
treated by government both at a national and local level and the weights attached to it.
I consider the way in which definitions of risk are constructed and used by government 
to establish an acceptable level of safety. Additionally I discuss the ways in which 
different parts of government talked about the geological complexity of the RCF site 
at the Nirex Inquiry in order to show the difficulty in determining what constitutes 
sufficient evidence of safety.
It is important to understand the way in which scientific evidence is treated by 
government in order to see how it is subsequently used in precautionary decision­
making. The weight that is placed on scientific evidence in relation to other types of 
evidence can detennine the outcome of a decision. I spoke with a representative from
48 Interview 12/12/96, transcript p4
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the Radioactive Substances Division of the DoE about this issue and was told that 
‘It’s hard to say whether it’s equally or whatever ... I don’t recall any 
decision being made that is counter to science but clearly the social 
views on things may condition a particular course, or a particular 
decision. B u t... it should still be technically sound, but, you know, a 
particular conclusion you come to will also be conditioned by the wider 
socio-economic views as well. B u t... however much people may like 
to at times you can’t overturn Newton’s Laws, you know’.49 
This illustrates the realist dimension in government thinking, and its need for a formal, 
logical rationale on which to base decisions. Weighting scientific evidence in this way 
allows government to justify decisions within this paradigm.
The notion that scientific evidence outweighs other evidence is countered by the 
following account of the site selection process through which Sellafield was selected 
as the favoured location for a radioactive waste repository. In this example the County 
Council feels that insufficient weight was afforded to scientific evidence and that other 
priorities were dominant. An officer at Cumbria County Council told me that Nirex 
started looking for a site for co-disposal50 in 1987 and finally identified Sellafield after 
a consultation exercise. He maintains that it was BNFL who actually proposed the 
site. A Multi Attribute Decision Analysis (MADA) was undertaken by Nirex to select 
the site and the chair of the group, Dr Lawrence Phillips of LSE, was called to give
49 Interview 16/10/96, transcript p i3
50In 1987 the government announced that Nirex was to give up its search for shallow sites and that they 
would co-dispose o f Low Level Waste and Intermediate Level Waste in a deep repository. Interview 
20/11/96, transcript p i.
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evidence at the public inquiry.51 Until the Nirex Inquiry none of the MAD A process 
had been made public and it transpired that it hadn’t paid much attention to safety.
This was due to the fact that it was assumed that all the sites were potentially 
licensable, and therefore equally safe. The County Council asserted that the Nirex 
Board, the government and RWMAC put too much weight on evidence of public 
support at Sellafield and insufficient weight on margins of safety. By using the 
MADA technique, which is a reputable approach to complex decision-making, Nirex 
hoped to lend authority to their decision to locate the repository at Sellafield. By 
concentrating on the lack of weight given to safety criteria Cumbria County Council 
hoped to bring the whole selection process to task thereby strengthening their claim 
that Sellafield was not a suitable site for a nuclear repository. This again illustrates the 
complex ways in which evidence is used by government and other bodies. On one 
hand national government is saying that scientific evidence will always outweigh other 
evidence while this example shows this was not the case in the site selection process. 
Local government, on the other hand, picks up on this lack of the use of scientific 
evidence to forward their arguments. This case does not, however, reveal 
government’s special role with respect to the specification and definition of risk.
It is the National Radiological Protection Board, which advises government 
departments on radiological protection issues, that establishes the radioactive dose 
limits set within waste disposal licenses. These limits classify waste in terms of the
51 UK Nirex Ltd (1995). P roof o f  evidence o f  Dr L.D. Phillips: Multi-attribute decision analysis fo r  
recommending sites to be investigated fo r  their suitability as a repository fo r  radioactive wastes (inch 
figures and tables). Town and Countiy Planning Act 1990. Town and Country Planning (Inquiries 
Procedure) Rules 1992. Appeal by United Kingdom Nirex Limited. Rock Characterisation Facility 
Longlands Farm, Gosforth. Cumbria: UK Nirex Ltd. 1995.; Stirling, A. (1995). The Nirex Multi- 
Attribute Decision Analysis as a justification fo r  the siting o f  the rock characterisation facility at 
Sellafield. London: Greenpeace UK. September 1995.; Greenpeace (1995). Nirex's rock 
characterisation facility. London: Greenpeace. November 1995.
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number o f people it is likely to kill in a given population. The spokesperson I talked 
with told me:
‘So how do you set a limit? -  there’s no threshold for general cancer.
It’s set on a balance of risks that people normally take. 10'5 is the dose 
limit. 10"6 is set at the level people consider trivial in normal life. It is 
a balance -  and radiation protection is all about that. ... 1 O'6 is a target 
-  it’s trivial -  no one worries about it. You have to justify anything 
above it. Anything above 10'6 we say is not good enough.’53 
These are the dose limits and levels of risk that are in standard use currently in the 
UK. They are used in evidence, for example in public inquiries, to show that these 
levels of risk from nuclear installations are acceptable. The NRPB’s actions and 
advice are based on this limit and the scientific knowledge and methodology on which 
it is based, and they are not willing to re-open debate on this issue. Government 
evidence which relies on this methodology is, however, open to challenge by others 
who disagree with the acceptability of the risk setting procedure.
In the previous section I showed how industry handled the issue of whether or not the 
RCF would be excavatable. I now consider the government’s position on the same 
issue. When I spoke to a representative of the Radioactive Substances Division about 
the Sellafield site’s geological complexity I was told that
‘... if  it does prove to be sufficiently complex or it’s unmodelable and 
we can't do the safety assessments as a consequence then that’s clearly 
something that’s going to preclude giving a authorisation. By the same
52Interview 20/11/96, transcript p2
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token I think that a degree of uncertainty is probably inevitable and has 
to be taken account of when making the judgement.’54 
This implies that the DoE is waiting for a certain but undefined ‘level’ of evidence 
before making a decision about the safety case. The DoE accept that a degree of 
uncertainty is inevitable but do not indicate how it will be taken into account in 
making decisions. In contrast to the nuclear industry, which claimed that uncertainty 
is manageable, the DoE is still awaiting evidence to prove this is the case. They are, 
however, open to persuasion. It would obviously be impossible for a government to 
say that authorisation would be given if the safety case was not met, however, it is still 
not clear what the government would consider to be sufficient evidence to show that 
the geological safety of the site has been proven.
Cumbria County Council, representing government at a local level, has been vocally 
opposed to the Nirex application. One of their objections was to the drilling of the 
boreholes that Nirex had to undertake to obtain preliminary data from the selected site 
area. A spokesperson from Cumbria County Council told me that this inevitably 
interrupts the geology of the site.35 They also pointed out that it could be construed 
(‘by the conspiracy theorists amongst us’) that Nirex was very clever in applying for 
small applications leading up to the full repository as it would then be less likely that 
future applications would fail.56 Cumbria County Council suggests that the very act of 
obtaining data about the site will actually undermine the safety of the site and will
53Interview 27/11/96, transcript p3
54Interview 16/10/96, transcript p i5
55Interview 20/11/96, transcript p2-3
56 Interview 20/11/96, transcript p3
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jeopardise any evidence of safety that might be found.57
The Nirex case shows that tensions can exist within different levels of government 
about the weight and use of scientific evidence. Nonetheless, this section also shows 
that government has a dominant and decisive part to play in framing the radioactive 
waste debate by setting out a framework of risk and thereby a framework of what 
counts as relevant evidence.
c) NGOs’ position
Environmental NGOs have to make use of scientific evidence if they are to challenge 
proposals from government and industry. How do they go about this? In this sub­
section I show how evidence about the geological safety of the proposed Sellafield 
repository site was challenged by the NGOs and how they used conflicting evidence to 
support their position that the site’s safety was still in dispute. I also look at the use of 
evidence with respect to the balance of power and where the burden of proof lies in
57 See ERM - Environmental Resources Management (1994). Cumbria County Council. Nirex deep 
repository Post Closure Safety Case: Safety> Assessment methodology and safety criteria. Technical 
Environmental Review TER/3: ERM. Oct 1994.
ERL - Environmental Resources Limited (1992). Cumbria County Council. Boreholes and rock 
laboratories to demonstrate a safety case: response to the October 1992 Rock Characterisation 
Facility Consultative Document (Nirex Report 327) Interim Technical Appraisal Report ITA/7: ERL. 
Dec 1992.
ERM - Environmental Resources Management (1994). Cumbria County> Council. Nirex deep repositoiy  
at Sellafield: site selection. Technical Environmental Review TER/2: ERM. Oct 1994.
ERM - Environmental Resources Management (1994). Cumbria County’ Council. Nirex deep repository 
at Sellafield: Assessment o f  Nirex Geological Investigation and Science Programme. Technical 
Environmental Review TER/4: ERM. Oct 1994.
ERM - Environmental Resources Management (1994). Cumbria County Council. Best Practicable 
Environmental Option (BPEO) fo r  radioactive wastes: issues relating to storage, late disposal or early 
disposal. Volume 2: Annexes. Volume I : Report. Technical Environmental Review TER/1: ERM. Oct 
1994.
ERM - Environmental Resources Management (1993). Cumbria County Council. Summary o f  
radioactive waste disposal policy and environmental issues affecting Cumbria. Interim Technical
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debates and decision-making as conventionally structured.
At the Nirex Inquiry, those opposing the planning application challenged the 
possibility of determining the geological suitability of the site given that the 
explosives used to excavate the Rock Characterisation Facility would upset the natural 
characteristics of the rock at the site. If it could be determined that the excavation 
process would have an adverse impact on the very material under investigation then 
the case of the opposition would be strengthened.58 In addition to the geological 
evidence being disputed, information was also provided about the hydrology at the site 
which indicated that there could be serious repercussions if groundwater was able to 
find its way into the burial chambers and then leach out into the surrounding area.59
One of the controversies was whether 2-dimensional computer models, as used by 
Nirex, were sufficient to illustrate the flow of water through the ground beneath the 
site. Friends of the Earth maintained they were not and that 3-dimension models 
should be used. I had been reminded by a spokesperson from the NRPB that any 
model is only as good as the data put into it and that in this case the more complicated 
the model the more information you need.60 The 3-dimensional models required much 
more data, only some of which was ‘raw’. In this field it is not always possible to 
know what data is real and what is extrapolated for many models rely on recycling 
results they have previously generated. This helps explain why Nirex and Friends of
Appraisal Report ITA/9: ERM. Oct 1993.
58 See Western, R. (1994). Undermined: the destruction o f  safety assessment data through RCF  
excavation. London: Friends o f the Earth. August 1994.
59 See Haszeldine, R.S. and Smythe, D.K., (eds) (1996). Radioactive waste disposal at Sellafield, UK: 
site selection, geological and engineering problems. Glasgow: Glasgow University Print Unit,
“ interview 27/11/96, transcript p2
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the Earth hold opposing positions about the type of model most appropriate for 
predicting safety. Nirex want and need to make their case as clear and straightforward 
as possible and Friends of the Earth want to undermine the Nirex safety case. By 
pointing out that Nirex’s 2D models cannot hope to emulate all the complexities of the 
site Friends of the Earth challenges Nirex’s analysis of suitability. By referring to the 
value of 3D modelling Friends of the Earth highlight their contention that the 
hydrogeology of the site is extremely complex and that it is impossible to know what 
will happen at the site for hundreds and thousands of years to come. Friends of the 
Earth refers to the relevance of a more complex methodology to undermine Nirex’s 
position by claiming it is too simplistic.
As I have already discussed, one of the disputes at the Nirex Inquiry was whether 
radioactive waste should be capped and sealed forever or whether it should be 
monitorable and retrievable. In the sub-section relating to industry I outlined Nirex’s 
position on this issue and here I contrast that with Greenpeace’s position. Greenpeace 
argued that waste which has already been created needs to be managed in a 
monitorable and retrievable form so that there is no need to make predictions about 
discharges because real data always exist.61 Greenpeace made an argument about 
giving future generations a choice in order to support this position. They believe that 
under this scenario future generations will be better informed than if waste is buried 
and sealed. Greenpeace was pointing out that not enough is known about the full 
range of options in order for a final decision to be made and that a more detailed 
discussion must take place before any options are ruled out.
6'interview 26/11/96, transcript p3
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Greenpeace has always favoured above ground storage. Dr Helen Wallace, Senior 
Scientist at Greenpeace told me:
‘Underground means there will be discharges into the environment.
The concept in people’s minds is that deep disposal is geological 
containment that locks away the waste forever. Then the question 
becomes what can be done. Above ground storage for 100 years or so 
-  but that is intergenerational. It’s a reason to shut down the nuclear 
industry.’62
By indicating that deep disposal is not an ultimate solution that gets rid of the problem 
of radioactive waste Greenpeace attempts to reopen the debate and refocus attention. 
The strategy employed here is to illustrate the way in which evidence allowed at the 
inquiry is curtailed because of previous decisions. Greenpeace wants to reopen debate 
about preferred options for radioactive waste management and is not satisfied with the 
prospect of merely looking at evidence about whether a selected site is ‘safe enough’ 
or not.
One of the reasons why NGOs seek to redefine the terms of debate has to do with 
where the burden of proof lies with regard to making the safety case, both for the 
preferred policy option and for the chosen site. Opponents of the nuclear industry 
argue that currently the burden of proof lies in favour of the industry and that it is 
necessary for this position to change if the environment and the public are to be 
protected. They believe that when evidence is disputed the industry is already in a 
stronger position to win the controversy. A representative of Greenpeace told me that
62Interview 26/11/96, transcript p3
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while it is impossible to prove safety from a scientific perspective it is possible to 
prove safety from a legal perspective by addressing the weight of evidence on each 
side.63 By bringing in a legal definition of the weight of evidence Greenpeace seeks to 
destabilise the traditional platform through which decisions are made based on 
scientific criteria and to redefine the decision.
In this sub-section I have shown how NGOs use scientific evidence, and how they try 
to reffame or reopen debates assumed to be closed by other actors.
To summarise, in this section on disputed evidence, I have demonstrated that the 
future o f radioactive waste is contentious. I have considered questions about the 
nature of evidence deployed in such cases: does evidence exist or not?; is there 
evidence that a course of action is safe or not?; how is evidence used to show that a 
proposed strategy is the best option? Taking the Nirex Inquiry as an example I have 
shown that industry presented its evidence in such a way as to show that it can handle 
the scientific uncertainties that arise. Where ‘scientific evidence’ reveals a ‘problem’, 
industry may then deny responsibility for actions which have led to contamination. I 
have shown with regard to government that weight is shifted between scientific 
evidence and other priorities depending on the situation. While national government 
advocates that scientific evidence should not necessarily be the determining factor in 
decision-making it is typically used as such. Finally, with regard to NGOs, I have 
demonstrated how they have used evidence to advance their positions. They have 
tried to use scientific evidence to undermine the opposition while also challenging the
63Interview 26/11/96, transcript p2
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assumptions underlying the policies and frameworks that define current practice.
Decision-making Processes
This chapter has mainly, although not exclusively, centred on the Nirex Inquiry. In 
order to tie together the previous sections identifying the cast of institutional interests 
involved and evidence, I now look in more detail at approaches to the formal 
organisation of decision-making about radioactive waste disposal. Here I describe the 
processes involved in a public inquiry. The objective is to show how decisions are 
negotiated and agreement reached, rather than to evaluate the outcome.
Scientific uncertainty lies at the root of disagreements about the way evidence is 
defined and used. However, in terms of the public inquiry uncertainty is an underlying 
concept that is explicated through rhetoric about definitions and evidence rather than 
being a concept that is openly and explicitly discussed as an issue in its own right.
The concept of time is rather different, although also critical. There is, for instance, a 
timeframe available in which decisions must be made. Time is also of importance in 
the radioactive waste decision-making process due to the inter-generational 
timeframes associated with life of radioactive waste itself. It is necessary therefore to 
look at this theme in more detail in relation to the public inquiry in question.
The problem of the longterm nature of radioactive waste was brought to a head at the 
public inquiry. It is instructive to look at this in relation to the cast of issues and 
voices involved in the inquiry. Radioactive waste will be around for a long time. The
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element plutonium has a half-life of 24,000 years, a time concept that does not easily 
fit into our normal decision-making timeframes. The issue of whether plutonium is 
defined as an asset or a waste product has already been discussed and has been seen to 
depend on the interests of the player doing the defining. However, regardless of the 
status afforded it, decisions regarding its management will still have to be made in 
current decision-making timeframes. This creates an anomaly as regards the length of 
time available to conduct any more research, the timing of which reflects political and 
pragmatic considerations, and the kind of time scales that would have to be understood 
in order to make fully informed decisions. This is one of the issues the public inquiry 
has to balance, and one which is critical to the interpretation and implementation of 
precaution.
At a public inquiry each group vies for as much time as possible to put their views on 
the agenda. However the inquiry is regulated with set procedures and protocols which 
establish running orders and the kinds of questions that can be directed at witnesses 
and the types of evidence that can be presented. Once all the evidence has been 
presented and all the cross-examinations have taken place the Inspector then writes his 
or her report to submit to the Secretary of State. This can take months with all the 
interested parties awaiting a decision while being unaware of when that decision will 
be announced.
As previously discussed, the Nirex Inquiry was undertaken to determine whether 
Nirex should be given planning permission to construct an RCF at Longlands Farm in 
Cumbria. This inquiry involved all the players previously mentioned and each of 
these brought forward evidence (with attendant definitions) to try to persuade the
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Inspector of their position. The Nirex Inquiry opened in September 1995 and ran until 
February 1996 but even before it started different groups were involved in the debate, 
putting forward their views through published reports and the media. Therefore by the 
stage the ‘official’ centre for debate opened (the Inquiry itself) many of what 
subsequently became the main players had already been identified.
The inquiry gave different groups the opportunity to dispute each others evidence and 
reopen previously closed controversies. The limitations of this process were set by the 
Inspector who has the authority to determine what evidence is acceptable and what 
should be given more weight. His decisions were informed by his knowledge of 
planning law and precedence about what is acceptable at an inquiry and what is not.
Knowledge of the planning system can also be used by the applicants and their 
opponents. By applying for planning permission for a Rock Characterisation Facility 
rather than a radioactive waste repository Nirex was claiming that this would help 
establish the true character of Sellafield’s geology which was, as yet, incompletely 
understood. Nirex assumed the Rock Characterisation Facility would help prove the 
safety case for the repository that would subsequently be built. Nirex was very aware 
of public resistance to the building of a repository and so developed a strategy 
whereby planning permission would be sought in stages. The first major stage of this 
was the application for the RCF.64 Because the RCF was not to be a radioactive waste 
disposal facility the planning process automatically excluded certain players and 
certain types of evidence. It was fortunate for the opposition that the Inspector took a
64 Previous applications had been applied for and granted for bore-holes in the area to obtain
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broad view of relevance and decided to allow all evidence to be given.
For Nirex, the inquiry was viewed as a platform from which to convince the 
government and anyone else who opposed them that the Rock Characterisation 
Facility was small, temporary and necessary. Nirex claimed that information about the 
suitability of other potential sites was irrelevant to this inquiry because that decision 
had already been made. Re-visiting the site selection process would hold up their 
timetable of subsequent action. Nirex preferred to treat site selection as a closed black 
box. Cumbria County Council, on the other hand, was very keen to re-open that black 
box by claiming that Longlands Farm was a poor site and chosen for the wrong 
reasons. By re-opening controversy over the selection process, Cumbria County 
Council wanted to draw attention to the politics involved, as well as questioning the 
geological unsuitability of the site. One of Nirex’s reasons for choosing the site was 
because it expected that the local population would be in favour because of local 
reliance on the nuclear industry for employment.
Debate at the inquiry concentrated on areas of expert knowledge in the fields of 
geology, hydrogeology, geophysics and engineering. Both Nirex and those in 
opposition to the application obtained expert witnesses who were called to give 
evidence. The public inquiry system is a formal process whereby evidence is 
submitted in advance of the inquiry. Those who submit evidence in advance can then 
present that evidence at the inquiry and call witnesses to support their position. It 
excludes many who might wish to give evidence but are unable to do so because of the
preliminary data on the geology o f the site.
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formalities involved with submission dates, the technical competence required of 
those who do give evidence, the time involved in compiling evidence and the 
knowledge of what is the remit of the inquiry and whether this remit can be 
challenged. However it also provides the space for those with appropriate resources 
who are willing to challenge the wishes and desires of large corporations. Assuming 
adequate resources, both in time and finances, all parties have a chance of persuading 
the Inspector of their case.
However, due to time constraints inherent within the planning process certain 
questions cannot be revisited. For example, the issue of whether nuclear power is 
necessary at all was not addressed at the Nirex Inquiry, nor was there scope for raising 
the issue of reprocessing which contributes significantly to the creation of nuclear 
waste. These are questions that are addressed in other, also formal, settings, possibly 
at other public inquiries.65 In these situations similar constraints limit participation in 
the decision-making processes, certain parties will be involved in the discussions and 
certain parties will be excluded and certain evidence will be ruled relevant while other
65 One o f these settings is the House o f Lords. In November 1997 the House o f Lords issued a call for 
evidence into the management o f nuclear waste House o f Lords (1997). Select Committee on Science 
and Technology Sub-Committee II - The Management o f Nuclear Waste. Call for Evidenced, p l-2 . 
They set fairly tight boundaries around what w'ould and wouldn’t be the focus o f the inquiry. They 
wanted to hear about international experience with radioactive waste management but ruled out an 
inquiry into the future o f nuclear power per se. They wanted to hear about sustainable solutions and 
how the institutional responsibility for radioactive waste in this country could be improved and whether 
an international solution might be desirable and feasible. They also wanted to consider the site selection 
process for a potential repository and what criteria that process should be based upon. Additionally they 
asked for submissions on how' risk could be assessed and the effects on intergenerational equity. This 
call for evidence was sent out to a w?ide range o f institutions and w'as also published on the internet. 
Anyone, whether an individual or an institution could respond to it. Submissions were due by 30 
January 1998. The Select Committee called witnesses to elaborate on their submissions. Friends o f the 
Earth used the inquiry to reiterate some o f their opinions about MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuel) which is 
produced at Sellafield and also to emphasise the point that the institutional bodies responsible for long­
term management are committed to additional production. Their aim was to influence the Committee to 
view radioactive waste in the wider framework o f  nuclear power rather than as a separate entity. They 
believed that by seeing the whole picture the Lords Committee would be more likely to come to the
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evidence will be ruled irrelevant.
It is the Secretary of State who makes the final decision at a public inquiry, based on 
the report written by the Inspector. In the statement issued by the Secretary of State 
following the Nirex Inquiry he expressed concern
‘... about the scientific uncertainties and technical deficiencies in the 
proposals presented by Nirex which would also justify refusal of this 
appeal. I am also concerned about the process o f site selection and the 
broader issue of the scope and adequacy of the environmental 
statement.,66
This demonstrates that the evidence and counter-evidence presented at the Nirex 
Inquiry on the issues discussed in the sections on definitions and evidence were 
significant in determining the outcome of this particular inquiry.
Summary
This chapter began with an explanation of why the radioactive waste management 
issue was a suitable topic for a case study of the precautionary principle. Decisions 
about radioactive waste have been made within well-established frameworks and the 
key players involved are easily identifiable due to the subject’s long history. Having 
identified the cast of players involved in the radioactive waste management debate I 
was able to categorise them along institutional lines. Despite a common precautionary
opinion that further production o f radioactive waste should cease.
66Quoted in Kelling, G. and Knill, J. (1997). The Nirex Story: a geological perspective. Geoscientist 7, 
(7): 10-13. p l3
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umbrella, derived from national legislative commitments, it became apparent that the 
interests of different government departments might clash due to their differing 
legislative obligations. It was also clear that there are two significant industrial 
players whose existence depends on the continued existence of nuclear facilities. The 
sub-group of NGOs is also prominent due to their united stance against nuclear power 
in general and their criticism of the handling of radioactive waste.
In the sub-section that followed I showed how these interest groups interact, and how 
the themes of precaution that I identified in chapter two were very present in debates at 
the public inquiry despite there being little specific reference to the precautionary 
principle itself. I used interview material about the Nirex Public Inquiry to show how 
positions on evidence, uncertainty and risk differed in practice. By looking at the way 
in which definitions were created and used I was able to show how positions were 
strengthened as terms were re-defmed to fit institutional agendas. Each had different 
ways of defining plutonium, seeing it as an asset, a waste product or weapons material. 
Similarly, quantities of waste were talked about in terms of volumes or in terms of 
half-lives. Subsequently I identified how evidence is used and what counts as 
evidence for each of the three institutional groups. Each of these groups had different 
interpretations of evidence that they felt were most important to the making of their 
case at the inquiry. This has important implications for the ‘precautionary principle’ 
since it suggests that the potential implications of the ‘principle’ multiply in practice.
In other words, there are as many fonns of precaution as there are interpretations of 
evidence.
Finally I showed how the process of the public inquiry system functions and how
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various types of ‘evidence’ are marshalled and deployed. The public inquiry provided 
a platform for particular voices and interests while excluding others. As might be 
expected it can be manipulated and managed by those who are familiar with its 
workings.
The public inquiry functions as a ‘machine’ for managing decision-making and in 
doing so measurably, if  inadvertently, frames debates and agendas in particular ways. 
As we’ll see in chapter seven, this formalised system positions the issue o f precaution 





‘For the first time in the history of the world, every human being is now 
subjected to contact with dangerous chemicals, from the moment of 
conception until death. In the less than two decades of their use, the 
synthetic pesticides have been so thoroughly distributed throughout the 
animate and inanimate world that they occur virtually everywhere.
They have been recovered from most of the major river systems and 
even from streams of groundwater flowing unseen through the earth. 
Residues of these chemicals linger in soil to which they may have been 
applied a dozen years before. They have entered and lodged in the 
bodies of fish, birds, reptiles and domestic and wild animals so 
universally that scientists carrying on animal experiments find it almost 
impossible to locate subjects free from such contamination. They have 
been found in fish in remote mountain lakes, in earthworms burrowing 
in soil, in the eggs of birds -  and in man himself. For these chemicals 
are now stored in the bodies of the vast majority of human beings, 
regardless of age. They occur in the mother’s milk, and probably in the 
tissues of the unborn child.’1
1 Carson, R. (1962). Silent spring. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, p 15-16
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Introduction
It is not possible for individuals to minimise their exposure to manmade chemicals due 
to their presence in water, food and other everyday products. Even in parts of the 
world where particular chemicals have never been used traces of them can be found 
due to dispersal by the winds, the sea and through the food chain. Problems regarding 
toxicity have a long history and are only partially resolved. A relatively new 
problematic characteristic, which has been identified in some chemicals and is 
suspected in others, is endocrine disrupting behaviour. Endocrine disruption is the 
situation whereby the hormone systems of wildlife and humans are being detrimentally 
affected and this can lead to physical and sexual developmental problems and 
abnormalities. This in turn may lead to reproductive difficulties for affected 
individuals or species. This may have significant effects when considered alongside 
the wide-ranging dispersal of manmade chemicals.
Many studies have indicated that the endocrine systems of humans and wildlife have 
been affected. It has been reported that sperm counts have decreased in men over the 
last 50 years. Giwercman has shown an increase in genitourinary abnormalities, 
cryptorchidism (undescended testicles), hypospadia (abnormal urethral opening) and
2 Carlsen, E., Giwercman, A., Keiding, N., and Skakkebaek, N.E. (1992). Evidence for decreasing 
quality o f  semen during past 50 years. British Medical Journal 305, (6854): 609-613.; Irvine, D.S.
(1994). Falling sperm quality. British Medical Journal 309: 476.; Ginsburg, J., Okolo, S., Prelevic, G., 
and Hardiman, P. (1994). Residence in the London area and sperm density - letter. Lancet 343, (8891): 
230.; Carlsen, E. and al., e. (1995). Declining semen quality and increasing incidence o f testicular 
cancer: is there a common cause? Environmental Health Perspectives 103, (suppl 7): 137-139.; Auger, 
J., Kuntsman, J.M., Czyglik, F., and Jouannet, P. (1995). Decline in semen quality among fertile men in 
Paris during the past twenty years. New England Journal o f  Medicine 332, (5): 281-285.; Irvine, S., 
Cawood, E., D, R., E, M., and J, A. (1996). Evidence o f deteriorating semen quality in the United 
Kingdom: Birth cohort study in 577 men in Scotland over eleven years. British M edical Journal 312, 
(7029): 467-471.
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2testicular cancer. Berger has shown that young girls are reaching puberty earlier and 
that the incidence of endometriosis (the appearance of the tissue lining of the womb 
outside the womb) is increasing.4 Bradlow discusses the effects that pesticides can 
have on the incidence of breast cancer.5 Chemicals which have been released into the 
environment have been shown to bind to intracellular receptor proteins for steroid 
hormones6 and evoke hormonal effects in animals7, humans8, and cell culture.9 
Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that exposure of foetuses to endocrine- 
disrupting chemicals can profoundly disturb organ differentiation10 because they act as 
hormone agonists or antagonists. Colbom says that exposure to endocrine disrupters
3 Giwercman, A., Carlsen, E., Keiding, N., and Skakkebaek, N.E. (1993). Evidence for increasing 
incidence o f abnormalities o f the human testis: a review. Environmental Health Perspectives 101, 
(supplement 2): 65-71.
4 Berger, G. (1994). Epidemiology’ o f  endometriosis: modern surgical management o f  endometriosis. 
N ew York: Springer-Verlag. Cited in Bimbaum, L.S. (1994). Endocrine effects o f prenatal exposure to 
PCBs, dioxins and other xenobiotics: implications for policy and future research. Environmental Health 
Perspectives 102, (8): 676-679. p676
5 Bradlow, H.L., Sepkovic, D.W., Telang, N.T., Tiwari, R., Davis, D., and Osborne, M.P. (1996). 
Effects o f chlorinated pesticides on estrogen metabolism and breast cancer risk. Effects o f  
organochlorines on human health workshop: Academic Medical Centre, University o f Amsterdam. .
6 Korach, K.S., Sarver, P., Chae, K., McLachlan, J.A., and McKinney, J.D. (1988). Estrogen receptor- 
binding activity o f polychlorinated hydroxybiphenyls: conformationally restricted structural probes. 
Molecular Pharmacology 33, (1): 120-126.
7 Gray, L.E., Ostby, J., Ferrell, J., Rehnberg, G.. Linder, R., Cooper, R., Goldman, J., Slott, V., and 
Laskey, J. (1989). A dose-response analysis o f methoxychlor-induced alterations o f reproductive 
development and function in the rat. Fundamental and Applied Toxicology’ 12, (1): 92-108.; 
Soontomchat, S., Li, M.-H., Cooke. P.S., and Hansen, L.G. (1994). Toxicokinetic and toxicodynamic 
influences on endocrine disruption by polychlorinated biphenyls. Environmental Health Perspectives 
102, (6-7): 568-571.
8 Guzelian, P.S. (1982). Comparative toxicology o f chlordecone (kepone) in humans and experimental 
animals. Annual Review o f  Pharmacology and Toxicology 22: 89-113.; van Loveren, H., de Heer, C., 
Ross, P.S., and Vos, J.G. (1996). Immunotoxicity: studies in rats, wildlife populations and man. Effects 
o f organochlorines on human health workshop: Academic Medical Centre, University o f Amsterdam. .; 
Sharpe, R.M. and Skakkebaek, N.E. (1993). Are oestrogens involved in falling sperm counts and 
disorders o f the male reproductive tract? The Lancet 341: 1392-1395.
9 Soto, A.M., Justicia, H., Wray, J.W., and Sonnenschein, C. (1991). para-nonyl-phenil: an estrogenic 
xenobiotic released from 'modified' polystyrene. Environmental Health Perspectives 92: 167-173. Cited 
in Colbom, T., vom Saal, F., S, and Soto, A.M. (1993). Developmental effects o f endocrine-disrupting 
chemicals in wildlife and humans. Environmental Health Perspectives 101, (5): 378-384.; Soto, A.M. 
and al, e. (1995). The E-SCREEN assay as a tool to identify estrogens: an update on estrogenic 
environmental pollutants. Environmental Health Perspectives 103, (Supplement 7): 113-122.
10 Gray, L.E. (1992). Chemical-induced alterations o f sexual differentiation: a review o f effects in 
humans and rodents. In, Colbom, T. and Clement, C., (eds). Chemically induced alteration in sexual 
and functional development: the wildlife/human connection:! 03-. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Scientific 
Publishing.; Peterson, R.E., Theobald, H.M., and Kimmel, G.L. (1993). Developmental and 
reproductive toxicity o f dioxins and related compounds: cross-species comparisons. Critical Reviews in
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during critical periods of development is of major concern as it may have profound 
and permanent effects on the future well-being of wildlife and humans. She also states 
that chronic exposure after maturity can also present a health risk.11 Whilst these 
studies suggest that there may be a problem with the reproductive health of humans 
and wildlife, many in government and industry do not believe the evidence is 
sufficient to warrant taking action against particular chemicals.
Characteristics of Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals
In this chapter I outline the features of the endocrine disruption problem relevant to 
how scientific advice is used in policy making and how decision-making frameworks 
are structured. I give a brief history o f the development of endocrine disruption as an 
‘environmental issue’ and identify the scientific studies that have been drawn upon in 
the debate about the need for precautionary policy and further research. I show that 
viewpoints on what action is appropriate range from ‘doing more research’ to banning 
whole families of chemicals.
Because the career of endocrine disruption as an environmental issue is at a much 
earlier stage of development than radioactive waste disposal I am able to look at 
deliberations about endocrine disruption from the point where the UK government is 
starting to wonder whether this is an issue that will require policy action. In the 
section on decision-making processes I show that there have, as yet, been no decisions 
about endocrine disrupting chemicals. I describe contributions to two workshops that
Toxicology 23, (3): 283-335.
"Colbom, T., vom Saal, F., S, and Soto, A.M. (1993). Developmental effects o f endocrine-disrupting
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have played a central role in the emergence of a debate about endocrine disruption, the 
Institute of Environment and Health workshop on environmental oestrogens in January 
1995 and a later round-table discussion on environmental oestrogens held in April 
1996. Both of these workshops were commissioned by the Department of the 
Environment and both set the background against which I selected and conducted my 
interviews.
By looking at the positioning of these workshops I show that the focus o f discussion 
was on scientific research studies and that debate about whether action should be taken 
with regard endocrine disrupting chemicals was framed around issues of scientific 
uncertainty, weight of evidence and the definition of terms.
I then look at the nature of evidence as used by participants at those workshops, and by 
my interviewees. In the section on definitions I discuss the contention that has arisen 
about endocrine disrupters and potential endocrine disrupters and show that the term 
‘endocrine disrupter’ is often used as a boundary object, with each user assuming that 
others all mean the same thing. I demonstrate that even when consensus is reached 
about a definition that does not close controversy over the meaning of a term; in 
actuality, one definitional issue leads to another.
I also look at the question of what constitutes sufficient evidence and discover that this 
depends on who is answering the question. I consider the different opinions on the 
issue of in vivo versus in vitro tests as evidence of endocrine disruption and I look at 
the arguments put forward by different interest groups regarding ‘taking action
chemicals in wildlife and humans. Environmental Health Perspectives 101, (5): 378-384.
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against’ specific chemicals.
The purpose of this chapter is to show how particular identified ‘experts’ have 
embedded interests which they bring with them to the negotiation table. The positions 
they argue from reflect these embedded interests whilst attempting to maintain an 
appearance of open-mindedness. By describing this scene I create the space to 
analyse, in the following chapter, the similarities and differences between radioactive 
waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals as issues to which the 
precautionary principle could and should be applied.
Formulating the Debate
The endocrine disrupting chemicals case study is unlike the radioactive waste case 
discussed in the previous chapter in that there have been no actual ‘decisions’ made as 
to what action should be taken about them.12 Whereas, with the radioactive waste 
problem I was able to focus on a public inquiry, the outcome of which was a decision 
not to allow the creation of a Rock Characterisation Facility, with the endocrine 
disrupting chemicals problem there is no similarly obvious moment of precautionary 
decision-making. This may partly be due to the fact that there is currently less
12 This situation has developed and changed since I imdertook my fieldwork in 1997 about endocrine 
disrupting chemicals. In 1998 the Environment Agency undertook a public consultation to seek views 
on what actions should be taken with regard endocrine disrupting substances in the environment (see 
Environment Agency (1998). Endocrine-disrupting substances in the environment: what should be 
done? Bristol: The Environment Agency. January 1998.) and the Department o f the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions undertook a public consultation to seek views on ways in which a more 
precautionary approach to chemicals in the environment might be taken (see Department o f  the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions (1998). Sustainable production and the use o f  chemicals: 
consultation paper on chemicals in the environment. London: DETR. July 1998.). However, I limit my 
discussion to the situation prior to 1998 and justify this by saying that this timeframe provides a 
snapshot o f an ‘environmental problem’ at a particular stage in its career and that it is the different 
stages that a ‘problem’ goes through that are shown in this thesis to be relevant with respect to how the
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consensus that there is even a problem with regard to endocrine disrupting chemicals. 
When we look at the current locations of debate about what should be done about 
endocrine disrupting chemicals we find ourselves looking at workshops and 
conferences, places where options and alternatives are discussed but not where 
decisions are made. Some of these workshops have resulted in consensus statements 
and recommendations for further research, but they have not had any legal power 
attached. It is important to point out at this stage that it is the process through which 
decisions come about that it of importance to this thesis rather than the decision 
outcomes. With this in mind the workshops and conferences mentioned above take on 
greater importance as they are the forerunner to more established frameworks where 
decisions can be made and therefore they help set the boundary of what ‘the problem’ 
is.
In 1994 the Department of the Environment commissioned the Medical Research 
Council’s Institute for Environment and Health at Leicester University13 to review 
existing literature and scientific opinion on the possible links between the production 
and release of manmade chemicals into the environment and oestrogenic effects on 
humans and wildlife in order to get a balanced perspective on the issue with a view to 
developing an effective Departmental policy.14 I focus on this and a later workshop 
run by the Institute for Environment and Health because at this time endocrine 
disruption was only just surfacing as ‘an issue’ of environmental and public concern
precautionary principle might be applied.
13 The Institute for Environment and Health was established in 1993 and is partly funded by the 
Department o f the Environment, the Department o f Health and other Government Departments and 
Agencies by way o f  specific research and consultancy contracts (Institute for Environment and Health
(1995). IEH assessment on environmental oestrogens: consequences to human health and wildlife. 
Leicester: Institute for Environment and Health.)
14 Department o f  the Environment (1995). Environmental oestrogens: assessment o f international 
research shows the way forward - newsrelease 376:9: Department o f the Environment.
191
and this commission was proposed in response to growing concerns about the possible 
impacts of oestrogen-mimicking chemicals on the reproductive health of human and 
wildlife populations.
A workshop designed to fulfil this task took place in Leicester in January 1995 and the 
resultant report was published in July 1995.15 The objectives of this assessment were 
stated as follows:
‘[to] review existing literature and scientific opinion on the evidence 
for changes in human reproductive health and effects in wildlife, and to 
examine possible links between the production and release into the 
environment of man-made chemicals and the observed effects, and 
identify the gaps in knowledge, information and research that need to 
be filled and to make recommendations and establish priorities for 
future research, addressing in particular those areas which will provide 
the best information for policy decisions.’16 
In order to fulfil these objectives the Institute prepared background scientific review 
papers on the effects of environmental oestrogens in humans and wildlife. They then 
invited
‘...acknowledged international experts in the field, together with 
representatives from a number of government and other interested
1 7organisations, to discuss these documents at a workshop...’
The final report concluded that:
15 Institute for Environment and Health (1995). 1EH assessment on environmental oestrogens: 
consequences to human health and wildlife. Leicester: Institute for Environment and Health.
16 Institute for Environment and Health (1995). I EH assessment on environmental oestrogens: 
consequences to human health and wildlife. Leicester: Institute for Environment and Health, p i
17 Institute for Environment and Health (1995). IEH assessment on environmental oestrogens:
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‘Proof of a cause-effect relationship between exposure to oestrogens in 
the environment and adverse effects on human reproductive health is 
likely to remain elusive. Similarly it may not be possible to identify 
conclusively which agents, acting singly or in combination, are 
responsible for adverse effects in wildlife populations.’18 
The conclusion continues by recommending that further human, wildlife and 
experimental studies are required before a risk assessment of the risks to human health 
from environmental oestrogens can be made.
The ‘acknowledged international experts’ who took part in the IEH workshop included
those who had participated in previous international scientific workshops.19 The 
• • • 20participant list reflects a high level of participation from government and academia 
with a much smaller representation from interest groups and industry.21
In February 1995 WWF wrote about their concerns about who would be involved in 
the proposed workshop:
consequences to human health and wildlife. Leicester: Institute for Environment and Health. p2
18 Institute for Environment and Health (1995). IEH assessment on environmental oestrogens: 
consequences to human health and wildlife. Leicester: Institute for Environment and Health. p70
19 Workshops to discuss the link between oestrogenic activity and a number o f environmental 
contaminants had been convened by the Danish Environmental Protection Agency, the German Federal 
Environment Agency and the United States Environmental Protection Agency.
20 Dr G Brighty, National Rivers Authority; Dr A Cassidy, Dunn Clinical Nutrition Centre; Dr A 
Dawson, Institute o f  Terrestrial Ecology; Dr J Ginsburg, Department o f Medicine, Royal Free Hospital; 
Prof L J Guillette, University o f Florida; Dr S Jobling, Brunei University; Dr R J Kavlock, United 
States Environmental Protection Agency; Dr M Litchfield, Melrose Consultancy; Prof J McLachlan, 
Tulane University; Dr P Matthiessen, MAFF Fisheries Laboratory; Dr S Milligan, King’s College; Dr D 
Peakall, King’s College; Dr A Poole, DOW Europe SA; ProfS H Safe, Texas A&M University; ProfN  
Skakkebaek, national University Hospital, Copenhagen; Dr A Smith, MRC Toxicology Unit; Dr R 
Thompson, Zeneca Ltd; Dr J van Zorge, Directorate-General for the Environment; Dr I White, MRC 
Toxicology Unit; Prof C Wilson, St George’s Hospital Medical School; Dr R Otter, Ms M Thomas, Mr 
R Tregunno, Department o f the Environment; Dr S Barlow, Department o f Health; Dr P T C Harrison, 
Dr C D N Humphrey, Dr L K Shuker, Prof L Smith, Institute for Environment and Health.
21 See Appendix 3 for a list o f groups and their particular interests and responsibilities with regard to 
endocrine disruption.
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‘A small technical group was expected to provide a direction for the 
review and the Institute was planning to hold a meeting to bring the 
technical experts together. However, in November 1994 it seemed that 
within some government departments and universities several people 
were unaware of the initiative.’22 
National environmental groups who had been very involved in this issue and had 
published reports about endocrine disruption are conspicuous by their absence.23 
Given the stated objectives of the workshop, including such voices may have focused 
the discussion and resulting report in an alternative direction to the one it took. The 
result of the workshop has therefore been a very scientistic and academic appraisal of 
current research, identifying particular ongoing scientific studies (indeed many of the 
participants are academics currently undertaking some of these projects) and 
determining future scientific studies that may be necessary. By framing the workshop 
in this way the IEH has prevented wider discussion about the use of science as a 
decision-making aid and its limitations given inherent uncertainties. These areas of 
discussion might also have fallen within the remit of the workshop. Excluding voices 
concerned with sustainability, community participation, social responsibility and 
justice has meant that the debate has remained within a conventional scientific 
paradigm. Narrowing the focus of the debate in this manner at this stage has had 
implications for, and defined the scope of, future workshops and research priorities.
22 Lyons, G. (1995). Reassessing pollution: wildlife, humans and toxic chemicals in the environment. 
Godalming: WWF UK. February 1995. p4
23 See for example Lyons, G. (1995). Reassessing pollution: wildlife, humans and toxic chemicals in the 
environment. Godalming: WWF UK. February 1995.
WWF (1995). Atrazine: an organochlorine herbicide. Godalming: WWF. May 1995.
Warhurst, M. (1995). An environmental assessment o f  alkylphenol ethoxylates and alkylphenols. 
Edinburgh: Friends o f the Earth Scotland. January 1995.
WWF (1994). The right to know: the promise o f  low-cost public inventories o f  toxic chemicals. 
Washington, DC: WWF. 1994.; Greenpeace (1994). Achieving zero dioxin: an emergency strategy fo r  
dioxin elimination. London: Greenpeace.
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Not only did the IEH select the participants for this workshop, they also prepared a set 
of background scientific review documents on the effects of environmental oestrogens 
in humans and their impact on wildlife. These were distributed to all participants prior 
to the workshop. These documents then became a central part of the ensuing report.
A distinguishing feature of the commentary on the scientific literature was that where 
uncertainty exists, more study and analysis is required to establish the mechanisms 
involved. The participants at the workshop therefore had a stage set in front of them 
where the props were already in place. The IEH decided who the actors would be 
although the actors each brought their own story lines with them. These lines reflected 
individual, institutional or research disciplines. This was to be expected for these 
were the grounds on which participants were selected. Other aspects, such as the 
necessity of particular chemicals, the rights of individuals to determine what goes into 
their bodies, and acceptance of predetermined levels of risk with regard to 
environmental oestrogens were not to be considered and no background papers 
referring to these issues were circulated.
It was only following publication of the report that some of the excluded voices were 
able to voice their opinions about the scope of the workshop. ENDS Report includes 
comments by Friends of the Earth, WWF, the Chemical Industries Association and the 
British Plastics Federation, none of which participated in the workshop, and states that 
‘the review is in danger of understating the full force of the scientific 
argument behind current concerns because of its focus on gaps in the 
evidence.’24
24 ENDS Report (1995). DoE report understates evidence o f oestrogen pollution. ENDS Report 246: 2.
Pi
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In the following section on the nature of evidence I address the issue of scientific 
knowledge and how it is used in areas of controversy around endocrine disrupting 
chemicals. I look at the evidence that my interviewees identify as being relevant and 
important to discussions about endocrine disruption. In this section I continue by 
setting out the background against which my interviews took place and thereby 
establishing the justification for interviewing the individuals I selected.
In a press release put out by the Department of the Environment, the Conservative 
Environment Secretary, John Gummer, welcomed the IEH report saying:
‘In commissioning this independent assessment last year the 
Government recognised the growing concerns about environmental 
oestrogens. ... It gives us a sound basis for taking forward our policies 
and reinforces the need for further research to clarify whether real 
problems exist.’25 
The Government’s response, as stated in this press release, was that:
‘In line with the Government’s commitment to the precautionary 
principle, we will be considering carefully the implications and 
recommendations for research. ... As a result of current environmental 
policy, controls are already in place to limit releases of chemicals into 
the environment and their presence in food. ... The report provides no 
justification for any immediate additional action on any particular 
chemicals. However the Government will reconsider this ... if  and 
when further scientific evidence is available.’26
25 Department o f  the Environment (1995). Environmental oestrogens: assessment o f international 
research shows the way forward - newsrelease 376:9: Department o f  the Environment, p i
26 Department o f the Environment (1995). Environmental oestrogens: assessment o f international
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It appears from this statement that the Government is basing a lot of its justification 
for not taking any further action on endocrine disrupting chemicals on the conclusions 
and recommendations of this report. This bring further into question why particular 
voices were included in and omitted from participation.
Three months after their assessment report came out, the Institute for Environment and 
Health held a planning meeting to discuss the organisation of a ‘round table discussion 
meeting on environmental oestrogens’ which would be held in April 1996. This 
round-table meeting was part of an ongoing programme of work commissioned by the
27Department o f the Environment. The planning meeting of 30 October 1995 was 
attended by eight people: Professor Lewis Smith (Director of the Institute for 
Environment and Health), Dr Paul Harrison and Dr Charles Humphrey (IEH), Ms 
Ruth Stringer (Greenpeace), Ms Gwynne Lyons (WWF), Mr Roger Lilley (Friends of 
the Earth), Dr Michael Warhurst (Friends of the Earth Scotland) and Dr Linda Smith 
(Department of the Environment). At this meeting Ruth Stringer asked what the 
ultimate purpose of the round-table meeting was and how it would contribute to either 
research activities or government policy. Lewis Smith responded that reports 
published subsequent to the IEH Assessment would be discussed and Linda Smith 
added that the Department of the Environment was keen to take all views into account 
when formulating policy which would be developed in the areas where Britain could 
have influence.28 The purpose of the meeting was proposed as being a forum for the 
exchange of views in order to identify both areas of agreement and the key research
research shows the way forward - newsrelease 376:9: Department o f the Environment. p2
27 Medical Research Council (1996). Institute for Environment and Health round table discussion 
meeting on environmental oestrogens: environmental groups, industry and government agree on 
priorities for action on environmental oestrogens - press notice:3. p2
28 Institute for Environment and Health (1995). Environmental Oestrogens - a planning meeting, Notes
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activities required to help address areas of disagreement.29 It was also thought that it 
would be useful to include a review and discussion of the mechanisms of regulation 
and policy formulation at the meeting.30
It was envisaged that the round-table meeting would consist of about thirty active 
scientists comprising approximately six from environmental groups, six from industry, 
six from government, six from the IEH plus relevant independent scientists. Gwynne 
Lyons of the WWF commented that it was disappointing that all the stakeholders were 
not present at the first workshop.31 It was agreed at this meeting that everyone 
attending would be involved in deciding what issues should be addressed and who 
should be invited and that Ruth Stringer, Gwynne Lyons, Roger Lilley and Michael 
Warhurst would inform IEH of other relevant environmental groups and independent 
scientists working in the field. This gave the potential for this round-table meeting to 
be much broader in scope than the previous assessment meeting.
The final list of participants included representatives from government departments, 
academia, industry and environmental groups.32 It was agreed that Chatham House
produced by the Institute for Environment and Health:4: Institute for Environment and Health, p i
29 Institute for Environment and Health (1995). Environmental Oestrogens - a planning meeting, Notes 
produced by the Institute for Environment and Health:4: Institute for Environment and Health. p2
30 Institute for Environment and Health (1995). Environmental Oestrogens - a planning meeting, Notes 
produced by the Institute for Environment and Health:4: Institute for Environment and Health, p i
31 Institute for Environment and Health (1995). Environmental Oestrogens - a planning meeting, Notes 
produced by the Institute for Environment and Health:4: Institute for Environment and Health, p i
32Participants at this meeting included representatives from the Department o f the Environment, 
Department o f Health, Ministry o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Health and Safety Executive, the 
Enviromnent Agency, the Medical Research Council, the Chemical Industries Association, British 
Plastics Federation, European Centre for Ecotoxicology and Toxicology o f Chemicals, Water Services 
Association, European Chemical Industry Council, Greenpeace, Worldwide Fund for Nature, Friends o f  
the Earth, Friends o f  the Earth Scotland, Dr Richard Sharpe, MRC Reproductive Biology Unit, 
Edinburgh, Prof. John Sumpter, Brunei University, Prof. Stephen Farrow, Barnet Health Authority, Dr 
Jean Ginsberg, Royal Free Hospital, London, Dr Philippa Darbre, University o f Reading.
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Rules33 would apply to the reporting of the discussions.34
Prior to the actual discussion, Gwynne Lyons circulated a letter to those at 
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the WWF saying that she felt
‘...it was very telling that the IEH report did not pay much attention to 
the precautionary principle, but talked about weight o f evidence.’
She added that it was important to underline the fact that the government and the 
Department of the Environment had signed up to the precautionary principle and 
therefore proposed that ‘acceptance of the precautionary principle’ be added to the 
meeting’s agenda.
The round-table discussion took place on 26 April 1996 and culminated in agreement 
that the possible impact of environmental oestrogens is a serious issue which should 
be addressed.36 The question of the applicability of the precautionary principle to the 
issue of environmental oestrogens was raised and drew different responses from 
participants. The discussion centred on the amount of evidence required before action 
could be taken and it was felt by some groups that the spirit of the precautionary 
principle was being met merely by discussing the issues and investing in further 
research.37 There was a general view that whilst government departments consider
33Chatham House Rules provide that particular comments should not be attributed to individuals.
34 Institute for Environment and Health (1995). Environmental Oestrogens - a planning meeting, Notes 
produced by the Institute for Environment and Health:4: Institute for Environment and Health. p3
35 Lyons, G. (1995). Letter to Ruth Stringer, Greenpeace Laboratories; Michael Warhusrt, FoE 
Scotland; Roger Lilley, FoE; Sally Nicholson and Sian Pullen, WWF UK. Re: Agenda for proposed 
DoE/IEH spring meeting on endocrine disrupters, (letter). 1995.
36 Medical Research Council (1996). Institute for Environment and Health round table discussion 
meeting on environmental oestrogens: environmental groups, industry and government agree on 
priorities for action on environmental oestrogens - press notice:3. p i
37 Institute for Environment and Health (1996). Report o f  the MRC Institute fo r  Environment and  
Health Round Table Discussion Meeting on Environmental oestrogens. Leicester: Institute for 
Environment and Health. 26 April 1996. p l4 . Due to Chatham House Rules being in operation these
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that they are taking a precautionary approach to the issue by carrying out further 
research, others, including the environmental groups, consider that this in itself is not 
sufficient and that actions to date have been too slow.38 A positive suggestion, that 
was said to be in keeping with the precautionary principle, was made to develop a 
regulatory framework that could be put in place rapidly should the balance of evidence 
show that human health and/or the environment are likely to be harmed by exposure to
-3Q
these chemicals. What exactly that balance of evidence would consist of was not 
agreed. There was further major disagreement between governmental, industrial and 
environmental groups on the issue of when and how it might be necessary to substitute 
endocrine disrupting chemicals with alternatives. Crucially, this debate focussed on 
the weight of evidence required to demonstrate that a chemical is an environmental 
oestrogen.40
This sets the background against which I conducted my interviews about endocrine 
disrupting chemicals. I selected individuals to interview due to their own or their 
organisation’s involvement in the above workshops, because they were conducting 
research in the area of endocrine disruption or because other interviewees either 
suggested their names or provided introductions 41 I interviewed 28 individuals in
views are not accredited to specific individuals.
38 Medical Research Council (1996). Institute for Environment and Health round table discussion 
meeting on environmental oestrogens: environmental groups, industry and government agree on 
priorities for action on environmental oestrogens - press notice:3. p2
39 Medical Research Council (1996). Institute for Environment and Health round table discussion 
meeting on environmental oestrogens: environmental groups, industry and government agree on 
priorities for action on environmental oestrogens - press notice:3. p2
40 Institute for Environment and Health (1996). Report o f  the MRC Institute for Environment and 
Health Round Table Discussion Meeting on Environmental oestrogens. Leicester: Institute for 
Environment and Health. 26 April 1996. p i 5
41 I did not always interview the person who had been the participant at the workshop because the 
organisation or government department concerned felt that someone else would be more appropriate. 
Due to there being no one individual in many government departments and organisations with direct 
responsibility for endocrine disruption it was not always easy to find the relevant spokesperson to 
interview.
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total including representatives from MAFF,42 Friends of the Earth, Friends of the 
Earth Scotland, Department of the Environment,43 the Environment Agency,44 the 
Institute for Environment and Health, Greenpeace, Pesticides Action Network,45 Dr 
Farrow from Barnet Health Authority,46 Dr Darbre from the University of Reading,47 
Dr Ginsberg from the Royal Free Hospital, Dr Howard from the University of 
Liverpool, Dr Tyler from Brunei University,49 Scientist from Thames Water, Mr Baltz 
from Healthcare Without Harm, Dr McLachlan from Tulane University50 and Dr Soto 
and Dr Sonnenschien from TUFTS University51.52
The subject of endocrine disruption is a trans-national one and in December 1996 
another workshop took place to consider the European-wide nature of the issue.
42 They have commissioned and undertaken many research studies into oestrogen activity and screening 
methods.
43 They commissioned the IEH workshops and other research into screening methods for chemicals
44 They support work at MAFF and Brunei University including studies looking at potential endocrine 
disrupting chemicals in sewage effluent.
45 Pesticides Action Network was not involved in the workshops I have discussed but many pesticides 
are implicated as endocrine disrupting chemicals.
46 Dr Farrow has written about male reproductive health and the question o f falling sperm quality. 
Farrow, S. (1994). Falling sperm quality: fact or fiction? British Medical Journal 309: 1-2.
47 Dr Darbre has written about the oestrogenic behaviour o f chemicals. Nesaretnam, K., Corcoran, D., 
Dils, R.R., and Darbre, P. (1996). 3,4,3(prime),4(prime) - Tetrachlorobiphenyl acts as an estrogen in 
vitro and in vivo. Molecular Endocrinology’ 10, (8): 923-936.
48 Dr Ginsberg has written about a study o f sperm density in London. Ginsburg, J., Okolo, S., Prelevic, 
G., and Hardiman, P. (1994). Residence in the London area and sperm density - letter. Lancet 343, 
(8891): 230.
49 Dr Tyler is part o f the team at Brunei University undertaking research supported by MAFF and the 
DoE into oestrogenicity in sewage effluent. Purdom, C.E., Hardiman, P.A., Bye, V.J., Eno, N.C., Tyler, 
C.R., and Sumpter, J.P. (1994). Estrogenic effects o f effluents from sewage treatment works. Chem Ecol 
8: 275-285.
50 Dr McLachlan has been undertaking research into detecting oestrogenic ity and the potential 
synergistic effects o f chemicals. Korach, K.S. and McLachlan, J.A. (1995). Techniques for detection o f  
estrogenic ity. Environmental Health Perspectives 103, (supplement 7): 5-8.
Arnold, S.F., Klotz, D.M., Collins, B.M., Vonier, P.M., Guillette, L.J.J., and McLachlan, J.A. (1996). 
Synergistic activation o f estrogen receptor with combinations o f environmental chemicals. Science 272: 
1489-1492.
51 Dr Soto and Dr Sonnenschien have developed an in vitro screen to detect oestrogenicity. Soto, A.M., 
Lin, T., Justicia, H., Silvia, R., and Sonnenschein, C. (1992). An 'in culture' bioassay to assess the 
estrogenicity o f xenobiotics (E-SCREEN). In, Colbom, T. and Clement, C., (eds), Chemically induced 
alteration in sexual and functional development: the wildlife/human connection:295-309. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton Scientific Publishing.
Soto, A.M. and al, e. (1995). The E-SCREEN assay as a tool to identify estrogens: an update on 
estrogenic environmental pollutants. Environmental Health Perspectives 103, (Supplement 7): 113-122.
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Again the Institute for Environment and Health was involved in setting up and 
reporting on this event.53 This European Workshop took place in Weybridge, UK and 
the subsequent report has become known as ‘the Weybridge Report’.54 This is one of 
many International Workshops convened with an agenda that covers endocrine 
disruption and chemicals but without a wider framework in which to orientate the 
ensuing discussions, recommendations and decisions.53 In parallel to the IEH 
workshops, the focus of the Weybridge event was also on scientific research studies. 
Discussion about action with regard to endocrine disrupting chemicals was once more 
framed around issues of scientific uncertainty, the weight of evidence and the 
definition of terms.
The following section picks up the theme of the ‘nature of evidence’. Using empirical 
material obtained from my interviews, I discuss the relevance of ‘scientific
52 See Appendix 2 for a complete list o f interviewees
53 The European Workshop in the Impact o f Endocrine Disrupters on Human Health and Wildlife was 
organised by the European Commission, the European Environment Agency, the WHO European 
Centre for Environment and Health, the OECD, national authorities and agencies o f the UK, Germany, 
Sweden and The Netherlands, CEFIC and ECETOC.
54 Environment and Climate Research Programme, D.X.E.C. (1996). European workshop on the impact 
o f  endocrine disrupters on human health and wildlife. Weybridge Conference: Weybridge, UK. .
55 Work Session on Chemically Induced Alterations in Sexual Development: the wildlife/human 
connection, Wingspread Conference Center, Racine, Wisconsin, 26-28 July 1991; Work Session on 
Environmentally Induced Alterations in Development: a focus on wildlife, Wingspread Conference 
Center, Racine, Wisconsin, 10-12 December 1993; Work Session on Chemically-Induced Alterations 
in the Developing Immune System: the wildlife/human connection, Wingspread Conference Center, 
Racine, Wisconsin, 10-12 February 1995; Work Session on Chemically-Induced Alterations in the 
Functional Development and Reproduction o f Fishes, Wingspread Conference Center, Racine, 
Wisconsin, 21-23 July 1995; Work Session on Environmental Endocrine-Disrupting Chemicals: 
neural, endocrine and behavioural effects, International School o f Ethnology , Ettore Majorana Centre 
for Scientific Culture, Erice, Sicily, November 5-10 1995; Workshop on the Effects o f Organochlorines 
on Human Health, Academic Medical Centre, University o f Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 3-4 February 
1996; IEH Round Table Discussion Meeting on Environmental Oestrogens, Medical Research Council, 
Institute for Environment and Health, University o f Leicester, Leicester, 26 April 1996; Work Session 
on the Health Effects o f Contemporary-Use Pesticides: the wildlife/human connection, Wingspread 
Conference Center, Racine, Wisconsin, 27-29 September 1996; Institute for Environment and Health 
Workshop on Male Reproductive Health, on behalf o f the Health and Safety Executive, IEH, University 
o f Leicester, Leicester, 6-7 November 1996; European Workshop in the Impact o f Endocrine 
Disrupters in Human Health and Wildlife, Weybridge, UK, 2-4 December 1996; Second Session o f the 
Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety, Ottawa, 10-14 February 1997; IBC Conference on 
Endocrine Disrupters in the Environment, The Merchant Centre, London, 20-21 May 1997.
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uncertainty’, ‘weight of evidence’ and ‘definitions’ to debate about endocrine 
disrupting chemicals and the implementation of the precautionary principle.
The Nature of Evidence in Debate about Endocrine Disrupting 
Chemicals
It is clear that there is much controversy as to the status o f the ‘problem’ of endocrine 
disruption. There is still no consensus as to what causes some of the observed 
abnormalities in human and wildlife reproductive health despite a number of studies 
indicating the oestrogenic properties of particular chemicals in laboratory studies. 
Disagreement hinges around the question of what actually is endocrine disruption, 
what constitutes an adverse effect in a human or wildlife population, what tests can 
demonstrate that a particular chemical or mixture of chemicals causes particular 
adverse effects to humans or wildlife, whether in vitro or in vivo tests are more 
appropriate and meaningful, and how much evidence is necessary before policy action 
is taken against specified chemicals. In this section I look at three aspects of what I 
term ‘the nature of evidence’. I discuss definitions of endocrine disruption employed 
by my respondents, consider the way these definitions relate to interpretations about 
what constitutes sufficient evidence of endocrine disruption to warrant taking action 
against particular chemicals and, review the role that scientific uncertainty plays in 
these deliberations.
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Definitions of endocrine disruption
Definitions help structure any debate by defining the vocabulary and categories used 
by those involved in the discussion. Within the endocrine disruption debate there are 
many terms that are used as boundary objects, that is where those using them are not 
necessarily talking about the same thing but where differences are disguised by a 
common terminology. Identifying which definitions have consensual agreement 
regarding their use and those which are still disputed and regarded as problematic 
helps in understanding the different positions observed in debate on endocrine 
disruption and the closure of controversy.
Using the case of the Weybridge workshop I discuss the term ‘endocrine disrupter’ 
and show the diversity of positions at stake. The question of ‘what exactly’ constitutes 
an endocrine disrupter is one that underpins further policy debate about options for the 
future.56 A ‘precise’ definition has not been forthcoming although the Weybridge 
workshop, set up on behalf of the European Commission in order to assess the scope 
of the problem of endocrine disrupters in Europe, managed to endorse a couple of 
definitions.57
A distinction was made at this workshop between endocrine disrupters and potential 
endocrine disrupters such that
56 Institute for Environment and Health (1995). IEH assessment on environmental oestrogens: 
consequences to human health and wildlife. Leicester: Institute for Environment and Health.
Institute for Environment and Health (1996). Report o f  the MRC Institute for Environment and Health 
Round Table Discussion Meeting on Environmental oestrogens. Leicester: Institute for Environment 
and Health. 26 April 1996.; Environment and Climate Research Programme, D.X.E.C. (1996).
European workshop on the impact o f endocrine disrupters on human health and wildlife. Weybridge 
Conference: Weybridge, UK. .
57 Environment and Climate Research Programme, D.X.E.C. (1996). European workshop on the impact
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‘An endocrine disrupter is an exogenous substance that causes adverse 
health effects in an intact organism, or its progeny, secondary to 
changes in endocrine function’ (emphasis added)
and
‘A potential endocrine disrupter is a substance that possesses properties 
that might be expected to lead to endocrine disruption in an intact 
organism’ (emphasis added)
It was generally agreed at this workshop that an endocrine disrupter could only be 
identified through testing in a whole animal, i.e. in vivo, although it was accepted that 
the identification of potential endocrine disrupters could be based upon data obtained
C Q
from in vitro studies.
These definitions, even if  agreed, open further areas of debate. At a conference I 
attended in May 1997 on ‘Endocrine Disrupters in the Environment’59 there appeared 
to be considerable discrepancy between participants about what these ‘agreed’ 
definitions meant. For example, one dispute was over what exactly constitutes 
‘adverse health effects’. Industry representatives felt that this meant harmful, 
permanent changes and that it was better to think of this as meaning ‘abnormal’. Dr 
John Ashby of Zeneca Central Toxicology Laboratory said that the word adverse was 
in there because there was a fear that the whole of policy would be based on changes 
rather than things that were adverse problems. This was a major point of disagreement 
as a number of academic scientists felt exactly that, that any changes to an intact
o f  endocrine disrupters on human health and wildlife. Weybridge Conference: Weybridge, UK. . p53
58 Environment and Climate Research Programme, D.X.E.C. (1996). European workshop on the impact 
o f endocrine disrupters on human health and wildlife. Weybridge Conference: Weybridge, U K .. p53
59 IBC Technical Services (1997). Endocrine disrupters in the environment. Endocrine disrupters in the 
environment: The Merchant Centre, London. IBC Technical Services.
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organism should be considered as adverse.60
Representatives from various chemical companies suggested that ‘sufficient evidence’ 
was necessary before something could be called an endocrine disrupter but would not 
commit themselves to what sufficient evidence might be.61 It was important for the 
chemical industry representatives to keep debate over definitions of endocrine 
disrupters going as this has the potential to delay further action, some of which may 
have financial implications for the chemical industry.
Circular logic seems to apply in the above example of how an endocrine disrupter is 
defined and how much evidence is necessary before a particular chemical can be 
called an endocrine disrupter. On one hand ‘sufficient evidence’ is required to 
implicate a particular chemical as an endocrine disrupter which necessitates that what 
an endocrine disrupter is is agreed, i.e. defined. On the other hand a definition of an 
endocrine disrupter is only accepted if it causes ‘adverse effects’ which requires that 
some method of determining those effects exists and is considered ‘sufficient’. This 
problem was also highlighted during my fieldwork when I found few people willing to 
define what they would accept as ‘sufficient evidence’ that endocrine disruption was 
an issue or that a particular chemical was an endocrine disrupting chemical. This was 
despite the fact that there seemed to be an unofficial consensus amongst scientists 
involved in the debate that something called ‘sufficient evidence’ was required before 
policy action could be taken.
60 IBC Technical Services (1997). Endocrine disrupters in the environment. Endocrine disrupters in the 
environment: The Merchant Centre, London. IBC Technical Services, and personal notes taken at the 
conference during discussion periods
61 IBC Technical Services (1997). Endocrine disrupters in the environment. Endocrine disrupters in the 
environment: The Merchant Centre, London. IBC Technical Services, and personal notes taken at the
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Through being aware of the context in which the debate on endocrine disruption and 
the associated definitions has evolved I can identify potential conflicts of interest and 
shed light on how these interests have been constructed and represented. By showing 
that the debate itself is a construction of different interests each vying for recognition 
and legitimacy it is possible to visualise how different interests might promote a 
different debate, or a different controversy. The workshops referred to above create 
the space for definition-making by bringing together interested parties who have a 
stake in future invocations of those definitions. However, even when ‘endocrine 
disruption’ is defined, as at the Weybridge workshop, definitions may still be 
problematic as their constituent terms are picked apart, as demonstrated above.
Sufficient evidence of endocrine disruption
As introduced in the previous sub-section the question of what constitutes ‘sufficient 
evidence’ of there being an endocrine disruption problem is tied up with the debate 
over defining endocrine disruption. Through such events as the IEH workshops, the 
Weybridge workshop and the IBC conference, debate about endocrine disruption has 
become focused on the specification of endocrine disrupting chemicals although there 
is, as yet, no consensus, either scientific or political, that chemicals are causing the 
observed effects. Due to this there is much dispute about whether to take action as if  
chemicals are the culprits or whether to delay taking action until more research into 
potential causes and effects has been conducted. This is an important problem in 
terms of precaution because those that advocate alternative positions both consider 
them to be precautionary. This again demonstrates the variety of interpretations to
conference during discussion periods
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which the precautionary principle can be subjected.
The question of what constitutes ‘sufficient evidence’ of endocrine disruption is one 
that has an impact on both the scientific research carried out and the policy decisions 
which are, or are not, made. Other possible causes of endocrine disruption have been 
mooted, ranging from the use of particular types of underwear, through ideas about 
geographic location and modem sexual behaviour, to sitting at a desk all day or 
driving a car. These suggestions tend to be made by those representing large 
corporations. However these possibilities are not disputed by the environmentalists I 
spoke to. Their feeling is that there could be many possible causes and that they 
should all be treated seriously. They agree that this might mean some chemicals are 
assumed guilty and later prove to be innocent, but they insist that is what the 
precautionary principle is about. Environmental groups such as Friends of the Earth 
and Greenpeace claim to speak for an uninformed and uninvolved public. They are 
concerned with the power that large corporations can draw on at an international level 
and have used the idea of precaution to set targets for particular chemicals which they 
believe should be banned or phased out.
One of the unresolved debates is about what evidence is sufficient to signify a link 
between cause and effect. How much proof is required to indicate that substance A or 
process B is causing an effect in situation X or eco-system Y? One of the dilemmas is 
whether political action can be taken if no evidence at all exists to indicate a potential 
causality. Here a distinction must be made between there being no evidence due to a 
lack of resources to look for that evidence, and there being no evidence despite having 
conducted an agreed set of tests and come up with no clear conclusion.
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In order to consider this question of what evidence is sufficient as a basis for political 
action I organise this section into two. Firstly I consider variant opinions on the issue 
of in vivo versus in vitro tests as evidence of endocrine disruption and, secondly, I 
look at the arguments put forward by different interest groups regarding ‘taking action 
against’ specific chemicals. I have chosen a ‘topic led’ categorisation rather than an 
‘institutional-led’ one based on analysis of my fieldwork data.
a) in vivo and in vitro tests as evidence of endocrine disruption
Here I focus on the views expressed regarding in vivo versus in vitro testing of 
chemicals as a way o f determining whether a chemical is an endocrine disrupter. I 
look at how this theme informs the assessment of policy options. This also highlights 
further debate about the limitations of extrapolating from in vivo and in vitro tests to 
real world situations. I identify the government’s position on the use of in vivo and in 
vitro tests and discuss their adherence to a formula for acquiring more data and 
evidence before they consider there to be sufficient evidence on which to base action.
I discuss disciplinary adherence to particular scientific paradigms when I look at the 
way in which science is used as a basis for making decisions, and I question the 
applicability of science in that role. I also consider the perspectives of NGOs who 
believe that there is already sufficient evidence to take action in particular 
circumstances. I draw attention to their a priori commitment to there being sufficient 
evidence, a position established due to their commitment to the precautionary 
principle.
On the question o f in vivo versus in vitro tests I spoke with an academic scientist
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doing research on fish in British rivers. He told me that a lot of research is being 
undertaken and that in the next few years more information will be available relating 
to specific laboratory testing of various compounds and chemicals. With regard to 
using this data to inform policy decisions he said
‘... at the end of the day the environment is very complex and to try 
and extrapolate from the very simplistic in vivo or in vitro experiments 
and trials to what’s happening in the real world is still going to be a 
really big jum p.’62
This is an important point as it has implications for whatever tests are conducted into 
endocrine disruption, whether they are in vivo or in vitro. There are limitations with 
all types of tests since none will be sophisticated enough to emulate real world 
complexity.
Since in vivo and in vitro tests are the two laboratory methods that exist for testing 
chemicals, and since extrapolation is so complex, I asked the Head of the Chemicals 
and Health Branch of the Department of the Environment how testing of potentially 
disruptive chemicals might be prioritised. She told me:
‘There’s a piece of work at the moment to prioritise chemicals -  
looking within groups at specific chemicals. The suspicion would be 
that they’re positive in vitro, and the suspicion increases if they’re 
positive in vzvo.’63
I was curious as to how this ‘suspicion’ became translated into ‘evidence’.
‘There isn’t a cut-off point. There is a feeling that there is sufficient
62 Interview 24/04/97, transcript p5.
63 Interview 25/04/97, transcript p2.
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evidence -  no formal guidelines.’64 
This demonstrates that the government is aware that there is no specific moment when 
there suddenly ‘is’ enough evidence, although they still prioritise certain types of 
scientific evidence. On one hand, there is an adherence to an objectivist paradigm of a 
hierarchy of scientific proof and, on the other hand, there is an acknowledgement that 
subjective ‘feeling’ plays a role.
By accepting the co-existence of these two aspects, the government can give the 
impression of doing all that is possible in the present circumstances. The government 
wants to be seen to be protecting the public from unseen potential risks (hence the 
more subjective aspect) whilst at the same time supporting industry and by their 
reasoning, the economy (through adopting science as a basis for making decisions).
Friends of the Earth also takes a ‘scientific’ approach with regard to evidence, 
although they suggest that in vitro evidence should be sufficient to indicate endocrine 
disruption:
‘We should find out if it binds to the oestrogen receptor in cell culture 
and if  it enters cells in cell culture and gets an idea of how it’s 
metabolised in the body by not killing animals. If you can show it goes 
into the body, into the cells. ... Should also measure levels in people to 
see the levels that exist in the real world. Look at what level is a 
problem in culture and look at what level exists in the human body.
And make decisions from there.’65
64 Interview 25/04/97, transcript p2.
65 Interview 16/05/97, transcript p i
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In terms of a hierarchy of accepted evidence Friends of the Earth is willing to accept a 
minimum amount of scientific evidence that indicates causality.
Similarly, Friends of the Earth Scotland were emphatic that they don’t feel that in vivo 
tests are necessary to establish a sufficient link between cause and effect in order for 
action to be taken. One representative told me:
‘If we come across animal studies we use the results but we support 
alternatives to animal testing. Computer modelling would be a useful 
way to test. There is a whole range of cell tests and yeast tests for 
oestrogen. We wouldn’t be calling for testing a chemical on an 
animal.’66
They feel that sufficient evidence can be established without recourse to animal 
experiments and, like Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace they feel that a minimum 
amount of evidence is sufficient to base action upon.
I also discussed the weight placed on the outcome of in vivo and in vitro testing with a 
toxico-pathologist from Liverpool University who told me:
‘In vitro tests are not sufficient to prove there is a problem, they show 
there is probably a problem. ... in vivo is stronger evidence... ’
Within science it is undisputed that animal tests provide stronger evidence. The 
toxico-pathologist continued:
‘Most chemicals in the environment have had no toxicological tests.
... There are crude toxicological testing -  LD50 -  for chemicals. In
66 Interview 16/04/97, transcript p3
67 Interview 26/03/97, transcript pi
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vitro allows you to get at the mechanisms more easily -  but you need 
animals to show if it will affect people .. .’68 
There is a strong disciplinary adherence to the fact that animal testing provides 
stronger proof of causality of human health problems than does in vitro testing. 
Toxicology is about understanding the mechanisms at work in causing toxic effects. It 
is not solely a matter of establishing that a particular chemical is oestrogenic (for 
example) or not but also in trying to establish the limits of the effects. Those engaged 
in science tend to have a disciplinary allegiance to particular paradigms which allows 
them to view the scientific method as deterministic and this allows for the claim that a 
hierarchy of procedures has been established which generates stronger or weaker 
evidence.
This opinion about in vitro tests not being sufficient to prove a problem was echoed by 
a representative of Thames Water who told me:
‘... you can test a substance for oestrogenicity by looking at it in an 
assay in a particular lab [in vitro], does that mean you must stop using 
that chemical in all circumstances? What if that lab messes up the test?
What if no one else can reproduce the results?’69 
This seems tantamount to changing the goal posts once it becomes likely that the goal 
will be reached. By questioning the validity of the results the Water Company is 
insisting on a greater amount of proof before they are willing to accept that a chemical 
is an endocrine disrupter. This may be associated with the financial burden they 
would be faced with in order to clean up their water supply and the potential liability
68 Interview 26/03/97, transcript p i
69 Interview 10/04/97, transcript p i -2
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claims they could have aimed at them by their customers. By challenging this stage in 
the ‘proof process (whether an in vitro assay is enough to ‘prove’ oestrogenicity), the 
Water Company is trying to force the level of acceptable evidence to the in vivo stage 
i.e. taking the ‘more science’ position. By doing this, potentially necessary mitigation 
measures can be deferred to a later date.
Science practitioners speak with great authority and this is reflected in the 
unquestioning way in which it is assumed that doing more scientific research will 
provide better evidence on which to base decisions. A hierarchy of protocols exists 
which determine the strength of the evidence provided but these protocols are taken 
for granted, so, although the question of extrapolation to human populations across 
species barriers is a common challenge to animal testing, in vivo tests persist in being 
considered a relevant measure of cause and effect. This makes the job of attempting to 
determine the level of sufficiency at a low base level much more difficult.
b) ‘taking action’ against particular chemicals considered to be endocrine disrupters
Causal evidence linking chemicals to particular observed endocrine disruptive effects 
is in short supply and the chemical industry disputes that there is enough to implicate 
them as responsible.70 Liz Surkovic of the Chemical Industries Association has 
suggested that other societal factors, such as modem lifestyles and changing dietary 
habits, may be the causal agents of observed physical and sexual developmental 
abnormalities.71 Manmade chemicals are an intricate part of modem life and
70 EMSG (Endocrine Modulators Steering Group) (1998). Endocrine disruption: the position o f  the 
chemical industry:8: CEFIC. p4
71 ENDS Report (1995). DoE report understates evidence o f oestrogen pollution. ENDS Report 246: 2..
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proponents claim that they provide huge social benefits due to their widespread use 
and that economic and environmental analysis must be undertaken to appraise the net 
benefit for society before adopting any measure that regulates or bans particular
72chemicals. Opponents, however, argue that many of the most suspect chemicals are 
substitutable with available alternatives and that particular chemicals and families of 
chemicals should be phased out.73
Greenpeace have been calling for the banning of certain chemicals with a particular 
campaign aimed at chlorine and the phasing out of PVC.74 Greenpeace claim that 
there is already enough evidence to implicate chlorine as an endocrine disrupter and 
that it should consequently be phased out.75 A representative from Greenpeace told 
me:
‘[A] US study concluded that wildlife is affected. [We’re] lacking 
direct evidence that humans are affected in the same way. ... Sperm 
count evidence. ... Similar things in animal studies and geographic 
variations point to an environmental factor.’76 
For Greenpeace the very fact that wildlife is affected is enough evidence to suggest
See also EMSG (Endocrine Modulators Steering Group) (1998). Endocrine disruption: the position o f  
the chemical industry:8: CEFIC. p3
72 ENDS Report (1996). DGIII buys chemical industry pleas for deregulation. ENDS Report 256: 48. p i
73 Greenpeace (undated). Body o f  evidence: the effects o f  chlorine on human health. London: 
Greenpeace.
Warhurst, M. (1995). An environmental assessment o f  alkylphenol ethoxylates and alkylphenols. 
Edinburgh: Friends o f the Earth Scotland. January 1995.; WWF (undated). Policy options fo r  endocrine 
disrupting chemicals (EDCs) within the European Union. Godalming: WWF. undated.
74 Greenpeace (1994). Achieving zero dioxin: an emergency strategy’ fo r  dioxin elimination. London: 
Greenpeace.
Greenpeace (1996). The problems o fP V C  and the alternatives. London: Greenpeace. June 1996. 
Greenpeace (1996). Building the future: a guide to building without PVC. London: Greenpeace. 
October 1996.
Greenpeace International (1994). PVC: the need for an industrial sector approach to environmental 
regulation. Paris Convention for the Prevention o f Marine Pollution Sixth Meeting o f the working group 
on industrial sectors: Oslo. Greenpeace International.
75 Greenpeace (undated). Chlorine crisis: time fo r  a global phase-out. London: Greenpeace.
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that some action needs to be taken and the fact that an environmental factor is 
implicated is enough to ban particular chemicals.
The Friends o f the Earth representative I spoke to was also willing to be specific about 
particular chemicals that he thought had enough evidence against them to justify a 
ban:
‘In my opinion alkyl-phenols should have been banned in the 60’s.
They don’t break down in the environment and there are alternatives.’77
In contrast, the Environment Agency believes that more information is required before 
it is possible to determine whether endocrine disruption is a serious problem and that 
particular chemicals should be regulated more stringently. A representative told me 
that
‘... it’s still in the R&D stage -  information gathering and learning 
more about the impact these substances are having on the biota
70
generally.’
The Environment Agency feels that it is too early to take any action as there is 
insufficient evidence on which to justify action. This may stem from a conflict of 
interest as, on the one hand, they are responsible for monitoring emissions to the 
environment and for initiating any necessary legal action, while on the other hand they 
also administer licenses to companies and negotiate with them closely about their 
mitigation procedures. Because of these almost opposing roles (serving the public and 
working with industry) they feel the need for more evidence in order to make a
76 Interview 09/04/97, transcript p i
77 Interview 16/05/97, transcript p i
78 Interview 23/04/97, transcript p5
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balanced decision which is seen as fair and reasonable by all sides:
‘What you need is more data collection, good quality information on 
which to base decisions. In many instances that is often lacking ...
Basically if  there was evidence to suggest that a discharge was causing 
damage we would take action. It’s establishing the link which is 
difficult -  when you’re talking about these trace quantities you’ve often 
got whole cocktails of chemicals. I mean if you analysed an effluent 
you’re looking for substances at a nanogram per litre level, which is 
your grain of sugar in the Olympic swimming pool, I mean you might 
find 800 substances so which one of those is causing a problem?’79 
Despite saying that if  there was evidence that a particular chemical was causing a 
problem they would take action, the Environment Agency would not be drawn to 
clarify exactly how much evidence they would require and what that would be.
There appears to be much rhetoric about ‘taking action’ without those using the phrase 
explicitly detailing what action they are talking about. Another example of this can be
O fv
seen at the launch of the IEH assessment on environmental oestrogens when the IEH 
director, Professor Lewis Smith, said of Dr Sharpe’s findings that low-level exposure 
o f pregnant rats to phthalates caused reduction in testis weight in their male offspring: 
‘If these effects are convincingly demonstrated in rats then my personal
view is that there should be action. It would be a case of using the
81precautionary principle.’
79 Interview 23/04/97, transcript p i0-11
80 Institute for Environment and Health (1995). IEH assessment on environmental oestrogens: 
consequences to human health and wildlife. Leicester: Institute for Environment and Health.
81 ENDS Report (1995). DoE report understates evidence o f oestrogen pollution. ENDS Report 246: 2. 
pl
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Although he says there should be action and equates this with using the precautionary 
principle he stops short of saying they should be banned or what other action he would 
consider appropriate. ENDS Report notes that the Department o f the Environment, 
Institute of Environment and Health and Dr Sharpe all believe that at present there is 
still insufficient evidence on any compound to warrant regulatory action.82
These examples illustrate the difficulty of establishing a precise set of scientific tests 
which will determine without doubt that a chemical is an endocrine disrupter. Even 
when evidence is produced via one set of procedures (i.e. in vitro tests) it can be 
challenged as incomplete and a case can be made that another set of procedures is 
more accurate (i.e. in vivo). This process can continue indefinitely through all the sets 
o f existing procedures until it is recognised that no laboratory experiments are capable 
o f emulating real world complexities.
An important feature of all the NGOs that I have identified is that they have an a 
priori commitment to there being sufficient evidence regardless of what the evidence 
is. Because they all support the invocation of the precautionary principle they believe 
that insufficient evidence should not be used as a reason for not taking action. There 
is no suggestion by the environmental groups that scientific evidence is not important, 
rather that it is important to take action based on what is known rather than waiting for 
some further approximation to the truth. They believe that enough is known currently 
about particular chemicals such as chlorine and alkyl-phenols to warrant taking action 
now, and the action they advocate is phasing out the use of these chemicals. What is
82 ENDS Report (1995). DoE report understates evidence o f oestrogen pollution. ENDS Report 246: 2. 
p2
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obvious here is a resistance to the established line that science will eventually provide 
all the answers and a call to acknowledge that the evidence that does exist is already 
sufficient.
As well as illustrating the different interests of each of these groups I’ve also pointed 
to the ambiguities in the concept of sufficient evidence itself. The concept can mean 
that there is sufficient evidence that a problem exists. From my fieldwork it appears 
that no one is actually denying that there is a problem. It can also mean sufficient 
evidence of the causes of the problem. There is much more controversy in this area 
although many potential causes appear to be identified. Finally the concept can be 
interpreted as sufficient evidence to determine a direction of action. This is the area 
over which there is greatest disagreement with some actors insisting that causality be 
established before action can be taken, and others insisting that action should be taken 
as a precautionary measure.
The role of scientific uncertainty in deliberations about endocrine disruption
There are many areas where scientific uncertainties come to the fore in discussions 
about endocrine disrupting chemicals. In this section I identify three areas of 
uncertainty: indeterminacy, synergy and extrapolation.
I look at the effects of indeterminacy on the debate about endocrine disrupting 
chemicals and the associated interests that keep these indeterminacies in place. 
Uncertainties about observed effects are discussed in an effort to understand what it 
means to know if a cause has been identified. Uncertainty over whether such an
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observed effect is actually an effect or an error in representation or whether these 
cannot be distinguished between is also considered. I use the example of disputes 
about the long-term effects of exposure to low doses of chemicals to illustrate the 
uncertainties that arise in particular research areas.
A major dispute in the scientific community over the existence and effects of synergy 
in the case of endocrine disrupting chemicals is discussed with reference to Professor 
John McLachlan’s report ‘Synergistic activation of estrogen receptor with 
combinations of environmental chemicals’83 which was subsequently withdrawn from
84publication. This study has major implications on both scientific and policy levels. 
Finally I discuss the methodological uncertainties associated with carrying out 
research on adult populations to the exclusion of embryonic populations, the reasons 
why this might happen and the problems that extrapolation between the two might 
produce.
a) Indeterminacy around endocrine disrupting chemicals
Indeterminacy is the aspect of uncertainty that acknowledges there are many things 
that cannot be known. It is one of three forms of uncertainty referred to by O’Riordan 
and Cameron, the others being uncertainty related to lack of data and uncertainty as
85 . . .  . .variability of process. I have discussed indeterminacy as a form of uncertainty m
83 Arnold, S.F., Klotz, D.M., Collins, B.M., Vonier, P.M., Guillette, L.J.J., and McLachlan, J.A. (1996). 
Synergistic activation o f estrogen receptor with combinations o f  environmental chemicals. Science 272: 
1489-1492.
84 McLachlan, J.A. (1997). Synergistic effect o f environmental estrogens: report withdrawn. Science 
277: 462-463.
85 O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds) (1994). Interpreting the Precautionary Principle. London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd. p62-66
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detail in chapter three. In this section I discuss indeterminacy as it relates to endocrine 
disrupting chemicals.
A first dimension of indeterminacy-related uncertainty concerns the question of 
whether the effects observed about human reproductive health are actually effects at 
all. This has been highlighted with regard to studies that have observed reduced sperm 
counts in men and was raised in an interview with a representative from the Institute 
for Environment and Health which has undertaken research into oestrogenic effects on 
humans and wildlife.86 My interviewee pointed out that prior to answering the 
question of what is causing this reduction in sperm counts a fundamental question that 
must be answered is whether they are actually reducing at all. There is a lot of 
conflicting data on this subject and he states that:
‘Generally there are problems with the analysis, with the recording of 
environmental factors etcetera, and I think that there appears to be ... 
regional differences. There are very clear geographical variations but 
exactly what the reasons for that is, what the causes are not clear at the 
moment.’87
Not only is there scientific uncertainty about what might be causing reduced sperm 
counts (if it is a real phenomena) but there is the indeterminacy of whether the 
phenomena exists.
One complicating factor that adds to this indeterminacy is the dimension of human
86 Institute for Environment and Health (1995). IEH assessment on environmental oestrogens: 
consequences to human health and wildlife. Leicester: Institute for Environment and Health.
Institute for Environment and Health (1996). Report o f  the MRC Institute fo r  Environment and Health 
Round Table Discussion Meeting on Environmental oestrogens. Leicester: Institute for Environment 
and Health. 26 April 1996.
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error. Many of the sperm count studies rely on questionnaire data or interviews which 
may lead to biased results due to the sensitive nature of the questions being asked. 
Measures of sperm count are affected by stress, time since previous ejaculation, and 
temperature -  to name a few factors. Questions about these issues may not elicit 
honest responses and this may lead to an exaggeration or minimisation of the extent of 
the problem of reduced sperm counts.
A second aspect o f indeterminacy-related uncertainty concerns identification of 
cause/effect relationships between chemicals and environmental problems either 
locally or more broadly due to the widespread dispersal of manmade chemicals. The 
ubiquity of chemicals in the environment is such that a ‘natural state’ against which to 
gauge exposure is hard to determine. Background levels themselves contain manmade 
chemicals. For this reason it is very difficult to monitor the effects that legislation to 
reduce the amount of chemicals entering the environment locally might have. It is also 
impossible to determine the full effects that particular processes or chemicals might 
have in particular environments.
Additional to this, circumstances which were once indeterminate may at another point 
in time become known or agreed upon. A representative from the Environment 
Agency gave me a very localised example:
‘We’ve had a situation of a discharge into the Mersey where we were 
finding substances which the discharger didn’t know he was 
discharging. It’s actually a trace quantity of a substance which is being 
synthesised as part of his processing. He didn’t know about this. ...
87 Interview 02/05/97, transcript p4
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we’re talking about very very small quantities here. This particular 
substance was being detected in mitolis m ussel... samples and also in 
fish. It doesn’t necessarily mean it’s harmful but ...,88 
There are a number of issues that arise from this example. Firstly, it raises the 
question of whether the discharger should have known about the synthesised substance 
which he was discharging. If the process through which the synthesised by-product is 
created has not been scientifically validated then this is a classic case of indeterminacy 
-  an uncertainty which cannot be known. The discharger will behave as if  their 
process does not produce unwanted by-products and will continue to do so until such a 
time as those by-products are detected and associated with their activities -  as is the 
case in the example. It would be expensive and time consuming for the discharger to 
investigate whether their site was producing unknown discharges and so if an 
association between the discharge and the by-product has not previously been 
established, without liability there is no motivation for the discharger to try to discover
O Q
possible associations. Secondly, this example illustrates the Environment Agency’s 
response to new knowledge coming to light. The Environment Agency representative 
told me:
‘The costs for analysing these trace quantities are huge, you couldn’t 
routinely put procedures in place which would enable you to monitor 
all discharges of all substances.’90 
The Environment Agency has financial restrictions in place which prevents it from 
undertaking all the detailed monitoring that it might like to conduct. The resources at
88 Interview 23/04/97, transcript p8
89 This situation is different if  there is a pre-determined association o f which the discharger is unaware. 
The discharger may then be held legally responsible for his actions although it may be that any penalty 
he receives for such an act is worth risking in comparison to the cost o f  mitigation techniques. This, 
however, is not a case o f  indeterminacy.
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the Agency’s disposal are not sufficient (and could never be sufficient) to identify the 
many uncertainties which exist let alone to deal with them. Finally this example 
illustrates the difficulty in determining cause and effect. The substance traces which 
were identified in the fish had to be traced back to the discharger and a connection 
found which linked the product to the by-product. Again, this is a lengthy and 
expensive process because of the multiple possible linkages and methods which could 
exist.
The indeterminacy of effects over time is another area of scientific uncertainty. One 
of my interviews was with a scientist at Reading University who was concerned with 
the long-term effects of chronic doses of chemicals. My respondent claims the effects 
of long-term exposure to low-level doses have not been studied adequately. One-off 
exposures to high-level doses are much simpler to study because accidents provide 
scope to study such cases and laboratory tests can be easily set up. Long-term studies 
are always more difficult to set up as they require time, adequate funding and a control 
population. As previously mentioned there is the added uncertainty as to whether a 
control population of individuals who are unexposed to low levels of chemicals 
actually exists. This scientist pointed out that:
‘If there is one major assault on the body the body can cope in time and 
the body can recover. What happens to low-dose long-term effects is 
that the body is not designed to cope with that.’91 
She went on to describe Sir Alex Jeffrey’s claim that long-term low-dose radiation 
could produce mutation effects which short-term high doses couldn’t and says she sees
90 Interview 23/04/97, transcript p8
91 Interview 10/04/97, transcript p3
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an analogy to chemicals in his claim:
‘It’s the only data that will support long-term low-dose as a problem.’92 
A toxico-pathologist from Liverpool University agreed with this concern about low- 
dose chronic effects when he said, with regard to endocrine disruption, that:
‘We’re not dealing with toxic effects -  we’re dealing with subliminal 
background chronic effects.’93 
Short term, high-dose studies produce more immediate results which can then be used 
to inform policy decisions. Funding for research into low-dose long-term effects does 
not appear to be a priority either by government or by industry and this may be 
because we live in a policy world where scientific results are required on a more 
urgent basis.
b) Synergy and uncertainty
There is a great deal of scientific uncertainty about the synergistic effects of chemicals 
in the environment due to the problem of measuring composite effects. The scientific 
tools currently available are able to detect which chemicals make up a mixture but are 
less able to determine the effects such a mixture might have on humans and wildlife. 
Studies have been undertaken to determine the carcinogenic effects of a combination 
of two substances94 but such a study has not been undertaken for endocrine disrupting 
effects. A scientist at Brunei University told me:
‘We should be looking at mixtures and the complexity of mixtures to
92 Interview 10/04/97, transcript p3
93 Interview 26/03/97, transcript p i
94 For details o f a study on the combined effects o f radon and tobacco see Monchaux, G. (1997). 
Synergism o f radon exposure with other pollutants. Pollutant Mixtures: law and ethics: Liverpool 
University. .
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get any idea of what real wildlife populations are being exposed to and 
we need information in particular on things like what happens to these 
compounds once they get into the bodies of animals -  some are just 
excreted straight away so they’re not going to have any effect, others 
are bio-metabolated, or broken down into ... compounds, in some cases 
non-active compounds are bio-metabolated into active compounds. ... 
we’re probably at the tip of the iceberg -  but it’s a very long journey 
before we can really start to get real grips as to what happens in a 
laboratory or what can happen in the laboratory and what’s really 
happening in the environment and how you can gel the two together.’95 
In the real world environment, chemicals do not exist in isolation and there is always a 
mixture of chemicals to which individuals are exposed. Synergistic effects may be a 
result of this multiple exposure although that is still uncertain. Synergy implies a 
greater than additive effect and the point in the above example is that science is unable 
to understand many of the mechanisms chemicals go through in the metabolism 
process and so is unable to determine whether effects might be additive let alone 
synergistic.
In order to get a government opinion on potential synergistic effects I spoke with the 
Head of Environmental Contaminants in Food at MAFF. He told me:
‘I wouldn’t say it’s a serious problem. The overall policy is set by the 
DoE who are developing a strategy for looking at potential endocrine 
disrupters. They are developing a battery of tests. Our primary concern
95 Interview 24/04/97, transcript p5
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is to establish exposure of individual effects.’96 
Because the effects of individual chemicals is not understood, the government is 
choosing to concentrate efforts in that research area. Focusing on synergistic effects 
would compound the problems associated with determining aetiology. This may be 
related to the time scale in which decisions must be made. The government is more 
likely to get quick answers from studies o f individual chemicals, which the DoE can 
organise, than would be possible from studies investigating synergistic effects. 
Additionally, the government is implying that if  chemicals are established to be 
endocrine disrupters at the individual level then there will be enough information with 
which to make policy decisions. This may fend off some of the issues around synergy, 
since it may reduce the number of individual chemicals in the environment, but many 
of the complexities will still be indeterminate.
An example that highlights this issue of the uncertainties about synergy in the 
endocrine disruption debate is the publication of a study by John McLachlan in the
07journal Science which was subsequently withdrawn from publication. The study 
showed that combinations of two or three common pesticides, at levels that might be 
found in the environment, were up to 1600 times as powerful as any of the individual 
pesticides by themselves. It also showed that chlordane, a chemical that shows no 
ability to disrupt hormones by itself, greatly magnified the ability of other chemicals to 
disrupt hormones. The report was withdrawn because no one, including the original 
research team, was able to replicate the results of the study. A spokesperson for
96 Interview 08/04/97, transcript p2
97 For the original article see Arnold, S.F., Klotz, D.M., Collins, B.M., Vonier, P.M., Guillette, L.J.J., 
and McLachlan, J.A. (1996). Synergistic activation o f estrogen receptor with combinations o f  
environmental chemicals. Science 272: 1489-1492.. For the withdrawal see McLachlan, J.A. (1997). 
Synergistic effect o f environmental estrogens: report withdrawn. Science 277: 462-463.
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Greenpeace talked to me about this study:
‘Look at Sumpter’s letter to Science. He repeated the synergistic study 
on two pesticides and didn’t get the same result -  no synergy. This is 
typical of the oestrogen debate and the sperm count debate. Sumpter 
doesn’t make a job of going around and knocking studies. It was done 
in Zeneca’s labs. It’s an ongoing debate. How much evidence do you 
wait for? Forever? That’s what industries want and governments.’98 
Even though there is much uncertainty about whether synergy exists, Greenpeace 
believes this should not be used as a reason for waiting and doing nothing in the 
meantime. Greenpeace have taken on a responsibility to speak out on behalf of the 
environment and to advance a moral challenge against the current assumption that 
everything is acceptable until it is proven to be a problem. It is important to recognise 
that the withdrawal of the report does not indicate that the uncertainties surrounding 
synergy have been resolved. It is not a reason to believe that synergy is not occurring. 
Greenpeace view this as all the more reason to assume there could be a problem and 
use this as a reason for suggesting that action needs to be taken on this issue.
The scientists who conducted the initial research and published the report were forced 
to withdraw it in order to sustain their status as reputable scientists. They are still 
conducting research on environmental endocrinology and to do this it is important to 
be able to attract further research funds. Due to the process of peer review and the 
sense of experimental validification through replication these scientists had to 
acknowledge the shortcomings of their research.99 They also had a responsibility to
98 Interview 09/04/98, transcript p2
99 Collins, H.M. (1985). Changing Order. London: Sage.
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the people who were using their report for political purposes.
The example of synergy as a form of uncertainty demonstrates that increased 
complexity can be used narrowly to prevent action from being taken (thus calls for 
increased research) or more broadly as a warning that there are so many unknowns that 
the scientific method will not be able to provide solutions (and thus decisions must be 
based on something other than scientific facts). The difficulty of establishing the 
existence of synergy as a scientific artefact has been shown through Professor 
McLachlan’s study of pesticides which subsequent to publication had to be withdrawn.
c) Extrapolation and uncertainty
Extrapolation is a scientific tool full o f methodological uncertainties. Results of 
experiments conducted under controlled conditions in laboratories are often 
extrapolated to real world situations without acknowledging that additional 
complexities of the real world have been assumed away in the controlled experiment. 
This is an example of the middle section of MacKenzie’s ‘certainty trough’ which 
shows the users (as opposed to the producers) of scientific knowledge assuming a low 
level of uncertainty in the knowledge they want to use.100 Often the extrapolation is 
undertaken by different parties to the one which undertook the initial research and so 
many of the finer methodological nuances are lost in interpretation. In the case of 
endocrine disrupting chemicals many experiments on individual chemicals have been 
undertaken on specific species or at particular stages of development. This has
100 See MacKenzie, D. (1990). Inventing accuracy: a historical sociology o f  nuclear missile guidance. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. p370-372, discussed in chapter three o f this thesis
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important implications for making policy about real world exposures based on results 
from these experiments.
Toxicological experiments are often carried out on full-grown, adult populations in 
order to determine the physiological, behavioural and neurological effects of particular 
substances. As a scientist at Brunei University pointed out to me:
‘... so far the major focus has been on ... exposing adults to these 
various compounds. It’s very likely that the younger stages o f the 
embryos are much more sensitive to these endocrine and hormone 
changes. And really it’s all the ... genetic programming and endocrine 
programming that determines how fit you are reproductively. It sets 
you up early in life. So if you screw the system up early on basically 
you’ll have repercussions later on.’101 
Not much research has been carried out to determine the effects of chemicals at 
different stages in development. If it is the case that early stages of development are 
more vulnerable to endocrine disruption than adult stages then looking at results from 
adult studies will not give much information about the effects that can be expected 
early in the development cycle. This has circular implications as research on adults 
may also be identifying effects which initiated at an embryonic stage.
An additional problem is cross-species extrapolation. There is a great degree of 
uncertainty about the appropriateness of extrapolating from one species to another. 
Laboratory experiments conducted on mice, rats or guinea-pigs will give data about 
what the effects of particular chemicals are on those species but will not give
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categorical evidence as to what will happen if a human is exposed to the same dose for 
the same length of time. Due to this methodological problem there is no consistent 
way to use animal experiment results.
To summarise, indeterminacy, in the sense of the impossibility of knowing a problem, 
can be used in an expedient way by government, the industrial sector, academics and 
environmentalists alike. Academics who are conducting much of the research into 
endocrine disruption are keen to obtain more funding to undertake further research.
The promise of reducing high levels of scientific uncertainty are conducive to 
receiving further research funds. One of the features of the various international 
workshops on the subject of endocrine disruption is the recommendation for further 
research to establish the extent of the problem and to determine methods of screening 
suspect substances due to the uncertainties and lack of knowledge in the area. 
Government departments are already supporting further research into some of the 
suggested areas.
Inherent uncertainties are also used by the chemical industry to deflect responsibility 
from themselves. They are anxious to demonstrate that there could be a range of 
reasons for the observed effects, some of which I have mentioned previously, and that 
it would be premature to take any radical actions such as banning particular chemicals 
until such uncertainties have been resolved (which they never can be). For this reason 
they too have been funding research into projects about endocrine disruption. 
Environmentalists, on the other hand, use indeterminacy to argue for a more 
precautionary approach to policy decisions. To them, whilst more research is
101 Interview 24/04/97, transcript p2
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welcome and the results should be considered when making decisions, policy should 
be made recognising that these indeterminacies exist rather than waiting for research 
results.
In this section on the nature of evidence I’ve examined how definitions help shape the 
context o f deliberations about endocrine disrupting chemicals and I determine the 
language used by actors in those deliberations. I’ve also examined the way in which 
what is considered ‘sufficient evidence’ and definitions of endocrine disrupters are 
tied together in these deliberations and I’ve shown how scientific uncertainty 
manifests itself in the endocrine disruption debate with regard to indeterminacy, 
synergy and extrapolation. What this suggests is that the definition of the ‘problem’ is 
as important within deliberations as is the understanding of evidence.
Summary
The aim of this chapter has now been realised. I have shown that the development of 
endocrine disruption as an environmental issue is in its early stages and that the UK 
government is starting to consider related policy implications. No ‘decisions’ have yet 
been made about endocrine disrupting chemicals, although a number of workshops 
and conferences have been held in the UK to discuss environmental implications. I 
have illustrated that from the initial commissioning by the Department of the 
Environment of the Institute for Environment and Health to undertake a review of the 
situation, a traditional scientific approach has been taken in line with the interests of 
those doing the organising and the commissioning. I have shown that despite an 
explicit emphasis on the precautionary principle when the NGOs became involved the
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deliberations still returned to discussions of scientific evidence and uncertainty. The 
parties involved and key characteristics of the endocrine disruption issue have both 
shaped the framework of those deliberations. I established that scientific evidence and 
its associated paradigms, values and institutional affiliations, all underpinned that 
framework.
In discussing the nature of the evidence that is drawn upon, both, in the workshops 
convened and by my interviewees, I show that definitions of endocrine disrupters are 
still open to negotiation and that there is an attempt by institutionalised parties to 
frame discussion around existing scientific paradigms and practices. The theme of 
precaution, in relation to endocrine disrupting chemicals, is being translated into 
debate about evidence and definitions.
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Chapter Seven
Science, interests and uncertainty
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Introduction
In chapter two I introduced the concept of precaution, discussing its evolution from a 
measure to an approach and finally to a principle. Through looking at various national 
and international agreements I observed that what the precautionary principle ‘is’ is 
open to broad interpretation and that this raises significant questions about its 
implementation.1 Having examined the wording used in a selection of agreements I 
was able to identify a set of six (not mutually exclusive) situations with which the 
precautionary principle must cope. These include:
a) situations where a causal link to effects is unclear
b) where scientific evidence does not yet exist
c) where there is no scientific evidence
d) where cost is a factor
e) where the scale of the threat is a factor
f) where there are a diversity of situations to be accounted for.
Through analysing each of these situations in chapter two I demonstrated that, despite 
there being no explicit expression of what the precautionary principle might mean in 
practice, lying behind each is a more explicit reference to science and uncertainty. 
From this I deduced that the key to understanding the precautionary principle was to 
look at how scientific evidence is organised and how uncertainty is acknowledged and 
used in current environmental situations.
1 See Appendix 1 for a list o f the formal agreements discussed in chapter two
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In chapters five and six I undertook case studies on radioactive waste disposal and 
endocrine disruption where I examined the specific issues each raised with respect to 
themes of scientific evidence and uncertainty. This led me to focus on and compare 
similarities and differences in terms of the nature of evidence, contested definitions, 
disputed evidence and scientific uncertainty.
In this chapter I undertake a comparison of these two case studies in order to ascertain 
what can be learned about the definition and implementation of precaution from a 
study o f these underlying themes. Five key areas of comparison are especially 
relevant. They are:
a) the emergence of a ‘problem’
b) the widespread nature of the problem
c) the role of ‘industry’
d) the extent of institutionalisation
e) the rhetorical absence/presence of the precautionary principle in deliberations
I identified these five themes of comparison through reviewing the history of debates 
about both radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disruption, through looking at the 
arenas in which those debates take place, the stage in the career o f the ‘problem’ that 
has been reached, and through identifying the individuals involved in those 
deliberations and decisions. These themes are discussed in detail later in the chapter.
Having compared the cases of radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disruption in 
these terms I then look at the relationship between these dimensions of comparison 
(i.e. those factors observed as having significant impact on the deliberative processes
236
about these two issues) and the six situations identified in the precautionary principle 
chapter (i.e. those factors that make up rhetorical precaution as derived from official 
definitions). This allows me to consider the contexts and circumstances of precaution 
and to review the relationship between that concept and specific environmental 
situations to which the precautionary principle might be applied. Distilled further, two 
core concerns come to the foreground. These are the ‘interests’ of the players 
involved in decision-making and the role of ‘scientific evidence’.
These two areas of ‘interests’ and ‘scientific evidence’ need further discussion in 
order to understand what the relationship between them might be and how that has a 
bearing on precautionary practice. Here I discuss the relevance of ‘interests’ theory 
and offer an explanation of the way in which interests are identified and interpreted. 
Taken further I review the influence they have on the evolution of the issues under 
consideration. To parallel this I discuss the relevance of scientific evidence in 
deliberations about policy making. Having undertaken these analyses I highlight the 
way in which the theme of ‘uncertainty’ is a factor for both interests and scientific 
evidence because of the interdependence between the two. Uncertainty is inherent in 
science, as discussed in chapter three, and has significant implications for the way in 
which controversy is resolved. As identified by MacKenzie, those who use scientific 
knowledge in making decisions are usually removed from the production of that 
knowledge and so they gloss over the levels of uncertainly existent within it. I show 
from my case studies that this glossing over of uncertainty relates to the interests of 
those individuals involved.
2 MacKenzie, D. (1990) Inventing accuracy: a historical sociology o f  nuclear missile guidance, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA. p370
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This thesis identifies a need to go beyond science when attempting to understand and 
implement the precautionary principle. I finally discuss what this might mean in 
today’s policy culture o f science.
(Un)establishing precaution
In chapter two I identified that the rhetoric of precaution is used in many national and 
international agreements without any express reasoning of what the notion might 
mean in terms of implementation. I demonstrated that although there has been broad 
agreement that the precautionary principle is about taking action even if there is no, or 
insufficient, scientific evidence to link a cause with an effect there has been no 
agreement as to what implementation of the precautionary principle really involves. 
This has left the precautionary principle open to being ascribed any meaning that the 
advocate or critic desires. I have discussed the tensions between lay and expert 
interpretations of precaution in order to give insight into the problem of translating 
common-sense understandings of precaution, as demonstrated through cultural 
proverbs, into a more robust formula for application to more extensive and dispersed 
issues that have relevance for wider society and which are beyond the control of 
individuals. Now I analyse how arguments between actors about what counts as 
evidence and about whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a decision, as 
demonstrated through the two case studies, relate to official definitions o f the 
precautionary principle.
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Six situations of precaution
Reviewing a selection of policy documents and international agreements led me to 
identify six situations in which the precautionary principle is expected to apply.3 
Although scientific evidence is mentioned often in these agreements it is not invoked 
in a uniform manner and I suggested that the precautionary principle fills the vacuum 
created by a science that continually searches for certainty but which continually fails 
to deliver due to the fact that ‘certainty’ is contingent upon agreed assumptions and 
error margins. Science therefore is unable to offer undisputed truth and the 
precautionary principle, as used in official agreements, prompts acknowledgement of 
this.
However, it is not enough to solely identify these features of the precautionary 
principle from policy documentation. In order to examine the concept of precaution in 
the wider policy world with regard to environmental issues it is also necessary to look 
at specific case studies to see what factors are relevant in the deliberations about 
policy action. What follows is a comparison of my two case studies o f radioactive 
waste disposal and endocrine disruption in which I identify five key areas that have 
relevance to understandings of the precautionary principle. Subsequently I discuss the 
connection between the six situations of precaution and these five keys areas of 
comparison described below.
3 See chapter two for a full discussion o f  these situations
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Comparing the Case Studies
The precautionary principle has been mentioned in reference to such diverse issues as 
radioactive waste disposal, endocrine disrupting chemicals, climate change, 
genetically manipulated organisms, BSE and breast implants. Because the 
precautionary principle is so broad and ill-defined it is left to those involved in 
specific debates to shape and define it in accordance to their needs and the needs of 
the issue in question. Whilst it is upheld as a worthy environmental principle, as 
indicated in the agreements reviewed in chapter two, implementation is a localised 
and specific social process. The issue at stake therefore is crucial in determining the 
meaning of the precautionary principle. The question that arises here is Ts there 
anything about a particular issue (for example, radioactive waste or endocrine 
disrupting chemicals) that determines how the precautionary principle is or could be 
implemented?’ It is this question that I attempt to answer in the following section.
In chapters five and six I identified some of the main characteristics of radioactive 
waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals. Some of these characteristics are 
specific to one topic whilst others may apply to both. These similarities and 
differences between the two case studies can be broken down into five key areas: the 
emergence of a ‘problem’; the widespread nature of the problem; the role of 
‘industry’; the extent of institutionalisation; the absence/presence of the precautionary 
principle in deliberations. These aspects are especially relevant for application of the 
precautionary principle to diverse situations. By considering how the problems of 
radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals emerged I establish that 
understanding the history of a problem helps identify what stage that ‘problem’ is at in
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its development and this helps in identifying types of institutions likely to be involved 
in debating it as an issue. By considering the geographical spread of a problem I show 
that the precautionary principle is invoked in diversely affected localities. I look at 
the role that industry plays in deliberations about radioactive waste disposal and 
endocrine disrupting chemicals because this also helps identify the range of voices 
involved and I show that when there is a defined ‘industry’, as in the radioactive waste 
case, it is easier to fix interests according to institutionalised categories. The extent of 
institutionalisation is considered as a separate issue as it has further implications for 
the frameworks within which deliberations take place. Additionally, the degree to 
which ‘the precautionary principle’ itself is discussed within deliberations about 
radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals is considered in 
relation to the outcome of those deliberations.
The emergence of a ‘problem’
The histories of the issues of radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disruption are 
very different. Where radioactive waste disposal has a long history during which 
many public inquiries have been held, many policies been made and re-negotiated, 
and the industry concerned has become narrowly defined, the issue of endocrine 
disruption is emergent with workshops and seminars taking place, policy options 
being discussed and a bounded ‘industry’ being impossible to identify. In this section 
I discuss how the sense of a problem comes about, identifying this with reference to 
the two case studies.
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The question of radioactive waste disposal, as a formalised problem, dates from 19554 
and as such many debates, both public and political, have taken place. Much 
documentation has therefore been produced on the subject, a considerable amount of 
which is in the public domain. In comparison the question of endocrine disruption is 
relatively new although a considerable amount of data has already built up on this 
issue. A distinctive difference is that the radioactive waste debate started at a time 
when secrecy was considered the norm within the nuclear industry due to its military 
history (although this has changed considerably). In contrast, the endocrine disruption 
debate has been held in public (through academic journals, workshops, conferences 
and the media). In terms of the emergence of a problem it has been easier to follow 
the debate about endocrine disruption from its inception than that of radioactive waste 
disposal. A paradox of this is that there is more consensus about what the problems 
with radioactive waste disposal are than there is about what causes endocrine 
disruption.
However, new insights into any issue will always be forthcoming, and these bring 
with them their own inevitable biases and constraints. New information constantly 
challenges old positions so renegotiations are necessary in order to reach a new 
consensus about knowledge positions. This is seen clearly in the case of endocrine 
disrupting chemicals where new research is constantly being commissioned in order to 
try to fill ‘information gaps’ with an ongoing circularity due to the recognition of 
further ‘information gaps’ brought about by the undertaken research. In this way 
information, and hence documentation, increases and the complexity of the problem 
emerges.
4 See Command Paper 9389 (1955),HMSO, London, pp. 22. p4 which says ‘The disposal o f  radioactive 
waste products should not present a major difficulty ... The volume o f waste will be small and great
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As new research is undertaken, so new players become involved in debate about the 
issue in question. The key players in the radioactive waste disposal case are easily 
identified as many have been around for a long time, and within government, industry 
and regulatory bodies, their positions are well established. In contrast the key players 
in the endocrine disruption case are rather more emergent. This is because, at present, 
many of the discussants of endocrine disruption are academics whose area of research 
may be impacted upon by endocrine disrupting chemicals, chemical manufacturers 
whose products and processes are suspects, government officials whose roles include 
regulation of water, food and the environment, and water company spokespersons 
who have a remit to provide safe drinking water and health professionals. There are 
no specific roles (at the time of writing) within government or the regulatory bodies to 
deal with the issue of endocrine disruption and/or endocrine disrupting chemicals. An 
additional contrast is the existence and non-existence of pressure groups campaigning 
about the issues in question. There have long been groups actively campaigning 
against the nuclear industry with CND and CORE working specifically on nuclear 
matters and multi-issue environmental groups such as Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace devoting many resources to anti-nuclear campaigning. In contrast there 
are no single issue groups campaigning specifically about endocrine disruption 
although multi-issue groups such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and WWF are 
devoting more and more resources to the topic.
The above illustrates that the career of a problem can develop in different ways. With 
radioactive waste disposal the key players have been in position for a long time, 
shaping and negotiating the boundaries of the debate. The nuclear industry has 
existed in Britain since the 1940s and the question o f radioactive waste has been
efforts are being made to determine the most economical methods o f storing or disposing o f it’.
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around since then (although not explicitly acknowledged until 1955). Over time, the 
parameters of discussion have changed with lobby groups challenging established 
positions. However, as the Nirex Inquiry illustrated, some subjects are not open to re­
negotiation due to the constraints of specific decision-making fora, such as a public 
inquiry. In contrast the career of the endocrine disruption problem is at an early stage. 
The boundaries o f the debate are still open, although they are being shaped in terms of 
toxicology. The sense o f the problem is emerging through studies identifying 
developmental problems in wildlife and laboratory studies identifying endocrine 
disrupting effects of specific chemicals. With radioactive waste there is a consensus 
that there is a real issue that needs to be managed, but with endocrine disruption there 
is still no consensus that chemicals are the cause of the problem, or even that there is a 
problem at all.
Another factor of significance in understanding the sense of a problem concerns the 
consensus regarding the links between cause and effect. With radioactive waste 
disposal these are more clearly established since there is, to a certain extent, consensus 
as to the health effects of radiation. Therefore, certain health and safety standards 
exist to protect workers within the nuclear industry and emissions quotas exist to limit 
the extent of manmade radiation in the environment. In contrast the health effects of 
potentially endocrine disrupting chemicals are not established and there are no health 
and safety standards for workers specifically related to the endocrine disrupting nature 
of the substances with which they work. Similarly there are no emissions quotas for 
chemicals specifically related to their endocrine disrupting potential.
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Despite there being differences in health and safety standards, studies have shown 
there to be clusters o f leukaemia around nuclear sites5 and reproductive disorders in 
individuals working with particular pesticides.6 Both the nuclear industry and 
manufacturers of chemicals, however, have argued that there is not enough evidence 
to link these effects with their processes and suggest that other factors might be 
involved. For example, the fact that elements other than endocrine disrupting 
chemicals may be involved is used as a reason by chemical manufacturers for 
delaying taking any rapid action regarding banning or phasing out particular 
implicated products.7 There have been suggestions that tight underwear or the fact 
that men spend much more time sitting down now than in the past might be causing 
the observed fall in sperm counts. Phytoestrogens have also been implicated as 
potential causes. Those who advocate immediate action concerning chemicals do not 
refute the idea that these other factors may be involved but do not accept these as 
reasons for not taking actions regarding the chemicals prior to some scientifically 
determined certainty about their effects.8
The above illustrates that what becomes seen as an ‘issue’ arises in different ways 
dependent upon the history of the associated industry, the players involved in debate, 
studies that have already been undertaken and the level of consensus with regard to 
causality. How the career of an issue then develops can depend on the level and range 
of expertise involved. Certain practices may become preferred because of the way the
5 Gardner, M. J., Snee, M. P., Hall, A. J., Powell, C. A., Downes, S. and Terrell, J. D. (1990) British 
M edical Journal 300, 423-429.; Downs, S. (1996) In Nuclear Power: Shut it Down!: an information 
pack on nuclear pow er and the alternatives. Vol /, Vol. 1 (Eds, Crispin, A., Granberg, D. and 
Hildyard, N.) The Ecologist,, pp. 93-96.
6 Watterson, A. (1996) In Effects o f  organochlorines on human health workshop Academic Medical 
Centre, University o f  Amsterdam.; Lindstrom, G. (Ibid.).
7 EMSG (Endocrine Modulators Steering Group) (1998),CEFIC„ pp. 8.; CEFIC (European Chemical 
Industry Council) (1997) In OSPARCOM head o f  delegation meetingCEFIC, London, pp. 4.
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debate has developed and alternatives may be neglected because they fall outside 
conventional ways of thinking. This could be seen with the radioactive waste disposal 
issue until fairly recently when the British Government Panel on Sustainable 
Development recommended that:
‘the Government’s research strategy on radioactive waste should be 
widely based, including intermediate-level waste, and that all options 
for disposal should be explored ... [and] that the Government should 
review the ways in which information is made available and decisions 
are taken...’9
With the endocrine disruption issue still emerging there is the potential to look at a 
range o f possible options from the onset of the debate. However, whether this actually 
happens depends very much on the political climate and the accepted range of 
expertise.
The suggestion is that different environmental ‘issues’ have different careers and that 
at any particular point in time the ‘issue’ of concern is at a particular point along the 
trajectory of a career path. This is not to suggest that every issue of environmental 
concern follows the same trajectory, nor that identifying the point along the trajectory 
of a particular issue’s career will determine how a generic ‘precautionary principle’ 
can be applied to it. However, understanding an environmental issue in terms of its 
career trajectory helps in locating the level o f deliberations about it, the voices 
involved in those deliberations and the influence they have on policy developments. 
Since each environmental issue has a distinctive trajectory the concept of the 
precautionary principle may be invoked at different stages in relation to different
8 Santillo, D., Stringer, R. L., Johnston, P. A. and Allsopp, M. (1998),Greenpeace Research 
Laboratories,, pp. 11.
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issues. This means that the principle must be adaptable to those different situations. 
If something is recognised as an ‘environmental problem’ at an early stage, 
precautionary policy options can be voiced at the onset. At such a point a diverse 
range of precautionary options may be discussed. When an ‘environmental problem’ 
is at a more developed stage, as in the case of radioactive waste disposal, the 
structures of debate have become more institutionalised and so the range of 
precautionary options may be more limited. Deliberations are shaped by 
predetermined paradigms.
The widespread nature of a ‘problem’
A second relevant point of difference between the radioactive waste disposal and 
endocrine disruption cases concerns the geographical location of the ‘problem’. 
Despite the fact that the ‘problem’ of endocrine disruption is still emergent, 
individuals are very close to it in terms of being exposed to chemicals. This is 
because chemicals are ubiquitous and no individual can prevent her or his exposure to 
them. Because radioactive waste is located in specific places the wider public is not 
exposed to its immediate effects, (barring transportation of the waste around the 
country and imports of waste from other countries which subsequently travels through 
populated areas). The argument can be made that the public can distance themselves 
from radioactive waste in a way that they are unable to do with endocrine disrupting 
chemicals.
This again illustrates the extremely varied situations in which the precautionary 
principle is adopted. Exposure to potential hazards may be within or beyond an
9British Government Panel on Sustainable Development (1996),DoE, London, pp. 20. p i 8
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individual’s or community’s control in terms of the ubiquity of the hazard, and 
decisions about the potential hazard may be beyond their control due to the structure 
of frameworks of policy and decision-making. Complementary to the question of 
control is that of detection, namely the ability of an individual to detect whether they 
are being exposed or not. It is not possible for individuals to eliminate their exposure 
to endocrine disrupting chemicals, indeed it may not be possible to limit one’s 
exposure. In contrast, radioactive waste is more localised in terms of its production 
and storage and so some members of the public will be closer to the source of risk 
than others. However in both cases people may not be aware of their exposure due to 
the difficulties o f detection. This highlights another problem that the precautionary 
principle must handle. The question of how many people can be allowed to be 
exposed to a risk before action is taken and the issue of whether a particular risk is 
acceptable is often addressed in scientific terms but can be refrained as a question of 
social acceptability. Establishing a statistical figure for tolerance regarding exposure 
and detection denies the social negotiating that takes place in determining the risk, yet 
the two case studies imply that these social dimensions are critical.
Neither radiation nor endocrine disrupting chemicals can be detected with the naked 
eye and people exposed to either substance may be so unknowingly. This is not to 
suggest that invisible dangers are necessarily more of a hazard than detectable ones 
but rather to highlight the point that many hazards may be unknown to those at 
greatest risk. It is important to note that being invisible to the naked eye does not 
necessarily imply that the hazard is not detectable. A study of the nuclear industry 
shows that it is possible to regulate certain, known ‘invisible’ dangers. With the use 
of scientific measuring devices levels of radiation can be detected and stringent
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regulations have been put into practice regarding radiation levels and safety. This 
contrasts with the case of endocrine disrupting chemicals where screens and tests are 
not readily available to detect hazards that are not detectable with the naked eye 
(although research is under way to develop such tests).
For the implementation of the precautionary principle this demonstrates yet another 
source of difficulty with regard to the use of scientific methods. If a hazard cannot be 
detected with the naked eye then there is a reliance on scientific equipment to make 
the detection. This relies on there existing sophisticated enough equipment for 
harmful levels o f the particular hazard to be detected and this in turn relies on 
judgements as to what counts as harmful (also usually defined in scientific terms).
The role of ‘industry’
As I have already stated, the key players involved in any debate play a determining 
role in defining and bounding how any decision comes about and thus whether it is 
precautionary or not.
With the radioactive waste disposal case study the ‘industry’ is very clearly defined, 
with Nirex pic and BNFL playing central roles and having specific legal 
responsibilities. Proponents and opponents of the ‘nuclear industry’ are readily 
discernible. With the endocrine disruption case study this is not so. Despite the fact 
that chemicals are the main protagonists in the story there is not one clear ‘chemical 
industry’. Chemicals are produced by a wide range of companies for a vast array of 
applications and despite the fact that a chemical industry council (CEFIC) exists in
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order to create one voice, different manufacturers have their own concerns and 
responsibilities. Unlike the ‘nuclear industry’ with its statutory responsibilities with 
regard to radioactive waste, chemicals manufacturers don’t have statutory 
responsibilities with regard to endocrine disruption.
What does this distinction between having an identifiable ‘industry’ or not having one 
tell us about the precautionary principle? Although many of the same names recurred 
at the various workshops and conferences on endocrine disruption, the list of 
institutions involved got longer over time as new research was undertaken and more 
sectors began to see the potential impacts on themselves. The potential ‘industrial’ 
voice has become larger over time in the endocrine disruption case whereas in the 
radioactive waste disposal case industrial interests are stable. As more voices are 
added so the potential for conflict increases, but there is more to it than that.
Many of the people involved in the radioactive waste disposal debate in the UK have 
had the same nuclear training and therefore belong to the same school of thought 
whether they work for the regulators, government or the industry itself. The 
implication is that they all start out with the same basic paradigms and so their 
perspectives are skewed in the same directions. The endocrine disruption debate 
contrasts with this as those involved come from a variety of backgrounds including 
toxicology, chemistry, food science, aquatic research, health and pollution control to 
name a few. Whilst each of these disciplines has its own basic paradigms they are 
sufficiently different to require a more deliberative debate on the issue. This 
difference between the two case studies illustrates that the backgrounds of those 
involved in making decisions can have a large impact on the debate that takes place
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forcing some issues to be minimised at the expense of others. In a situation where the 
majority of players share the same institutional background those who oppose the 
status quo have a more difficult job as they are arguing against an established way of 
thinking. It is apparent from my two case studies that a point of relevance for 
decision-making in general, and therefore for invoking the precautionary principle, is 
that debate is shaped by the established institutions involved and their associated 
paradigms.
The extent of institutionalisation
The fourth relevant comparison between the radioactive waste disposal and endocrine 
disruption case studies is the degree to which ‘decisions’ have been defined and made, 
and the existence or non-existence of a framework for decision-making.
Decisions about radioactive waste disposal have become highly institutionalised, 
being made within established frameworks, such as planning inquiries. In contrast, at 
the time of my fieldwork, decisions about endocrine disruption were emergent and not 
part of established frameworks.
The ultimate decision about the RCF, as discussed in chapter five, was made by the 
Secretary of State after the Planning Inspector at the public inquiry produced his 
report. In that case it was the planning system, laid out by government, which 
determined which voices could be heard and which couldn’t. Some bodies had a 
statutory duty to be involved whilst others were able to present their evidence if  they 
submitted their documents in the proper format at a predetermined time. In contrast
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there is no framework into which decisions regarding endocrine disrupting chemicals 
can slot and no sense even of what these might be. Deliberations have come about 
through conferences and workshops set up by academic institutions, NGOs and 
commercial conference organisers. Government departments have been involved in 
these discussions and debates but they have not established their own frameworks for 
prompting or forcing decisions.10
One factor that has a strong influence on when and how ‘decisions’ come about is the 
state of current government policy. The contrast between policy on radioactive waste 
disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals is stark. Currently there is government 
policy on radioactive waste disposal and none on endocrine disruption with regard to 
chemicals.11 However, in April 1998 the Environment Agency conducted a 
consultation into endocrine disrupting chemicals12 and in July 1998 the DETR 
produced a consultation paper which demanded responses by October 1998.13 This 
shows that policy-making is a dynamic enterprise. Similarly, the House o f Lords 
undertook a review on radioactive waste policy in 1997.14
Policy with regard to these two issues has emerged and developed under different 
political ideologies. Nuclear power was a national industry developed at a time when 
energy self-sufficiency was considered important by the then government. The 
various components of the ‘chemical industry’ developed privately, although it was
10 Since conducting my fieldwork this situation has changed with the European Commission having 
conducted a number o f workshops on the subject o f endocrine disruption. See European Commission - 
Directorate General for Environment, N. S. a. C. P. a. D. G. f. I. (1999) In Industrial chemicals: burden 
o f  the past, challenge fo r  the fiiture( Ed, Commission, E.) European Commission, Brussels, Belgium.
11 I write this as applying at the time o f my fieldwork (1996-1997) as policy is always in a state o f flux 
with adaptations and developments constantly occurring.
12 Environment Agency (1998),The Environment Agency, Bristol, pp. 13.
13 Department o f the Environment, T. a. t. R. (1998),DETR, London, pp. 34.
14 House o f  Lords (1997),, pp. 2.
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encouraged by government policy due to the employment it brought to particular 
regions. Both nuclear power and chemical production are regulated by government 
but the conditions for regulations have changed over time. Chemicals are stringently 
regulated with regard to carcinogenicity but no regulations exist with regard to 
endocrine disruption since this is a relatively newly observed phenomenon. The 
nuclear industry regulates radioactive waste disposal stringently according to the 
radioactivity of the substances to be managed. The guidelines for assessing 
radioactivity relate to a substance’s radioactive and heat producing properties. A 
similarity that can again be detected from these two case studies is the reliance on 
scientific determinants to ascertain the ‘hazardousness’ of a product or process. The 
status o f current policy is the springboard for future policy and this can have a stifling 
effect such that the concept of the precautionary principle may be backgrounded due 
to the way in which existing policy came into being.
The rhetorical absence/presence of the precautionary principle in deliberations
A final point of comparison between the two case studies is the degree to which the 
rhetoric of the precautionary principle has been a part of these deliberations. In the 
case of radioactive waste disposal there was minimal reference to the precautionary 
principle at the Nirex Inquiry whereas with the endocrine disrupting chemicals case 
NGOs were anxious from the beginning to include explicit discussion of the 
precautionary principle in deliberations.
As discussed in chapter five, the Nirex Inquiry centred on a debate about evidence, 
uncertainty and risk. The only explicit reference to the precautionary principle itself
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was made by Greenpeace in order to assert that the site selection process was the 
important relevant factor. In their closing submissions they stated:
‘The choice of a site which is more robust under worst case scenarios 
would fit with the precautionary approach.’15 
Further discussion of the precautionary principle did not become a focal point of the 
inquiry. Instead the inquiry focussed on areas that I identified in chapter two as being 
component parts of rhetorical precaution and deliberations expanded on those.
In contrast the precautionary principle was more explicitly invoked in the endocrine 
disrupting chemicals case study. As shown in chapter six, the NGOs were not 
involved in the initial workshop set up by the Institute for Environment and Health but 
became more involved at the second workshop where they made a concerted effort to 
have acceptance of the precautionary principle a critical part of the agenda. They 
were concerned that the first workshop had focussed on the weight of evidence that 
was available as an indicator of how policy should progress, and they wanted the 
precautionary principle to be more explicitly recognised as a theme in its own right. 
However, despite this subsequent deliberations again focussed on issues of scientific 
evidence, uncertainty and definitions.
Having made this observation I must point out that despite the precautionary principle 
being (effectively) absent from the Nirex Inquiry, nevertheless a decision was 
ultimately made -  that the RCF should not be granted planning permission to be 
excavated. In contrast, at the time of my fieldwork, negotiations about endocrine 
disrupting chemicals were still very much at the deliberations stage and no decision
15 See Haszeldine, R. S. and Smythe, D. K. (Eds.) (1996) Radioactive waste disposal at Sellafield, UK: 
site selection, geological and engineering problems, Glasgow University Print Unit, Glasgow. p202
254
was imminent, despite the explicit invocation of the precautionary principle early on. 
What is clear from both case studies, however, is that the themes I identified as 
component parts of rhetorical precaution in chapter two were component parts of both 
sets of deliberations. In both cases issues of evidence, uncertainty and definitions 
were central to the process.
Five areas of comparison and six situations of precaution
My intention in elaborating on these five areas of comparison between my case 
studies is to illustrate the complexity of situations in which the precautionary principle 
is applied. An environmental issue may be at any position along its career trajectory 
when it becomes seen as a ‘problem’. ‘The precautionary principle’ may be invoked 
at the point when it is recognised as a ‘problem’. The form of ‘invocation’ depends 
on the problem at stake and the level of institutionalisation. As was seen in the 
radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals case studies some 
participants felt that invoking the precautionary principle meant doing more research 
whilst others felt that this was missing the point of precautionary action and advocated 
more interventionist measures. The positions taken reflect institutional, disciplinary, 
political and social interests and, since those involved in deliberations about each new 
environmental ‘problem’ will be different, so the range of alternative implementations 
advocated will also be diverse.
There appears to be no ‘optimum’ time at which it could be said the precautionary 
principle should be implemented since the nature of each problem and the 
institutionalisation of the fora in which deliberations about each problem are made are
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unique and dynamic. Additional to this, there is no universal consensus as to what 
‘the precautionary principle’ is and so it has become a reified term, which is applied in 
a blanket fashion, with the users of the term unsure about what exactly they are 
invoking.
With the aid of diagrams the diversity of situations with which the concept of the 
precautionary principle is faced can be illustrated more clearly. Figure one, below, 
illustrates the relationship between the geographical dispersal o f the ‘problems’ of 
radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals and the level of 
institutionalisation of decision-making.
















As discussed above, endocrine disrupting chemicals are ubiquitous and individuals 
cannot control exposure to them. Radioactive waste, on the other hand is more 
localised and so the environmental ‘problems’ associated with it are located where it 
is created and where it is stored. This places them at opposite ends of figure one. 
However, the institutionalisation of each problem in terms of the decision-making fora 
that exist for deliberating on them is very developed for radioactive waste disposal 
and at a much more emergent stage for endocrine disrupting chemicals. This places 
these issues at opposite ends of the other axis in diagram one. Other issues can also be 
placed on this diagram. Sound pollution, for example, is very localised, similar to 
radioactive waste, but it has a low level of institutionalisation. Heart disease, on the 
other hand, is geographically widespread but has a high level of institutionalisation. 
Therefore it can be seen that endocrine disruption and radioactive waste disposal are 
only two of a much larger population of issues.
Figure two (below) illustrates the direction that scientific uncertainty is currently 
moving for both radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals. The 
institutionalisation of endocrine disruption is currently low and as such the 
understanding of the uncertainties embedded in knowledge about it is low. As 
deliberations open up, more participants are involved and institutionalisation 
increases, so the uncertainties increase. This is because, as more research is 
undertaken and discussed, more uncertainties come to light. However, there appears 
to be a stage, with the radioactive waste issue, at which the level of uncertainties starts 
to decrease. As radioactive waste disposal deliberations have become highly 
institutionalised many uncertainties have come to light, although they have not 
necessarily been resolved.
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Figure two: Scientific uncertainty and institutionalisation of endocrine 









Previously I identified six situations in which ‘the precautionary principle’ is expected 
to apply through looking at documentation that invokes the term precaution. Looking 
at these situations, the importance placed on the existence or non-existence of 
scientific evidence is immediately apparent. The lack of ‘scientific evidence’ is used 
as a criterion in many of the agreements that invoke precaution, although not in a 
uniform manner. Having analysed these situations I suggested that understanding how 
scientific evidence is marshalled and how uncertainty is acknowledged and used is 
key to considering what lies behind the precautionary principle. From comparing the 
case studies five main themes came to the fore. These also indicate a reliance on 
scientific evidence, the specific relevance of which depends on the career of the issue 
and the range of interests at stake. It is this reference to scientific evidence and 
uncertainty that connects the concept of precaution as embodied in official documents 
in chapter two with my analysis of the real-life deliberations surrounding radioactive
258
waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals. From this connection implications 
for implementing the ‘precautionary principle’ can be derived.
Scientific Evidence and Interests
In the following sections I discuss how I rediscovered interests theory through my 
data and its advantages and limitations as an aid to understanding the way in which 
scientific evidence is used in making precautionary decisions about environmental 
problems. Additionally I deconstruct the use of scientific evidence in my two case 
studies in order to open up the question of what factors other than science are 
currently used as the basis for decisions. This shows that we come back to the 
problem of ‘uncertainty’ as an underpinning feature both when deconstructing science 
and when looking at the case studies of radioactive waste disposal and endocrine 
disruption in terms of the interests involved.
Rediscovery of interests
In chapter three I identified six key factors relating to interests theory that are of 
relevance to my research on the implementation of the precautionary principle and I 
now evaluate them in relation to my case studies. These are:
259
a) Scientists’ knowledge-claims embody, or are informed by, social and political 
interests and these may reflect disciplinary, professional and ideological interests 
and objectives.
With reference to the Nirex Inquiry, discussed in chapter five, it is apparent that there 
was a scientific conflict of opinion in respect to the safety of the proposed RCF. I 
have demonstrated that this conflict came about due to the institutional and ideological 
interests and responsibilities of the players involved at the inquiry. Some of this is 
due to statutory responsibilities laid down by law as with the Department of the 
Environment and the Environment Agency which forces a professional framework 
upon the individuals involved. This meant that, for the scientists involved, only 
certain parameters were open for discussion and so they confined their contributions 
to those areas. For other groups, ideological interests and objectives could be seen to 
be more relevant as with Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. Their campaign 
priorities and philosophical beliefs led them to advance evidence in order to reopen 
debates that would otherwise have remained closed. Disciplinary and professional 
interests and objectives could also be seen in the way in which Nirex and BNFL 
handled their evidence at the inquiry. They accepted that the safety question had been 
satisfactorily closed and therefore they provided evidence to indicate that their 
‘science’ was uncontroversial.
My fieldwork on endocrine disruption also indicated disciplinary, institutional and 
ideological interests and objectives. Although a distinct ‘industry’ was not obvious in 
this case, the different players were all drawn from narrow professional groupings. In 
this case all discussants are agreed that scientific knowledge is not at a point where
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consensus has been reached that certain chemicals cause particular effects, but there is 
still a wide range of opinions as to what point scientific knowledge has reached.
Again, government bodies such as MAFF and the Environment Agency are bound by 
the disciplinary frameworks within which government institutions operate and as such 
they view the current state of knowledge about endocrine disrupters as given within 
the scientific disciplines that have produced that knowledge, for example toxicology. 
They then commission further research in response to this previous set of 
‘knowledge’. As with the radioactive waste case, NGOs such as the WWF and 
Friends of the Earth have their ideological interests and objectives which can be seen 
in their unwillingness to accept that there isn’t already enough scientific evidence of a 
problem with chemicals to warrant policy action.
b) The interests approach aims to understand how knowledge is produced as opposed 
to simply understanding what knowledge is taken to exist.
Both case studies illuminate the way in which knowledge is produced, identifying that 
it is through the structures and frameworks that exist or are set up to discuss the issues 
that what is considered ‘knowledge’ comes about. Certainly a public inquiry such as 
the Nirex Inquiry can be seen to be a stage for airing and debating the knowledge that 
is already taken to exist but I would take that further, suggesting that such frameworks 
themselves can produce the ‘knowledge’ by endorsing certain beliefs at the expense of 
others. What may start out as conflicting evidence at a public inquiry is eventually 
summed up as a more certain, ‘known’ knowledge. By looking at the endocrine 
disruption case study, another mechanism by which knowledge is produced is 
identified. In this case what is considered ‘known’ came about by trial and error and
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by developing previous research activities. Some of the studies that discovered 
problems with wildlife and others that discovered endocrine disrupting qualities of 
particular chemicals happened almost accidentally while the researchers were 
studying other interactions.16 What both case studies identified is that the individuals 
involved in discussing radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disruption were 
instrumental in producing the knowledge subsequently debated and that they were 
influenced by the interests and objectives discussed in the above point.
c) The interests approach reasons that knowledge is the result of consensus amongst 
individuals rather than being inherently ‘true’.
This point is also supported by my case studies as I indicated in chapters five and six. 
What is taken to be ‘known’ is a matter for negotiation between key players, at the 
Nirex Inquiry in the case of radioactive waste disposal and in conferences, workshops 
and academic journals in the case of endocrine disruption. Where consensus is 
reached, knowledge is considered to exist. For example, with regard to endocrine 
disruption it is agreed by those involved in the workshops discussed in chapter six that 
in vivo studies provide a more detailed understanding of the mechanisms whereby 
chemicals may cause endocrine disruption than do in vitro studies. The consensus is 
that data produced by replicable in vivo studies is considered to be stronger evidence, 
giving it the position of ‘truth’. In contrast data produced by in vitro studies is not 
considered sufficient in and of itself, despite the fact that in vitro studies can also 
demonstrate endocrine disruption. When looking at ethical debates about animal 
experimentation one common argument is that proving an adverse effect in one
16 See Soto, A. M., Justicia, H., Wray, J. W. and Sonnenschein, C. (1991) Environmental Health 
Perspectives, 92, 167-173.
262
species does not necessarily imply an adverse effect in another species.17 The 
implication of this is that in vivo tests demonstrating endocrine disruption in rats, for 
example, need not necessarily imply endocrine disruption in humans, or conversely 
that in vivo tests showing no endocrine disruption in one species does not imply no 
endocrine disruption in another. This establishes that it is the consensus of the experts 
involved in the endocrine disruption debate that determines what counts as 
‘knowledge’.
The radioactive waste disposal case study also illustrates this point of knowledge 
being a consensus of opinion. The public inquiry provided a platform where all that 
was known about the geology and hydrology of the proposed RCF site near Sellafield 
could be debated. Positions about the geology and hydrology differed and the final 
outcome was that the Secretary of State was not satisfied that there was enough 
consensus of opinion about the safety of the site to allow the RCF to go ahead. Each 
representative who gave evidence at the inquiry spoke from a position o f relative 
expertise, and presented evidence that, within their discipline or institution, was 
considered as closed. When these disparate ‘knowledges’ were brought together it 
was clear that an objective ‘truth’ did not exist and indeed that a consensus may only 
have existed within a select group of individuals. Involving a wider audience meant 
less consensus and so generated a sense of less certain knowledge.
d) The interests approach asserts that frameworks of assumptions, standards, 
purposes and meanings exist which are shared by individuals and which are 
reinforced by conditions within society. Additionally it maintains that science is a
17 See for example LaFollette, H. and Shanks, N. (1996) Brute science: dilemmas o f  animal 
experimentation, Routledge, London and New York.
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social process, which follows a set of procedures in order to modify or elaborate a 
previous theory, and this establishes and reinforces institutional and disciplinary 
interests.
The radioactive waste disposal case and more specifically the Nirex Inquiry illustrates 
very succinctly one such framework in which assumptions, standards, purposes and 
meanings do exist. As discussed in chapter five, many of the individuals involved in 
discussions about radioactive waste disposal come from the same disciplinary 
background. These paradigms are further reinforced by society whose more civil 
frameworks, such as planning inquiries, afford an expertise to those from such 
disciplines. A hierarchy of frameworks can be seen to exist, both scientific and civil, 
which depend upon each other for reciprocal support.
In both case studies, the view of science as a social process can be seen. With 
endocrine disruption, where there is still contention as to what is causing certain 
observed effects, various theories exist as to what the aetiology is. Research is 
continually being undertaken based on these theories in order to gain a further 
understanding of the processes involved. Individuals conducting research into the 
oestrogenic effects of individual chemicals, for example, already work within a 
particular scientific discipline, and this shapes the particular types of experiments and 
fieldwork that is undertaken. For this reason much of the research into endocrine 
disruption has centred around toxicology.
Finance is a major factor in determining the type of research that is undertaken. It is 
apparently easier for scientists to obtain funding that draws upon previously 
‘successful’ research than it is to obtain funding to test new, possibly contentious
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theories. Both my case studies highlighted a commitment to scientific knowledge as 
the arbiter o f controversy, through calls for more scientific research to be undertaken 
in the case of endocrine disruption in order to determine if there is a ‘problem’ and the 
extent of it, and through the use of scientific evidence at the Nirex Inquiry by all the 
participants in order to advance their position. All the research involved in attempting 
to understand endocrine disruption and radioactive waste disposal has attached costs 
which are undertaken in an effort to reduce uncertainty. However, the costs involved 
in undertaking different types of research will influence the research that actually gets 
undertaken due to the limited resources available.
e) Empirical work that follows the interests approach looks at debates over scientific 
‘expertise’ in public settings. The relationships between scientists, power-brokers 
and decision-makers are all involved in the closure of scientific debate.
The empirical work that I conducted into both radioactive waste disposal and 
endocrine disruption looks at debates over scientific ‘expertise’ in public settings. In 
chapters five and six I discuss the ways in which scientific evidence is obtained and 
used and the relationships between the key players involved in those debates. I 
illustrate the interests of scientists, industry spokespersons, government officials and 
campaigners, and suggest that the interaction between them shapes and brings about 
closure of the debate.
f) Advocates of the interests approach show that interests can be identified in all 
forms of scientific knowledge -  discrediting the notion that scientific knowledge 
should and can be purely objective in nature.
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My research has shown that knowledge claims have depended on the disciplines, 
paradigms and institutional affiliations of the individuals involved.
Analysing interests
I use the idea of interests in an unproblematic way in this thesis in order to tell my 
empirical story from a particular perspective. However, if  the interests that I identify 
don’t actually exist or are caused by other phenomena outside of the radioactive waste 
disposal or endocrine disruption debates is it then possible to say they are the cause of 
the positions taken within those debates? This illustrates a circularity in the theory of 
interests. If interests are caused by something external, for example social factors, and 
then they are applied in another context, for example a position on the evidence 
related to radioactive waste, do they then create further interests within the radioactive 
waste debate? The argument from the opposite direction asks what interests caused 
the social interests. If the interests identified are separate and distinct from the 
scientific context which I use them to explain then the same interests should be able to 
explain other areas of scientific conflict. My empirical work shows this to be the case. 
While the actual professional and institutional interests involved in the radioactive 
waste disposal debate and endocrine disruption debate are different it remains the case 
that there are professional and institutional interests at play in both instances.
It is important to recognise that an interests perspective only affords one interpretation 
of the way in which scientific knowledge is produced and the way in which scientific 
evidence is used. In the same way that it is problematic to assume that scientific 
practice is capable of producing an authoritative statement about the world due to the
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uncertainties which are endemic to it, it is similarly problematic to assume that the 
interests which an interests approach identify allow one to produce an authoritative 
statement about the scientific and policy making world. Where recognition of 
interests can help is with an understanding of how uncertainty is defined and used by 
different people in different contexts. However, such recognition does not help with 
resolving those uncertainties or bringing about a consensus.
It may be that I am the one imposing particular interests on the individuals involved 
and that the relationships are more intricate and complex than I can hope to suggest. 
Even so, I believe that the interests approach can help to identify who is regarded as 
an expert and the social and institutional reasons for why this is the case. In my two 
case studies I have identified interests through knowing something of the backgrounds 
of the institutions and organisations discussed, through knowing something of their 
institutional agendas, and through taking respondents’ own observations at face value. 
Other approaches, for example Actor Network Theory, may give an alternative picture 
of the involvement of all the actors, both human and non-human, but I would suggest 
that an advantage of looking at expertise from an interests perspective is that it offers 
a simplified analysis of decision-making processes and therefore provides a useful 
baseline for further enquiry.
It is important to note that interests are not static, unchanging attributes that can be 
attached to particular entities like labels. They will develop and change depending on 
context and situations. Therefore when individuals take up certain roles and positions 
their interests may change accordingly. This is not something that is denied through 
my empirical work as it is the institutional and disciplinary interests that I show to be
267
at work in shaping positions. I have looked at a static snapshot of time with regard to 
the two case studies and within that snapshot it is possible to regard the interests as 
fixed as the individuals involved have defined roles and responsibilities. I have, 
however, placed considerable emphasis on the notion that problems and issues have 
careers, and that levels of institutionalisation, and the range and types of interests 
involved change over time.
Adherence to scientific evidence
Above I have looked at the way my empirical research is illuminated by interests 
theory, thereby showing the importance interests have in making decisions about the 
two environmental problems of concern in this thesis. I now look into why so much 
importance is placed on scientific evidence both in relation to the meaning of the 
precautionary principle and within disputes about radioactive waste disposal and 
endocrine disruption.
When discussing the precautionary principle the subject of sufficient scientific 
evidence comes up again and again, both at the level of official documentation and in 
relation to specific environmental issues. One of the main distinctions made in the 
various agreements discussed in chapter two, and between those discussing what 
action should be taken in the radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disruption 
cases, is the strength of causality that is required and how it should be determined. 
Some individuals argue that action should not be taken before aetiology is established 
whereas others argue that precaution means to take action before causality is 
determined. Even if a link between cause and effect is not already established many
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suggest that it must be plausible that a link could exist before action can be taken.
This is more difficult to reach agreement on as different individuals have different 
interpretations of levels o f evidence that they would find sufficient to indicate that 
link. Measures of risk are often used to help determine what action is appropriate in 
particular situations. However risk analysis itself is open to criticism. Additionally, if 
risk is well understood, action is preventative rather than precautionary.
Scientific evidence is obtained through various forms of research. This itself imposes 
limits on what can be discovered, thus adding to the uncertainties and indeterminacies 
at stake. Researchers in the UK who have been studying endocrine disruption have 
been focusing on identifying the specific effects of particular pollutants, for example
1 Rstudying the femmisation of fish downstream of sewage effluent plants.
Additionally, other research is looking at whether there is a trend in reduced sperm 
counts and other reproductive disorders, especially in males.19 In contrast, in the US 
the USEPA has set up a committee to identify a battery of screens and tests to check 
chemicals against in order to identify which ones are endocrine disrupting. Both the 
UK and the US are looking for scientific evidence of a problem but are going about it 
in different ways. The UK is attempting to identify environmental effects in the field, 
of chemicals that are already dispersed in the environment and trying to associate
18 See Purdom, C. E., Hardiman, P. A., Bye, V. J., Eno, N. C„ Tyler, C. R. and Sumpter, J. P. (1994) 
Chem Ecol, 8, 275-285. and Desbrow, C., Routledge, E., Sheenan, D., Waldock, M. and Sumpter, J. 
(1996),MAFF Fisheries Laboatory and Bmnel University, Bristol, pp. vi, 65, xi.
19 See Montague, P. (1997),Montague, Peter.
Sharpe, R. M. and Skakkebaek, N. E. (1993) The Lancet, 341, 1392-1395.; Irvine, S., Cawood, E., D, 
R., E, M. and J, A. (1996) British M edical Journal, 312, 467-471.
Carlsen, E., Giwercman, A., Keiding, N. and Skakkebaek, N. E. (1992) Ibid., 305, 609-613.
Auger, J., Kuntsman, J. M., Czyglik, F. and Jouannet, P. (1995) New England Journal o f  Medicine, 
332,281-285.
Irvine, D. S. (1994) British M edical Journal, 309, 476.
Ginsburg, J., Okolo, S., Prelevic, G. and Hardiman, P. (1994) Lancet, 343, 230.
The Lancet Editorial (1995) The Lancet, 345, 933-935.
Institute for Environment and Health (1997),Institute for Environment and Health, Leicester, pp. 5. 
Sexton, S. (1993) The Ecologist, 23, 212-218.
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these effects with certain causes. In contrast, the US is undertaking laboratory studies 
to determine a set of characteristics whereby individual chemicals can be determined 
endocrine disrupters or not. This illustrates that different scientific approaches are 
possible and shows how one issue, endocrine disruption, can be framed as a different 
type of scientific problem. The main point here is that scientific evidence is being 
looked for in each case although at a different stage within the boundary of the 
problem.
If the UK strategy is followed and the scientific evidence that is being searched for is 
found, the next step is that more evidence will be demanded, possibly along the lines 
o f the scientific research being undertaken in the US. However, one difficulty with 
the US approach is that tests and screens for identifying all the possible permutations 
that chemicals take may not be developed, thus prolonging the time spent undertaking 
research in order to obtain scientific evidence on which to base decisions and working 
out what those might be.
The availability of evidence in itself is not sufficient to determine a decision. How it 
is contextualised and presented also determines outcomes. Even when meanings of 
evidence are formalised, as at a public inquiry, the questions remain unanswered as to 
what constitutes sufficient evidence and how much evidence is enough.
Chemical manufacturers advocate further research to determine whether there is 
actually a problem at all. In contrast pressure groups state that there is already 
evidence that certain chemicals are causing reproductive problems in humans and
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wildlife and that these chemicals should be phased out and replaced immediately.20 
Although many of my interviewees talked about the need for sufficient evidence 
before action could be taken, none were actually willing to state what that might be. 
The above sections on interests and scientific evidence show that both these factors 
are of great relevance to a discussion on the precautionary principle because they both 
affect the way in which decision-making is organised and the positions taken on 
particular issues. However, of themselves neither an understanding of interests 
involved nor the meanings of scientific evidence can help us to implement the 
precautionary principle. They can only help us to understand how controversies are 
shaped and decisions are made. While this may appear to be very limiting it actually 
offers a great insight into the obstacles standing in the way of understanding the 
precautionary principle.
Interests, evidence and implementation
Having made comparisons between the two case studies of radioactive waste disposal 
and endocrine disruption, and having looked at written agreements that invoke 
precaution, I have been able to identify the relationship between the empirical use and 
the rhetorical use of precaution. Both ‘empirical precaution’ and ‘rhetorical 
precaution’ rely heavily on science as a proposed arbiter of disputes involving 
uncertainty. Both imply that the precautionary principle is not any one thing but is 
created each time is it invoked. This relationship between the empirical and rhetorical 
use of precaution brings together the use of scientific evidence and the interests 
involved in particular issues. The actual interests (i.e. professional, disciplinary, and
20 See Greenpeace (1996b) Taking back our stolen future: hormone disruption and PVC plastic, 
Greenpeace, London.
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institutional) and the scientific evidence (i.e. related to the subject) used in each case 
are very different but my explanation of their relevance is the same. The defining 
reason why the precautionary principle is so difficult to implement is because of the 
scientific uncertainties inherent within the ‘knowledge’ of the issues of concern. 
Written agreements pertaining to the precautionary principle advocate use of 
precaution without addressing how it can be implemented and managed. Looking at 
two particular issues demonstrates that scientific evidence is again a centrally 
contentious issue and that this contention is shaped by the interests of those involved. 
The scientific evidence presented in each debate, as illustrated in chapters five and six, 
is so full o f uncertainties that decisions come about through the consensus of those 
involved rather than because some inherent ‘truth’ becomes known.
This is key to understanding what the precautionary principle might mean in practice. 
If we accept that decisions are currently made through consensus reached by 
negotiation between interest groups, and not through common reference to an agreed 
body of scientific knowledge, then we can start looking at alternative factors that 
might be used as a basis for implementation. Accepting a move away from the 
rhetoric of scientific evidence and from the determination of cause and effect is the 
first stage in attempting to define what precautionary action might be.
One suggestion of how the precautionary principle might be implemented is by 
reversing the burden of proof.21 There might certainly be benefits to doing this as the
Greenpeace (1996a),Greenpeace, London, pp. 32.
21 The idea o f reversing the burden o f proof transfers responsibility to the polluter to prove their actions 
are not detrimental to the environment. See Bodansky, D. (1991) Environment, 33, 4-5 & 43-45. 
Bodansky, D. (1994) In Interpreting the Precautionary' Principle^Eds, O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J.) 
Earthscan Publications Ltd, London, pp. 203-228.
Jackson, T. and Taylor, P. J. (1992) Chemistry and Ecology, 7, 123-134.
O'Riordan, T. (1992),CSERGE, Norwich, pp.’31.
onus would then be on the polluter to justify their actions. However, this would 
require a pre-determined level of safety to be established. This once again brings in 
the question of evidence and what would constitute sufficient evidence that safety had 
been demonstrated. If safety is measured in scientific terms this would entrench 
implementation of precaution once more in the rhetoric of science and certainty. I 
suggest therefore that reversing the burden of proof is not in itself a suitable way of 
implementing the precautionary principle.
Another suggestion has been to look at the potential risks associated with an issue, 
product or process and to determine how large those risks are.22 Risk can be gauged 
in many different ways, Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) and Risk Assessment (RA) 
being two common methods of calculation. Both have drawbacks that make them 
unsuitable as a ways of applying the precautionary principle. Both CBA and RA rely 
on quantitative analysis. CBA involves putting a price on activities and the things 
they affect in order to determine whether something is valuable or invaluable. RA 
relies on obtaining numerical statistical data, involving calculations of probabilities to 
determine how high a risk is. Such methodologies assume that these statistics can be 
determined and again reinforce decision-making based on scientific evidence and 
measurements. This therefore excludes CBA and RA as suitable ways of applying the 
precautionary principle.
O'Riordan, T. and Jordan, A. (1995) Environmental Values, 4, 191-212.
Cross, F. B. (1996) Washingon and Lee Law Review, 53, 851-925??
Jordan, A. and O'Riordan, T. (1998),CSERGE„ pp. 24.
22 See for example Department o f the Environment (1995) A guide to risk assessment and risk 
management fo r  environmental protection, HMSO, London, and Gibson, S. B. (1976) Journal o f
Occupational Accidents, 1, 85-94.
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Risk can also be gauged as a judgement, and judgement can be based on levels of 
social-wellbeing which could be derived by judging the scale of the impact of the 
activity concerned. The impact could be judged as the number o f people who would 
potentially be affected, or it could be judged in terms of the geographical range within 
which the effects could be felt. However, this also relies on assumptions about cause 
and effect in relation to pathways of effects and so we’re back once again to a reliance 
on scientific evidence.
This suggests that in order for the precautionary principle to mean something we have 
to go beyond science in some way, although from the above we can also see just how 
entrenched in science our way of thinking is. In the following section I discuss the 
potential for going ‘beyond science’ and what that means for implementing the 
precautionary principle.
Precaution Beyond Science
This chapter has shown how deeply our decision-making is entrenched in the use of 
science and the quest for certainty and it has also demonstrated how fruitless that 
quest is due to the interests that shape what is regarded as ‘scientific knowledge’.
Here I attempt to look at what going beyond science might mean for the precautionary 
principle, although I do not claim to provide answers to the question of what 
implementation of the precautionary principle should actually look like. I do not 
believe a structured set o f rules can exist whereby the precautionary principle can be 
said to have been implemented although I do believe that frameworks of deliberation
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and policy-making can be created that are more sympathetic to precautionary courses 
of action.
Considering once again the issue of scientific evidence a host of questions can be 
derived. If an agreement on what constitutes sufficient evidence is not reached, 
individuals will none the less still be exposed to risk. The actual risk faced is not 
dependent on consensus about the nature or scale of the risk. Does it make a 
difference for the precautionary principle whether a select number of localised 
individuals are exposed to a problem, as in the radioactive waste case, as opposed to 
everyone being exposed, as in the chemical case? Is more precautionary action 
required in situations where individuals cannot control their own exposure to risks and 
hazards? Does the precautionary principle imply finding an acceptable exposure 
which is harmless and is it actually possible to find an exposure which is harmless? 
What does it mean if there is no exposure which is harmless and the exposure is 
continued indefinitely? Who becomes responsible for the consequences of such 
exposures? Who has the authority to set risk limits? Are these legally and/or morally 
justifiable? Doesn’t justification rely on scientific evidence also? Are dangerous 
substances acceptable, or more acceptable, if they exist within closed systems and 
never leave those closed systems? Are such closed systems possible to create? How 
might such a closed system be disposed of? This set of questions is a sub-set of an 
infinite array which arise when considering the issue of sufficient evidence in relation 
to the precautionary principle. They open debate about the type of issue as a matter of 
importance. Part of the challenge for those implementing the precautionary principle 
is to be aware of the questions and issues it raises and to be ready to make decisions
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before having all the answers. This makes the precautionary principle a political 
rather than a scientific tool.
By looking at the two case studies of radioactive waste disposal and endocrine 
disruption it is obvious that commercial interests are a distinctive feature. Could this 
be a starting point for invoking the precautionary principle? The identification of 
commercial interests surrounding an issue means that the product or process in 
question is being driven by profit motivation. This may exclude factors such as social 
well-being, social need or social good.
We need to consider whether the argument about social benefits is valid. For 
example, would quality of life get better or worse if  certain industries (or the 
contentious aspects of them) were closed down? Should implementation of the 
precautionary principle be governed by economic justifications of particular courses 
of action, or is it constrained by economic justification? How would social benefits be 
measured and does this bring cost-benefit analysis back into the picture? When are 
environmental policies in opposition to economic interests? Is cost always a limiting 
factor?
Talk about commercial interests and profit motivation raises the subject of costs and 
benefits which is also a qualifying factor mentioned in many of the agreements 
discussed in chapter two. This has implications for the way in which the 
precautionary principle can be applied more generally. The commercial prevalence of 
particular industries and products will determine the wider effects that policy 
measures directed at them will have. This means that economic justifications will be
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used both to promote and to oppose any such measures. This raises another issue of 
the balance of weight between economic considerations and health, safety and 
environmental issues.
The above demonstrates a plethora of questions that arise when considering what the 
precautionary principle means and when attempting to untangle how judgements can 
be made about implementing it. Perhaps ‘judgement’ itself is the key. If it were to be 
acknowledged and accepted that in policy decisions judgement should be an ethical or 
moral judgement then individuals involved in making decisions would be freer to 
openly voice their interests and values and the process would not be constrained by 
attempts to portray it as objective and scientific.
One way of moving towards this type of judgement is to stop looking at issues about 
the fundamental certainty of science and to start looking at who makes decisions and 
what their reasons are for involvement. Once interests are established, questions can 
be raised about what are the excluded interests in particular instances. Precaution is 
not just about scientific uncertainty, it is also about social good -  what kind of world 
we want and what risks we are prepared to take -  and ultimately about who decides.
However, the question arises as to whether it is possible for the precautionary 
principle to supersede manipulation by interests at the level of decision-making.
Won’t interests also appear in judgements based on ethics and morals? I would 
suggest that the interests associated with these factors are more explicit since ethics 
and morals are intrinsically value laden. Therefore such interests are not hidden in 
rhetoric of certainty and objectivity as they are in decisions based on science.
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Establishing ethical judgement as a legitimate ground for decision-making allows for 
less ‘scientific’ parameters to be evaluated. For example, one way of evaluating a 
product or process is to look at the concept of need. This is potentially a narrow 
parameter as there are many things that cannot be said to be ‘needed’ but which 
society has become used to and which are therefore seen as expedient and necessary. 
Substitutability with alternatives is often suggested in relation to problematic products
99and processes but this brings us full circle with the alternatives themselves coming 
under the same scrutiny as that for which they are a substitute.
It is apparent that something far more radical than has been suggested so far is 
necessary in order to embed precaution into environmental decision-making. A major 
restructuring and reordering of decision-making processes themselves with an explicit 
acknowledgement of the limitations of the decisions that can be made with 
indeterminacy being waved as a banner at all times is in order. The challenge is not 
how to make decisions based on uncertainty but rather how to review the whole 
system of making decisions and what it is to make a decision.
The above calls for a move towards a system that does not view science as the 
arbitrator of decisions and does not assume that such evidence will eventually be 
forthcoming. It challenges the economic views of profit as necessarily good and 
demands an equal platform for voicing opinions about social well-being. It allows 
that ethical judgements are legitimate factors in making decisions.
23 An example is Greenpeace’s demands for the substitution o f  PVC - Greenpeace (1996a),Greenpeace, 
London, pp. 32.
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The implication is there is no fixed formula for implementing the precautionary 
principle because there is no general consensus as to what ‘the precautionary 
principle’ means and so each case and situation will have to be judged on its own 
merits and terms. However, what analysing the precautionary principle does show is 
that it is the frameworks in which decisions are made that need to be restructured 





In this concluding chapter I review the argument of the thesis, taking the reader 
through the rhetorical evolution of precaution, explaining the power of ‘interests 
theory’ as a way of analysing scientific controversy and consensus forming, and 
highlighting my conclusions about the precautionary principle based on case studies 
on radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals. I show that the 
career trajectory of an environmental issue and the extent o f institutionalisation of fora 
of deliberation shape what the precautionary principle means in practice. I show that 
the precautionary principle is not one thing, but comes into being as it is applied.
In this chapter I also reflect on the limitations of the thesis, identifying constraints due 
my own approach to the project and the methodology I used. Finally, I look at the 
different contributions this work makes to its various audiences. I look at the 
implications it has for an academic audience in terms of interests theory, the concept 
o f scientific evidence and most relevantly, the precautionary principle; I review its 
relevance for Friends of the Earth in terms of their campaigning interests; and for a 
corporate audience in terms of its implications for policy-making.
Review of Thesis
I began by analysing the way the rhetoric of precaution is used within policy 
documents. By focusing on the constituent ideas behind the precautionary principle I 
moved beyond the stalemate position of taking the rhetoric to be the focus of attention 
itself. I identified a recourse to scientific evidence as the arbiter in precautionary
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decision-making at this level and I suggested that understanding how scientific 
evidence is marshalled and how uncertainty is acknowledged and used is key to 
considering what lies behind the precautionary principle.
In chapter three I developed an argument about the relationship between academic 
literature on uncertainty and literature on interests. I showed that of three different 
types of uncertainty identified by O’Riordan and Cameron1 (lack of data, variability of 
process and indeterminacy) indeterminacy is the most complex and least understood 
and that due to it science cannot always provide answers for policy makers to use in 
determining policy. Pinch2 claims that norms and relationships are assumed in all 
specialist fields and these may appear to specialists in other fields to be wild 
assumptions that are translated as uncertainties. Those making policy decisions have 
none of this specialised expertise and yet must use the available science with its 
inherent norms and relationships as a basis for their decisions. The differences 
between those close to the knowledge production, those distant from it and those 
committed to using the knowledge are recognised by MacKenzie3 in his analysis of 
the ‘certainty trough’ where he shows the way uncertainty is handled by those 
different groups. To put the idea of the ‘certainty trough’ into practice I address the 
question of expertise and who is considered ‘expert’. Webster4 argues that expertise is 
associated with broad ideological positions favouring certain interests above others.
He implies that scientific advisors anticipate political positions and offer expert advice 
accordingly.
1 O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds) (1994). Interpreting the Precautionary Principle. London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd.
2 Pinch, T.J. (1981). The Sim-Set: the presentation o f certainty in scientific life. Social Studies o f  
Science 11,(1): 131-158.
3 MacKenzie, D. (1990). Inventing accuracy: a historical sociology o f  nuclear missile guidance. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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In reviewing a selection of literature from the sociology of science I suggested that the 
important question is why scientists and policy makers behave as they do. I argued 
that the uncertainties embedded in scientific knowledge are managed in ways which 
reflect the interests of those constructing and interpreting that knowledge, and I have 
shown how the ‘Interests Approach’ of the Edinburgh School elucidates the dynamics 
of scientific controversy. Bloor,5 one of the original advocates of the interests 
approach, argues that empirical studies must be undertaken in order to identify the 
interests that shape the construction of scientific knowledge. I have suggested that the 
interests approach can be extended to offer a perspective which looks beyond internal 
scientific debates, and which offers a useful angle from which to view debates over 
scientific ‘expertise’ in public settings, such as public inquiries.
While Woolgar6 criticises users of interests theory for imposing their own 
interpretations of the desires they identify during empirical research, this must be 
contextualised. Regulations and legislation reflect shared cultural norms and these 
impact on the social spheres in which individuals and organisations operate.
Collective convention attributes desires and interests to individuals and organisations 
in specific circumstances and interests theory recognises these processes, using the 
outcomes (i.e. a catalogue of positions) to help understand the nature of negotiation 
and consensus forming in decision-making. In my research some of the interests 
identified were related directly by the individuals interviewed whilst others were 
suggested by third parties. In defence of my use of interests theory I asserted, in 
chapter three, that all theory is about constructing an explanation for observed
4 Webster, A. (1991). Science, technology> and society. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd.
5 Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and Social Imagery. London, Henley and Boston: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul.
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phenomenon and so the use of interests theory represents no more of a value 
judgement by the analyst (me) than were I to have chosen any other perspective. I 
concluded that while there are many other theoretical perspectives that I could have 
drawn upon, my data shows that ideas of interests can be useful when trying to 
analyse sites of scientific controversy and consensus forming.
In chapter four I discussed the reasons for choosing radioactive waste disposal and 
endocrine disrupting chemicals as case studies and concluded that these two studies 
provided examples of the contrasting range of problems and situations that advocates 
o f the precautionary principle would face. I defended my choice of semi-structured 
interviews on the grounds that it gave my interviewees the opportunity to talk about 
issues they felt were relevant without me necessarily directing them in the way that 
questionnaires or structured interviews may have. This related clearly to my 
theoretical use of interests theory as it meant that interviewees’ interests were 
expressly identified by themselves or suggested by other interviewees, thus addressing 
one criticism levelled at interests theory, that the researcher identifies predetermined 
interests of their own invention. Also in chapter four, I explained how I selected my 
interviewees, a combination o f their involvement in deliberations about the issues of 
radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals or their having contacts 
with Friends of the Earth. I interviewed people from a broad range of organisations in 
order that I had representations from a range of different interest groups and in order 
that I didn’t miss any important voices.
6 Woolgar, S. (1981). Interests and explanation in the social study o f science. Social Studies o f  Science 
11:365-394.
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In chapters five and six I focus on the concepts of scientific evidence and uncertainty, 
as these are issues around which deliberation takes place. This reframes the emphasis 
from looking at ‘the precautionary principle’, about which there is little detailed 
discussion. While the ‘precautionary principle’ isn’t the subject of explicit debate, its 
constituent components definitely are. Time and again, questions of evidence and 
uncertainty were factors that the involved actors considered relevant to their 
deliberations. This reconciles the issues behind the ‘rhetorical precaution’ discussed 
in chapter two and the issues analysed through the case studies.
In chapter five I reviewed the cast o f players involved in debate about radioactive 
waste disposal, and showed that how public decisions are made and the way in which 
controversies are closed depends on institutional arrangements and their attendant 
interests. In this case, I established that interests are broadly split along the 
institutional lines of government, industry and non-governmental organisations 
despite there being differences within these groups. Through looking at ‘the nature of 
evidence’ I showed how definitions of radioactive waste and associated concepts are 
created and used by the different players, and how these polarise according to both the 
interests and values of the players involved within the public inquiry framework. I 
concluded that definitions, re-definitions and non-definitions are used emotively by 
different ‘voices’ and interest groups according to their own agendas and that those 
who manage to influence the dominant definition put themselves in a stronger position 
by setting the terms of subsequent debate. Finally I discussed the actual framework of 
a public inquiry showing how decisions are negotiated and agreements reached, 
concluding that it measurably, if  inadvertently, frames debates and agendas in 
particular ways.
Chapter six examined the very different case of endocrine disruption. Again I focused 
on the ‘nature of evidence’ (encompassing definitions o f sufficiency and types of 
uncertainty), interests, and decision-making processes as key areas in which 
precautionary issues dominate decision-making. I showed that precise definitions of 
the problem of endocrine disruption and its causes are a construction o f a realist 
discourse that provides an impression of objectivity. I established that the players 
involved in the endocrine disruption debate cannot be broken down into the same 
institutionalised groupings as in the radioactive waste disposal debate and that a 
bounded ‘industry’ voice is not so apparent. Finally, I examined the framework of 
policy-making on the subject of endocrine disruption in the UK and concluded that 
‘policy’ related to this issue is at an early stage of formation. So far, there is only a 
patchwork o f existing research data and legislative requirements. I showed that the 
focus of debate on this issue was narrowed from the beginning due to the selective 
range of voices invited to participate in key workshops (organised by the Institute for 
Environment and Health at Leicester University on behalf of the Department of the 
Environment) the purpose of which was to identify gaps in knowledge about 
endocrine disruption in order to inform policy decisions. This ensured that debate was 
framed within the conventional scientific paradigm, and imposed an order on an 
otherwise wide-ranging field.
In chapter seven I analysed and compared the cases studies o f radioactive waste 
disposal and endocrine disrupting chemicals in order to answer the question ‘what is 
involved in applying the precautionary principle to such contrasting areas of 
environmental concern?’. I argued that the career o f an environmental problem can 
develop in different ways and that precaution means different things depending on the
stage at which the ‘problem’ is being addressed. What is seen as a ‘problem’ arises in 
different ways and depends upon such factors as the history of the associated industry, 
the players involved in debate about the issue, and research studies that have already 
taken place. Additionally I showed that the established frameworks through which 
decisions are made may be inclusive or exclusive.
I also identified the implications of the extent of ‘institutionalisation’ for 
implementation of the precautionary principle. Where an ‘industry’ can be defined (as 
in the radioactive waste case) an ‘industrial’ voice can be heard, creating an 
‘industrial’ position from which to negotiate. Without an ‘industry’ so clearly defined 
the range of voices is much increased. What implementation of the precautionary 
principle will mean in specific cases will be determined by the range of voices, due to 
the diversity of interests associated with them. I uncovered the way scientific 
evidence and the interests of individuals and institutions combine in current debates 
and decisions. Through deconstructing the use of scientific evidence in my two case 
studies and observing the interests involved I uncovered the problem of ‘uncertainty’ 
as an underpinning feature. I showed that neither understanding interests nor 
understanding the meanings of scientific evidence in themselves help in implementing 
the precautionary principle. However, they do help in understanding how 
controversies are shaped and decisions are made, thereby highlighting some of the 
obstacles facing implementation of the precautionary principle. A simple view would 
be that these contextual features create obstacles impeding the ready implementation 
of the precautionary principle. By demonstrating that decisions reflect the outcome of 
negotiation amongst individuals each of whom have associated interests, and that 
decisions do not therefore represent the simple expression of scientific ‘truth’, I set the
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stage for looking for alternative ideas about what constitutes precaution and what it 
might mean to implement the precautionary principle.
I concluded that although a structured set of rules cannot be created whereby ‘the 
precautionary principle’ can be said to have been implemented, frameworks of 
deliberation and policy making influence interpretations o f precautionary courses of 
action.
I demonstrated that an infinite number of questions can be asked when attempting to 
look at the precautionary principle from the perspective of scientific evidence because 
all questions asked bring forth further questions rather than answers. I suggested that 
the key may be in understanding ‘judgement’ and in accepting the subjective nature of 
judgement as an integral part of making decisions. Precaution is about social good, 
the kind of world we want and the risks we are prepared to take, and ultimately about 
who decides what, and how.
My central contention is that the precautionary principle exists only as it is invoked 
and applied in practice. Reviewing formal agreements that invoke the precautionary 
principle exposes tensions that exist about understandings and applications o f 
scientific evidence on a rhetorical level. I suggest that decisions based on the 
precautionary principle are the theoretical corollary of decisions based on a 
necessarily uncertain science. Looking at scientific evidence and the factors related to 
it from the perspective of two contrasting case studies (radioactive waste disposal and 
endocrine disrupting chemicals ) I argued that the interests of individuals and 
organisations influence positions adopted in the process of making decisions. I have
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shown that the way scientific evidence is presented depends on interpretations of 
relevance and significance and that these reflect institutional and political affiliations, 
interests due to affiliations to disciplinary paradigms, and interests related to the wider 
cultural and societal associations of those involved. Uncertainties are embedded in 
scientific knowledge and I have shown that different interpretations o f uncertainty co­
exist. Like Jasanoff,71 suggest, interpretations of scientific evidence and uncertainty 
are significantly filtered by the political interests of individuals who have their own 
paradigms and realities.
Through looking at the way in which scientific knowledge was invoked in the two 
case studies, I was able to uncover the interests and the institutional framing of debate 
involved in both cases. From this position I was able to argue that the interests at play 
depend on the disciplinary and institutional background of those involved. Although 
the actual interests were not the same in both cases, it could be seen that the interests 
that did exist shaped the development of debates. Having uncovered the way in which 
scientific evidence was used in both cases and the way in which scientific uncertainty 
was highlighted or minimised depending on who was presenting evidence, I then 
argued that since interests and uncertainty are bound together so closely, it is wrong to 
see the precautionary principle as an ‘external’ criteria for decision-making. Having 
looked at two situations where the ‘career’ of the issue is at different stages, and 
where decision-making is therefore at different stages, I showed that definitions of 
precaution were themselves contested, and that such definitions formed part o f the 
‘career’ of the issues at stake, i.e. radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disruption.
7 Jasanoff, S. (1987). Contested boundaries in policy-relevant science. Social Studies o f  Science 17, 
(12): 195-230.
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In sum, precaution is contested, contextual and situational in a way that no one 
principle can accommodate. I conclude that there is a tension between the 
precautionary principle that policy makers are seeking to implement, that being a 
reified, codified entity, and what is actually happening in practice where component 
aspects of precaution (scientific evidence, uncertainty and definitions) are being 
deliberated in relation to specific issues. I discuss the implications of this for different 
audiences below.
Limitations of the Thesis
In this section I want to address the limitations of this thesis. Firstly, I attempt to be 
reflexive about my work, drawing out the limitations brought about by my own 
involvement in the research as well as those brought about due to my theoretical 
perspective. Secondly, I discuss the methodological limitations of the data I obtained 
and my methods of data collection. In this part I discuss further research that could be 
undertaken and the value that other studies might have in understanding the 
implementation and interpretation of the precautionary principle.
Reflecting on my approach
Woolgar8 is concerned that proponents of interests theory are not reflexive enough 
about the interpretation they themselves put on the knowledge they examine. He 
wants researchers to demonstrate their awareness of their role as the constructor of the 
explanation for the knowledge event being evaluated. In this section I attempt to be
reflexive about my own involvement with my research and also say something about 
the limitations of interests theory.
This research started due to my own interest in environmental matters and my desire 
to undertake research that would be of interest and benefit to those seeking to protect 
the environment. I wanted to contribute something that helped and promoted the 
environmental agenda. Additionally, the case studies that I chose, although having 
concrete academic reasons for doing so, were chosen because of my own interest in 
those areas. These personal reasons I have talked about more in the introduction to 
the thesis. I am very aware that I have a personal interest in the data that I obtained in 
my empirical work. Through writing, reading and re-writing my thesis I was able to 
reduce this bias although I would never suggest that I have no influence on the result. 
One example of this is that I was very wrapped up in identifying an ‘industrial’ voice 
in the endocrine disruption case study simply because I had identified such a voice in 
the radioactive waste disposal case study. It took a lot of looking at the data, 
analysing it and questioning myself before I was able to see that such a voice did not 
exist in this case. Realising this made me recognise that the precautionary principle 
was a relative concept and forced me to consider new ways of thinking about 
decision-making and the uses of science.
One of the difficulties with suggesting that different groups use and interpret scientific 
evidence in different ways (for example depending on their interests) is that those 
interests are identified by me, the researcher. It is impossible to determine whether 
this is only one of many possible alternative ‘logical’ explanations. As I stated in
8 Woolgar, S. (1981). Interests and explanation in the social study o f science. Social Studies o f  Science 
11:365-394.
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chapter seven I have identified ‘interests’ in my case studies through knowing 
something of the backgrounds of the institutions and organisations discussed, and 
through knowing something of their institutional agendas. However, one limitation of 
interests theory is that it fails to show the direction of causality. It is possible to say 
that the interests identified shed light on the possible strategies involved in the 
alternative uses of scientific evidence but it is not possible to say which came first.
The interests approach does however help by highlighting the different perspectives 
from which knowledge can be created and understood. By describing my empirical 
work from an interests perspective I deploy one way of looking at knowledge in use. 
The point is that there is no ‘true’ way of looking at and using knowledge, only 
interpretations. Knowledge is represented according to the theoretical position of the 
interpreter. Therefore, while interests theory has its limitations, the same is true of 
other theoretical positions. Since this thesis was never primarily about testing the 
value of different theoretical positions, all I want to say here is that I am aware of the 
limitations of using one theoretical perspective, but that it would take a different type 
of research to test the value of alternative theories.
Limitations of methodology
Despite having defended my use of semi-structured interviews in chapter four, which 
was unmistakably the preferred methodology given the scope o f this thesis, I can, 
nevertheless, identify several methodological limitations within this piece of work.
I have relied on data obtained from a total of forty interviews, all chosen because of 
their connections with radioactive waste disposal and endocrine disruption. However,
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given a longer research period and more resources, a wider set of interviewees would 
have been approachable. Despite having approached specific chemical companies for 
interviews none of them were able to meet with me. This has meant that many of the 
chemical manufacturers’ voices have been derived from documented material. This in 
itself has limits, as discussed in chapter four, due to the selective nature of what is 
recorded and what is left out.
In order to get other perspectives on how people see these issues, and thereby on how 
decisions could be made, it might have been possible to set up either a number of 
focus groups or a citizens’ panel. These would have given the thesis a completely 
different viewpoint. I considered focus groups impossible due to the geographical 
distribution of the individuals involved and the expense of arranging for corporate 
representatives, government officers, campaigners and councillors to be at the same 
location at the same time. However, given a larger budget and access to all the 
individuals and organisations required, such a study could provide much richer data 
than obtained through interviews such as conducted for my thesis. Further benefits 
could possibly be obtained through organising a citizens’ jury, especially if  any 
decision reached by such a jury was fed directly into a policy-making process. Such a 
jury would need to have access to all the witnesses they requested in order to meet 
their demands for technical, scientific and philosophical information. This in itself 
would prove costly, but such a fora could potentially reveal multiple interpretations of 
key issues about interests, scientific evidence, uncertainty and precaution.
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Implications of the Thesis
In this section I evaluate the importance o f this thesis by showing the different areas to 
which this research contributes.
I break this section into three parts in order to distinguish between the implications of 
the thesis for different audiences. Firstly, I look at the implications for an academic 
audience and here I discuss the way in which the theory I started with has changed as 
a result o f my research work. I discuss these implications in terms of interests theory, 
scientific evidence and most relevantly, the precautionary principle. Secondly, I look 
at the implications of my work for Friends of the Earth and I discuss the way in which 
this research might impact on their own campaigning with regard the precautionary 
principle. Finally, I look at the implications for a corporate audience, discussing the 
impact that these insights might have on future policy-making. Each of these 
audiences will read this thesis with a different aim in mind. Even readers have 
institutional and disciplinary interests, a point I addressed in the previous section on 
limitations of my research under the sub-heading of being reflexive.
Implications for an academic audience
Initially I started out with the idea that I would discover how exactly the precautionary 
principle could be implemented in practice. I believed that by undertaking a number 
of case studies I would leam how decisions based on precaution were made and that I 
would be able to create a determinate list o f criteria whereby the precautionary 
principle could be applied to other environmental problem areas. I soon reasoned that
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this was not to be. For a start, deliberations about the precautionary principle itself 
were not significant parts of the deliberations involved in the case studies. Rather it 
was the issues behind the rhetorical notion of precaution that were significant 
components of the deliberations. By showing that each problem has its own unique 
set of characteristics it became apparent that there could be no uniform guidelines for 
implementing precaution. By identifying the key players within debates around my 
case studies and reviewing the way in which they all used science as evidence I 
showed that institutional, disciplinary and social interests play a determining role in 
decision outcomes. Implications can be drawn from this with regard to future 
academic research. I found interests theory a useful theoretical basis for my work as it 
offered a model of how knowledge is determined and decisions made. I developed 
this typically static approach through an analysis of the careers of two key 
environmental issues. This work could provide a benchmark from which further 
research could be developed into the dynamics of interest formation.
In this thesis I did not set out to test interests theory or to apply it to a new situation 
but rather rediscovered it through analysis of my empirical data. Despite theory in the 
sociology of scientific knowledge having moved on from the heyday of interests 
approaches as developed in the 1970s, these ideas can still be put to use, and as my 
case studies show, contemporary applications can be revealing.
My research has concluded that the development and emergence of a problem, the 
widespread nature of a problem, whether or not a clear ‘industry’ exists in relation to 
the problem, and the extent of institutionalisation and decision-making structures are 
all factors o f significance that bear on implementing the precautionary principle. Any
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subsequent research into the precautionary principle should be undertaken with this in 
mind.
Finally I want to talk about the academic implications o f my research in terms of what 
it means for the precautionary principle itself. Is the precautionary principle any more 
‘implementable’ due to this research? Have I shown the precautionary principle to be 
nothing other than a rhetorical device? I have demonstrated that decision-making 
frameworks generate contrasting interpretations of precaution and that there is no one 
principle to implement. This conclusion highlights the significance of decision­
making processes and lends support to those who argue for their re-organisation.
Further academic research into ‘the precautionary principle’ should start from a 
position where it is not reified, as this creates major blocks to understanding and 
analysis. It is necessary to move beyond the notion that it is one principle that is 
applicable to many situations and to understand that it embodies several elements, 
each of which are significant factors in already ongoing deliberation. Taken further, 
this thesis identifies the need to better understand decision-making structures, as it is 
at this level that a more structured framework may be applicable. This would move 
research away from particular environmental issues and would perhaps identify social 
and political structures that could be applied more broadly in different environmental 
contexts.
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Implications for Friends of the Earth
The second audience for which this thesis has implications is Friends of the Earth due 
to the fact that they were the collaborative body associated with my CASE award.
The factors that are of importance to them are somewhat different to those that are 
relevant to an academic audience. Because Friends of the Earth is an environmental 
campaigning organisation they will be interested in what the thesis concludes about 
the precautionary principle in practice, what it says about the case studies undertaken 
and how its results and conclusions can be used from a campaigning perspective.
That I have concluded that there can be no absolute set of criteria whereby the 
precautionary principle can be said to have been implemented and that it only comes 
into being as it is put into practice is of great significance to Friends of the Earth, 
especially as it follows from the revelation that the players involved determine the 
debate about each environmental issue under consideration and the form and shape it 
takes. This means that Friends of the Earth’s role as campaigners is all the more 
significant. If they are early players in helping shape what are seen to be significant 
factors within a contentious field they will influence the direction the debate takes. If 
scientific evidence is continually used as a deciding factor in decision-making then 
Friends of the Earth will find itself attempting to invoke the precautionary principle, 
and constantly justifying its position through recourse to scientific evidence. My 
conclusion that what is required to ‘operationalise’ the precautionary principle 
changes over time and from case to case, that the mix of interests is central to the 
decision-making process, and that uses and definitions of scientific evidence and 
uncertainty are contextual, will put Friends of the Earth in a much stronger
campaigning position. This is because they currently share the perspective that 
greater scientific knowledge minimises the level of uncertainty contained within it. 
By playing within this conventional framework the scope of Friends of the Earth to 
advance alternative ways o f looking at a problem is limited. They also play the game 
of using science in an unproblematic way (despite challenging the science that is 
presented by their opposition). A framework that admitted the value laden content of 
all knowledge would allow Friends of the Earth to advance arguments about fairness, 
justice, equity and need.
Additionally, Friends of the Earth should take note of the finding that the 
precautionary principle is not one particular thing that can be applied in various 
situations. By working to change the structures and fora in which deliberations take 
place, they will be in a better position to alter the decision outcomes. Invoking a 
reified precautionary principle does nothing to advance their position on an 
environmental issue. With specific reference to the two case studies the NGOs made 
the progress they did by working within the deliberative structures available. By 
working to change those deliberative structures to make them more inclusive and to 
include wider concepts than scientific evidence they will increase the possibility of 
achieving their objectives.
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Implications for a policy audience
The third audience for whom my thesis has implications is the policy world. This 
includes government and business. The relevance is that it challenges the current 
status quo in decision-making and implies that factors other than quantifiable 
scientific criteria may be important.
For business this has large implications. The business world operates within 
identifiable structures of decision-making bounded by their own business and 
company arrangements, legal regulations and legislation and economic factors 
including the market place. They tend to be responsive to calls for environmental 
protection if such calls are justified in scientific or economic terms, that is, terms that 
are quantifiable. My conclusion that precaution is an essentially contested subject and 
that decision-making must go beyond science runs against what the corporate world 
has come to expect and accept. The current position whereby each environmental 
issue (or potential environmental issue) is looked at in isolation puts corporations in a 
powerful position especially since the burden of proof is not on them currently. 
Creating decision-making frameworks that accepted issues of judgement, equity and 
need as relevant, would mean that corporations would be required to move their line 
of arguments from what they see as the objective scientific sphere, and start to engage 
openly in a much wider debate.
For government there are further implications. Both the European Commission and 
the UK government have been struggling to find an interpretation of the precautionary 
principle that they can implement. There is a clear tension between what policy
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makers want in terms of an implementable precautionary principle and what this thesis 
demonstrates to be the way forward. Often, policy makers want a categorical 
‘precautionary principle’ that can be applied in multiple situations whereas this thesis 
shows that it is the themes that lie behind rhetorical precaution, namely those of 
evidence, uncertainty and problem definition, that are relevant when looking at real 
environmental problems. Policy makers still discuss ‘the precautionary principle’ in 
reified terms because they want something that can be applied in various situations 
and which will produce results. The way forward for a more generalisable 
‘precautionary principle’ is to look at deliberative processes more broadly, to accept 
that it is the interests and values of those involved in making decisions that determine 
outcomes and to consider whether specific deliberative frameworks could be 
established that can be extrapolated from one situation to another. This may be a 
more time intensive route but attempting to find a blanket set of criteria to apply to a 
multitude of situations will prove futile. A detailed discussion of how to 
operationalise of this suggestion is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless it is 
clear that the central issues of accepted and contested knowledge, of interests, and of 









This list o f national and international agreements which incorporate the ethos of 
precautionary action has been put together by reviewing literature that refers to the 
precautionary principle. I have followed up citations that refer to agreements invoking 
the precautionary principle and have made use o f lists compiled by others, particularly
1 'y
Young and Haigh. It is arranged in chronological order.
EC Council Decision 80/372 concerning CFCs in the environment - April 1980. 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, March 1985.
Preamble to the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection o f the 
Ozone Layer on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987. 
Ministerial Declaration, Second International Conference on the Protection of the 
North Sea, (London Declaration), 24-25 November 1987.
Inputs of Dangerous Substances to Water: Proposals for a Unified System of Control 
-Departm ent of the Environment/Welsh Office, July 1988.
The Paris Commission (PARCOM) established by the Convention for the Prevention 
of Marine Pollution from Land Based Sources, 22 June 1989, Recommendation 89/1. 
Sixth Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection o f the 
Mediterranean Sea against Pollution (Barcelona Convention), October 1989.
Nordic Council, International Conference on Pollution of the Seas, October 1989.
UK Government White Paper, Command 1200 ‘This Common Inheritance: Britain’s 
Environmental Strategy’ 1990.
1 Young, M.D. (1993). For our children's children: some practical implications o f  inter-generational 
equality and theprecautionaiy principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. 
November 1993.
2 Haigh, N. (1994). The introduction o f the precautionary principle into the UK. In, O’Riordan, T. and 
Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the Precautionaiy Principle:229-251. London: Earthscan Publications 
Ltd.; Haigh, N. (1993). The precautionaiy principle in British environmental policy. London: Institute 
for European Environmental Policy.
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Preamble of the Final Declaration o f The Third International Conference on the 
Protection of the North Sea - Hague Declaration, 7-8 March 1990 .
Bergen Ministerial Declaration (ECE), 16 May 1990.
Fifty-second Ordinary Session of the Council o f Ministers of the Organisation of 
African Unity, Addis Ababa, 3-7 July 1990.
Houston Declaration, 11 July 1990.
UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), Ministerial 
Conference on the Environment, Declaration on Environmentally Sound and 
Sustainable Development in Asia and the Pacific, October 1990.
The Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, 7 
November 1990.
OAU Pan African Co-ordinating Conference on Environment and Sustainable 
Development, (The Bamako Convention, article 4, paragraph 3), Bamako, Mali, 30 
January 1991.
OECD Council Recommendation C(90)164 on Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control - January 1991.
Caring for the Earth (1991) IUCN-UNEP-WWF.
South Pacific Environment Ministers Declaration, 9 July 1991.
Australian ESD Intersectoral Issues Report, 1992, p40.
Report of the Fisheries Task Force to the Minister of Fisheries an the Review of 
Fisheries Legislation, New Zealand 1992.
“Maastricht Treaty”, Treaty on European Union, signed February 1992 (in force from 
November 1993), Article 130r (2).
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Agenda 21, 
Rio Declaration, June 1992.
Framework Convention on Climate Change - June 1992.
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 16th report -  Freshwater Quality, 
paragraph 1.24, June 1992.
Ministerial Meeting of the Oslo and Paris Commissions: Convention for the Protection 
of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Article 2(2)(a), Paris, 21-22 
September 1992.
OECD Secretariat draft guidelines for minimising the negative environmental effects 
o f trade policies, November 1992.
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) Governing Council Decision 15/27, 
15th Session.
UK Strategy for Sustainable Development, consultation paper, paragraph 1.20 -  
Department o f the Environment, July 1993.
International Joint Commission Seventh Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water 
Quality, 1994.
Sustainable Development: The UK Strategy -  Command Paper 2426, 1994.
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The following expands the above list to include the text referring to precaution:
EC Council Decision 80/372 concerning CFCs in the environment - April 1980: 
“Whereas, in accordance with the common position o f Member States 
of 6 December 1978 and in accordance with recommendation IE of the 
Munich Conference, a significant reduction should, as a precautionary 
measure, be achieved in the next few years in the use of 
chlorofluorocarbons giving rise to emissions.”3
Vienna Convention for the Protection o f the Ozone Layer, March 1985:
“Mindful also o f the precautionary measures for the protection o f the 
ozone layer which have already been taken at the national and 
international levels.”4
Preamble to the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection o f the 
Ozone Layer on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987:
“[The parties are] determined to protect the ozone layer by taking 
precautionary measures to control equitably total global emissions o f 
substances that deplete it, with the ultimate objective of their 
elimination on the basis of developments in scientific knowledge, 
taking into account technical and economic considerations”5
3 Quoted in Haigh, N. (1993). The precautionaiy principle in British environmental policy. London: 
Institute for European Environmental Policy.
4 Quoted in Haigh, N. (1994). The introduction o f the precautionary principle into the UK. In, 
O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the Precautionaiy Principle.229-251. London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd. p243
5 Quoted in Young, M.D. (1993). For our children's children: some practical implications o f  inter- 
generational equality' and the precautionaiy principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing
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Ministerial Declaration, Second International Conference on the Protection of the 
North Sea, (London Declaration), 24-25 November 1987:
in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of 
the most dangerous substances a precautionary approach is necessary 
which may require action to control inputs of such substances even 
before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific 
evidence;... [the parties] [tjherefore agree to accept the principle of 
safeguarding the marine ecosystem of the North Sea by reducing 
polluting emissions of substances that are persistent, toxic and liable to 
bioaccumulate at source by the use of best available technology and 
other appropriate measures. This applies especially when there is 
reason to assume that certain damage or harmful effects on the living 
resources of the sea are likely to be caused by such substances, even 
where there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between 
emissions and effects (“the principle of precautionary action”).”6 
Inputs o f Dangerous Substances to Water: Proposals for a Unified System of Control 
-  Department o f the Environment/Welsh Office, July 1988:
‘In addition, for those substances which represent the greatest threat to 
the environment, the Government considers it is necessary to ago 
further by seeking to minimise inputs to all parts of the environment as 
part o f a more precautionary approach to water pollution’.7
Service. November 1993. p43
6 Quoted in Cameron, J. and Abouchar, J. (1991). The Precautionary Principle: a fundamental principle 
o f law and policy for the protection o f the global environment. Boston College International and  
Comparative Law Review  14, (1): 1-27. p5
7 Quoted in Haigh, N. (1994). The introduction o f the precautionary principle into the UK. In, 
O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle:229-25 \ . London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd. p247
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The Paris Commission (PARCOM) established by the Convention for the Prevention 
of Marine Pollution from Land Based Sources, 22 June 1989, Recommendation 89/1: 
“[The contracting parties] accept the principle of safeguarding the 
marine ecosystem of the Paris Convention area by reducing at source 
polluting emissions o f substances that are persistent, toxic and liable to 
bioaccumulate by the use o f best available technology and other 
appropriate measures. This applies especially when there is reason to 
assume that certain damage or harmful effects on the living resources 
o f the sea are likely to be caused by such substances, even when there 
is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between the emissions 
and effects (“the principle of precautionary action”) ...”8 
Sixth Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea against Pollution (Barcelona Convention), October 1989:
“[Contracting parties agreejto fully adopt the principle of precautionary 
approach regarding the prevention and elimination o f contamination in 
the Mediterranean Sea area ...”9
Nordic Council, International Conference on Pollution of the Seas, October 1989: 
‘[The signatories take into account] the need for an effective 
precautionary approach, with that important principle intended to 
safeguard the marine ecosystem by, amongst other things, eliminating 
and preventing pollution emissions where there is reason to believe that
8 Quoted in Cameron, J. and Abouchar, J. (1991). The Precautionaiy Principle: a fundamental principle 
o f law and policy for the protection o f the global environment. Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review  14, (1): 1-27. p i 5
9 Quoted in Cameron, J. and Abouchar, J. (1991). The Precautionary Principle: a fundamental principle
o f law and policy for the protection o f the global environment. Boston College International and
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damage or harmful effects are likely to be caused, even where there is 
inadequate or inconclusive scientific evidence to prove a causal link 
between emissions and effects.’10
UK Government White Paper, Command 1200 ‘This Common Inheritance: Britain’s 
Environmental Strategy’ 1990:
given the environmental risks, we must act responsibly and be 
prepared to take precautionary action where it is justified. ... Where 
there are significant risks of damage to the environment, the 
Government will be prepared to take precautionary action to limit the 
use o f potentially dangerous materials or the spread of potentially 
dangerous pollutants, even where scientific knowledge is not 
conclusive, if  the balance of likely costs and benefits justifies it. This 
precautionary principle applies particularly where there are good 
grounds forjudging either that action taken promptly at comparatively 
low cost may avoid more costly damage later, or that irreversible 
effects may follow if  action is delayed.’11
Preamble of the Final Declaration o f The Third International Conference on the 
Protection of the North Sea - Hague Declaration, 7-8 March 1990 :
“[parties]will continue to apply the precautionary principle, that is to 
take action to avoid potentially damaging impacts of substances that
Comparative Law Review  14, (1): 1-27. p l5
10 Quoted in Cameron, J. and Abouchar, J. (1991). The Precautionary Principle: a fundamental principle 
o f  law and policy for the protection o f  the global environment. Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review  14, (1): 1-27. p l6
11 Command Paper 2100 (1990). This common inheritance. London: HMSO. September 1990. p lO & ll
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are persistent, toxic and liable to bioaccumulate even when there is no 
scientific evidence to prove a causal link between emissions and 
effects.”12
Bergen Ministerial Declaration (ECE), 16 May 1990:
“In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based 
on the precautionary principle. Environmental measures must 
anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack o f full 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.”13
Fifty-second Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers o f the Organisation of 
African Unity, Addis Ababa, 3-7 July 1990.14
Houston Declaration, 11 July 1990:
“We agree that, in the face of threats of irreversible environmental 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty is no excuse to postpone 
actions which are justified in their own right.”15
12 Quoted in Cameron, J. and Abouchar, J. (1991). The Precautionary Principle: a fundamental principle 
o f law and policy for the protection o f  the global environment. Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review  14, (1): 1-27. p 16
13 Quoted in Young, M.D. (1993). For our children's children: some practical implications o f  inter- 
generational equality and the precautionaiy principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service. November 1993. p40
14 Cited in Freestone, D. (1991). The Precautionary Principle. In, Churchill, R. and Freestone, D., (eds), 
International Law and Global Climate Change:2\-39. London: Graham and Trotman / Matinur Nijhoff. 
p29
15 Quoted in Young, M.D. (1993). For our children's children: some practical implications o f  inter- 
generational equality’ and the precautionaiy principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service. November 1993. p40
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UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), Ministerial 
Conference on the Environment, Declaration on Environmentally Sound and 
Sustainable Development in Asia and the Pacific, October 1990:
‘[We are] deeply concerned about the threat to environmentally sound 
and sustainable development due to economic degradations and the 
depletion of natural resources in the ESCAP region,.. [and we]
[b]elieve that, in order to achieve sustainable development, policies 
must be based on the precautionary principle.’16
The Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, 7 
November 1990:
“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost- 
effective measures to prevent such environmental degradation. The 
measures adopted should take into account different socio-economic 
contexts.”17
OAU Pan African Co-ordinating Conference on Environment and Sustainable 
Development, (The Bamako Convention, article 4, paragraph 3), Bamako, Mali, 30 
January 1991:
‘Waste generation in Africa -  The adoption of precautionary measures:
(f) Each Party shall strive to adopt and implement the preventive,
16 Quoted in Freestone, D. (1991). The Precautionary Principle. In, Churchill, R. and Freestone, D., 
(eds), International Law and Global Climate Change:21-39. London: Graham and Trotman / Matinur 
Nijhoff. p29-30
17 Quoted in Young, M.D. (1993). For our children’s children: some practical implications o f  inter- 
generational equality and the precautionaiy principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing
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precautionary approach to pollution problems which entails, inter alia, 
preventing the release into the environment of substances which may 
cause harm to humans or the environment without waiting for scientific 
proof regarding such harm. The parties shall cooperate with each other 
in taking the appropriate measures to implement the precautionary 
principle to pollution prevention through the application of clean 
production methods, rather than the pursuit o f a permissible emissions 
approach based on assimilative capacity assumptions.’18
OECD Council Recommendation C(90)164 on Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control - January 1991:
“the absence of complete information should not preclude 
precautionary action to mitigate the risk o f significant harm to the
, , 1 9environment.
Caring for the Earth (1991) IUCN-UNEP-WWF:
“All governments should adopt the precautionary principle. This 
means minimising, and where possible, preventing discharges of 
substances that could be harmful.”20
South Pacific Environment Ministers Declaration, 9 July 1991:
Service. November 1993. p41
18 Quoted in Freestone, D. (1991). The Precautionary Principle. In, Churchill, R. and Freestone, D., 
(eds), Internationa! Law and Global Climate Change:21-39. London: Graham and Trotman /  Matinur 
Nijhoff. p29
19 Quoted in Haigh, N. (1994). The introduction o f the precautionary principle into the UK. In, 
O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle:229-251. London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd. p245
20 Quoted in Young, M.D. (1993). For our children’s children: some practical implications o f  inter- 
generational equality> and the precautionaiy principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service. November 1993. p42
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“Declare our commitment to work individually and collectively, 
including through SPREP, to achieve sustainable development in the 
South Pacific region, in particular by making every effort to ... 
formulate resource and development planning policies which take into 
account the precautionary principle”.21
Australian ESD Intersectoral Issues Report, 1992, p40:
“Dealing cautiously with risk implies that where considerable 
uncertainty surrounds a proposed action, the decision should lean on 
the side of caution. This does not mean that development should not 
proceed whenever we cannot be certain o f its ecological impact. It 
does mean that the need for particular caution needs to influence the 
balance between a need to preserve natural capital and a need to 
proceed.”22
Report o f the Fisheries Task Force to the Minister of Fisheries an the Review of 
Fisheries Legislation, New Zealand 1992:
“We propose that the statute contain a set o f environmental principles 
which cover such matters as consideration o f ... avoidance of the risk 
of significant irreversible change, and allowance for major impacts and 
scientific uncertainties.”23
21 Quoted in Young, M.D. (1993). For our children's children: some practical implications o f  inter- 
generational equality> and the precautionary principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service. November 1993. p40
22 Quoted in Yoimg, M.D. (1993). For our children's children: some practical implications o f  inter- 
generational equality> and the precautionaiy principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service. November 1993. p42
2'’ Quoted in Young, M.D. (1993). For our children's children: some practical implications o f  inter-
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“Maastricht Treaty”, Treaty on European Union, signed February 1992 (in force from 
November 1993), Article 130r (2):
“Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of 
protection taking into account the diversity o f situations in the various 
regions of the Community. It shall be based on the precautionary 
principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, 
that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source 
and that the polluter should pay. Environmental protection 
requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation 
of other Community policies.”24
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Agenda 21, 
Rio Declaration, June 1992:
“Principle 15: In order to protect the environment, the precautionary 
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their 
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.”25
generational equality> and the precautionaiy principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service. November 1993. p42
24 Quoted in Young, M.D. (1993). For our children's children: some practical implications o f  inter- 
generational equality’ and the precautionary’ principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service. November 1993. p42 and Haigh, N. (1994). The introduction o f  the precautionary principle 
into the UK. In, O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle:229- 
251. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd. p245
25 Quoted in Young, M.D. (1993). For our children's children: some practical implications o f  inter- 
generational equality* and the precautionaiy principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service. November 1993. p41-42 and Haigh, N. (1994). The introduction o f the precautionary principle 
into the UK. In, O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the Precautionaiy Principle:229- 
251. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd. p245-246
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Framework Convention on Climate Change - June 1992:
“Article 3: the parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, 
prevent or minimise the causes of climate change and mitigate its 
adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason 
for postponing such measures...”26
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 16th report -  Freshwater Quality, 
paragraph 1.24, June 1992:
‘Fifthly, a precautionary approach to pollution control should be 
maintained.’27
Ministerial Meeting of the Oslo and Paris Commissions: Convention for the Protection 
of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Article 2(2)(a), Paris, 21-22 
September 1992:
“[The Contracting Parties shall apply] the precautionary principle, by 
virtue of which preventive measures are to be taken when there are 
reasonable grounds for concern that substances or energy introduced, 
directly or indirectly, into the marine environment may bring about 
hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems, 
damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, 
even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship
26 Quoted in Haigh, N. (1994). The introduction o f the precautionary principle into the UK. In, 
O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the Precautionaiy Principle:229-251. London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd. p246
27 Quoted in Haigh, N. (1994). The introduction o f the precautionary principle into the UK. In, 
O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the Precautionaiy Principle:229-25l. London:
314
between the inputs and the effects.”28
OECD Secretariat draft guidelines for minimising the negative environmental effects 
o f trade policies, November 1992:
“The following are environmental concepts and principles relating to 
standards for consideration by trade policy makers. ...precautionary 
principle - the absence of full scientific information should not 
constitute an obstacle to the adoption of environmental standards or
90environmental measures.”
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) Governing Council Decision 15/27,
15 th Session:
“Recognising that waiting for scientific proof regarding the impact of 
pollutants discharged into the marine environment may result in 
irreversible damage to the marine environment and in human suffering 
... [the Governing Council] recommends that all the governments adopt 
the ‘principle of precautionary action’ as the basis of their policy with 
regard to prevention and elimination of marine pollution ...”30
UK Strategy for Sustainable Development, consultation paper, paragraph 1.20 -  
Department of the Environment, July 1993:
Earthscan Publications Ltd. p250
28 Oslo and Paris Commissions (OSPAR) (1992). Ministerial meeting o f  the Oslo and Paris 
Commissions. Paris: OSPAR. 21-22 September 1992. p84
29 Quoted in Young, M.D. (1993). For our children’s children: some practical implications o f  inter- 
generational equality and the pr'ecautionaiy principle. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service. November 1993.
30 Quoted in Cameron, J. and Abouchar, J. (1991). The Precautionary Principle: a fundamental principle
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‘Where appropriate(for example, where there is uncertainty combined 
with the possibility of the irreversible loss o f valued resources), actions 
should be based on the so-called ‘precautionary principle’ if  the 
balance of likely costs and benefits justifies it. Even then the action 
should be in proportion to the risk.’31
International Joint Commission Seventh Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water 
Quality, 1994:
‘Precaution in the introduction and continued use of chemicals 
substances in commerce is a basic underpinning of the proposed virtual 
eliminations strategy. It is generally agreed, in principle, that the 
burden of proof concerning the ‘safety’ o f chemicals should lie with 
the proponent for the manufacture, import or use of at least new 
substances ... rather than with society as a whole to provide absolute 
proof of adverse impacts. ... This principle should ... be adopted for all 
human-made chemicals shown or reasonably suspected to be persistent 
and toxic... The onus should be on the producers and users of any 
suspected persistent toxic substance to prove that it is, in fact, both 
‘safe’ and necessary .,.’32
Sustainable Development: The UK Strategy -  Command Paper 2426, 1994:
o f law and policy for the protection o f the global environment. Boston College International and  
Comparative Law Review  14, (1): 1-27. p l4
31 Quoted in Haigh, N. (1994). The introduction o f the precautionary principle into the UK. In, 
O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., (eds), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle\229-25 \ . London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd. p251
32 International Joint Commission (1994). Seventh Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water Quality: 
International Joint Commission. 1994. p9
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‘when potential damage to the environment is both uncertain and 
significant, it is necessary to act on the basis o f the precautionary 
principle.’33





NAME/ JOB TITLE REPRESENTING... INTERVIEWED
Campaigner North Lakes Friends 
of the Earth
1 October 1996
Head o f Radioactive Substances Division Department of the 
Environment
16 October 1996
District Councillor Gosforth Parish 
Council
18 November 1996
Drigg resident Ex Copeland District 
Councillor,
Ex Secretary for the 
Six Parish Councils, 









Environmental Planning Manager Cumbria County 
Council
20 November 1996
Senior Scientist Greenpeace 26 November 1996
Computer Modeller National Radiological 
Protection Board
27 November 1996
Dr Gordon McKerron 
Science Policy Research Unit
University of Sussex 28 November 1996
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Dr Frans Berkhout 
Science Policy Research Unit
University of Sussex 28 November 1996
Geosciences Group Leader QuantiSci 29 November 1996
Harold Bolter 
Ex-Director BNFL
Author of ‘Inside 
Sellafield’
3 December 1996
Convenor of the British Government 
Panel on Sustainable Development
Oxford University 10 December 1996
Research, Development and Strategy 
Manager
UKAEA 10 December 1996
Waste and Effluent Treatment Director BNFL 12 December 1996
Sellafield Site Inspector Environment Agency 16 December 1996
Chief Executive UK Nirex Ltd 7 January 1997
Senior Nuclear Research Officer Friends of the Earth Many occasions
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Endocrine Disruption
NAME/ JOB TITLE REPRESENTING... INTERVIEWED
Dr Vyvyan Howard





Head of Food Contaminants Division, 
Food Safety and Science Group
MAFF 8 April 1997
Head of Environmental Contaminants in 
Food, Food Contaminants Division
MAFF 8 April 1997
Campaigner Number 1 Greenpeace 9 April 1997
Campaigner Number 2 Greenpeace 9 April 1997








Senior Scientist Thames Water 
Authority
10 April 1997
Head of Research Friends of the Earth 
Scotland
16 April 1997
Campaigner Friends o f the Earth 
Scotland
16 April 1997
Regional Scientist Environment Agency 23 April 1997
R&D Management Support Officer Environment Agency 23 April 1997
Dr Charles Tyler
Department of Biology and Biochemistry
Brunei University 24 April 1997
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Head of Chemicals and Health Branch Department of the 
Environment
25 April 1997
Dr Charles Humfrey Institute of 
Environmental Health
2 May 1997
Industry and Pollution Researcher Friends o f the Earth 16 May 1997 and 
many occasions






Dr Carlos Sonnenschein TUFTS University, 
Boston
7 July 1997
Dr Ana Soto TUFTS University, 
Boston
7 July 1997
Special Assistant to the Director, 











Lawyer Environmental Law 
Clinic, New Orleans
11 July 1997




Campaigner Greenpeace, New 
Orleans
12 July 1997














Groups and Their Interests and 
Responsibilities with Regard to Endocrine 
Disrupting Chemicals
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A great range of individuals and groups have been involved in debates about 
endocrine disrupting chemicals, some through a legal requirement to be involved and 
others through specific interests. In this appendix I identify who many of these are 
and establish what their interests and responsibilities are.
a) The Department of the Environment (DoE) has policy responsibilities to protect 
the natural and man-made environment, to maintain air, water and soil quality, and to 
protect human health from exposure to hazardous substances via environmental 
pathways. The DoE is responsible for assessing the risks currently posed by 
oestrogenic chemicals in the environment to human health and wildlife and whether 
current controls are adequate.
b) The Department of Health acts as an advisor to other governmental departments in 
order to guide research and policy decisions. They are not directly involved in the 
implementation of policy or the funding of research in the area of endocrine 
disruption although they do have close links with the Medical Research Council 
which promotes and supports research into environmental oestrogens at its various 
units including the Institute for Environment and Health in Leicester which produced 
an assessment of environmental oestrogens.
c) The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) is involved in measuring 
the levels of chemicals in food and develops analytical techniques and determines the 
average and high level exposure to environmental oestrogens. MAFF, with its 
interest in fisheries, has been investigating the oestrogenic effects in wildlife of 
sewage effluent discharge. To date, almost all discharges investigated have proved to
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be oestrogenic to fish, as measured by the induction of vitellogenin. One o f their 
areas of concern is the lack o f knowledge of the effects of environmental oestrogens 
at current levels on aquatic populations and they also plan to investigate marine 
populations.
d) The Health and Safety Executive is interested in the reproductive effects of 
occupational chemicals and in investigating animal models to look for biomarkers of 
toxicity.
e) The Environment Agency is responsible for protecting controlled water from 
polluting discharges and has a statutory duty to carry out research and development to 
support its main functions. It supports work at MAFF and Brunei University and has 
a number of ongoing projects including studies to identify and quantify the 
substances in sewage effluent, which are responsible for vitellogenic responses in 
fish, and a study aimed at assessing oestrogenic effects in wild fish. They plan 
further laboratory and field investigations and the development and recommendation 
of environmental quality standards followed by the assessment of compliance.
f) The Chemicals Industries Association (CIA) represents 200 of the UK’s leading 
chemical producers and it addresses product regulatory issues including health, safety 
and the environment, science and education issues and employee relations. It is 
concerned about potential endocrine disrupting effects of chemicals but feels that 
current evidence is not conclusive with respect to human reproductive health 
problems and the possible causal factors.
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g) The European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) covers all major European 
chemicals companies and has established an Endocrine Modulators Steering Group 
(EMSG) which is committed to clarifying and understanding the issues and to the 
elimination of unsustainable impacts on man or the environment.
h) The British Plastics Federation covers about 4000 firms in the UK most of which 
are plastics users. It believes that the science is at an early stage with conflicting data 
but it is keen to support CEFIC and other research initiatives.
i) The World Wide Fund for Nature has been very active in the field o f endocrine 
disruption. It has published a book1 and a number of reports2 and is funding some 
basic research by MAFF into the effect of oestrogenic pollutants on fish populations. 
They believe that the precautionary principle should be applied now to reduce 
environmental and human exposure and that accurate no-observable-adverse-effect- 
levels need to be established, especially for behavioural effects at very low levels of 
exposure. WWF considers that, under the Environment Act, environmental 
oestrogens should be classed as prescribed chemicals by application of BATNEEC3
1 Colbom, T., Peterson Myers, J., and Dumanoski, D. (1996). Our Stolen Future. London: Little, 
Brown and Company.
2 For example, WWF (1995). Atrazine: an organochlorine herbicide. Godalming: WWF. May 1995. 
WWF (1996). A framework convention fo r  the phase-out and elimination o f  POPs. Prepared fo r  the 
Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety Meetings on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Philippines. 
Gland, Switzerland: WWF. 17-22 June 1996.
WWF (1997). Overview o f  policy initiatives relating to endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs). 
Godalming: WWF. 5 May 1997.
WWF (undated). Policy options fo r  endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs) within the European 
Union. Godalming: WWF. undated.
WWF (undated). Lindane. Godalming: WWF. WWF (1996). Bisphenol A (BPA). Godalming: WWF. 
June 1996.
WWF (1996). Vinclozolin. Godalming: WWF. June 1996.
WWF (1996). Alkyl Phenol Ethoxylates (APEs) and related compounds. Godalming: WWF. June 
1996.
3 BATNEEC means Best Available Technology Not Exceeding Excessive Cost.
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and that regulators should set emission limits and look for areas of high and low 
contamination.
j) Greenpeace has been running a campaign against PVC and chlorine with the aim of 
seeing these banned. They believe that efforts should be concentrated on hazard 
identification and that current techniques should be examined to see if  they are 
applicable to environmental oestrogens. They also believe the risk arising from an 
inability to identity the causal agents should be considered.
k) Friends of the Earth and Friends of the Earth Scotland would also like the 
precautionary principle to be invoked with regard to endocrine disrupting chemicals. 
They highlight the need to develop an accurate inventory of industrial emissions, 
which they suggest should be carried out by the Environment Agency and SEP A, and 
more appropriate methodologies to assess the risk of new chemicals.
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